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iZusammenfassung
Diese Doktorarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Erforschung von so genannten mu-
tierenden Datenpfaden und ihrem Einsatz als Gegenmaßnahme gegen Leistungs-
analyseangriffe auf die Implementierungen von kryptographischen Algorithmen.
Mutierende Datenpfade sind konzeptionell Datenpfade einer Schaltung, welche
während der Laufzeit ihre Architektur ändern können ohne die Korrektheit des
implementierten Algorithmus zu kompromittieren. Das Konzept der mutieren-
den Datenpfade wird theoretisch in dieser Arbeit erforscht und anhand von
Anwendungsbeispielen in der Praxis erprobt. Zur praktischen Umsetzung wer-
den als Basisplattform FPGAs verwendet, weil die plattformspezifischen Eigen-
schaften das Kernkonzept der mutierenden Datenpfade geeignet unterstützen.
Leistungsanalyseangriffe gehören zur Klasse der passiven, nicht invasiven Im-
plementierungsangriffe. Diese Art von Angriff nutzt die Leistungsaufnahme einer
Implementierung zur Laufzeit aus, um geheime Parameter der kryptograph-
ischen Implementierung über ihr physikalisches Verhalten zu extrahieren. Bei
diesen Angriffen wird das Gerät mit der Implementierung des kryptographis-
chen Algorithmus im Normalbetrieb betrieben, so dass keine Spuren eines An-
griffs nach Beendigung der Analyse erkennbar sind. Essentiell für diesen An-
griff ist, dass der Widersacher weiss, welcher kryptographische Algorithmus im
Gerät implementiert ist und dass er neben der Leistungsaufnahme auch Zu-
griff auf die Eingabe- und Ausgabewerte hat. Ebenso ist essenziell, dass sich
das Gerät mit der Implementierung deterministisch verhält, so dass bei jeder
Prozedur im Normalbetrieb die Schaltung die gleichen Operationen mit unter-
schiedlichen Eingabewerten ausführt. Genau dort setzt das Konzept der mu-
tierenden Datenpfade an, um den Aufwand für einen solchen Implementierungsan-
griff unattraktiv für den Widersacher zu machen, da der zu betreibende Aufwand
zum Extrahieren des parameterspezifischen Geheimnis der Schaltung zu groß
oder gar unmöglich ist.
Im Gegensatz zu bisherigen Verschleierungs- oder Maskierungsmaßnahmen
setzt das Konzept der mutierenden Datenpfade auf eine Verwürfelung der Schal-
tungsarchitektur des Datenpfades, um so die physikalischen Eigenschaften der
Schaltung im Bezug auf die Leistungsaufnahme und die Ausführungszeit zu ran-
domisieren. Es werden nicht wie beim Maskierungsverfahren die zu verarbeit-
enden Daten für die interne Bearbeitung randomisiert, sondern das physikalisch
deterministische Verhalten der Schaltung manipuliert. Im Gegensatz zu manchen
anderen Verschleierungsverfahren, welche auch das physikalische Verhalten der
Schaltung verändern, wie bei Dual-Rail-Logic, ist die Änderung des physikalis-
chen Verhaltens bei den mutierenden Datenpfaden nicht statisch sondern ändert
sich kontinuierlich.
ii
Konservativ betrachtet, werden verschiedene Verschleierungskonzepte, wie
zum Beispiel Verwürfelung und Rauschgenerierung, genutzt um so einen mu-
tierenden Datenpfad zu erstellen. Durch die geschickte Integration der ver-
schiedenen Verfahren im Datenpfad können die verschiedenen Verschleierungs-
methoden effizient als Gegenmaßnahme in eine Implementierung eines kryp-
tographischen Algorithmus eingebettet werden. Zu diesem Zweck wird ein Ent-
wurfsvorgang zur Erstellung von mutierenden Datenpfaden vorgeschlagen und
diskutiert.
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Summary
This thesis deals with the study of so-called mutating data paths and their uti-
lization as a countermeasure against power analysis attacks on implementations
of cryptographic algorithms. Mutating data paths are conceptually data paths
of a circuit, which can change their architecture during runtime without compro-
mising the correctness of the implemented algorithm. The concept of mutating
data paths is investigated in this work theoretically and tested on the application
examples for use in practice. A FPGA is used as basis platform for the prac-
tical implementation, because the platform-specific properties support the core
concept of mutating data paths quite well.
Power analysis attacks belong to the class of passive, non-invasive imple-
mentation attacks. This type of attack uses the power consumption of an im-
plementation during runtime to extract secret parameters of the cryptographic
implementation by exploiting their physical behavior. For these kind of attacks,
the device is operated with the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm
in normal mode, so that no traces of the attack can be found after the analy-
sis. Essential for this attack is that the adversary knows, which cryptographic
algorithm is implemented on the device and that in addition he has access to
the power consumption as well as access to the input and output values. It is
also essential that the unit with the implementation behaves deterministically,
so that the circuit performs the same operations with different input values for
every execution in normal operation mode. Exactly at this spot the concept of
mutating data paths tries to increase the costs for such an implementation attack
in order to make it unattractive for the adversary. Thus, the additional effort to
extract the specific parameters of the circuit, being too much or infeasible.
Unlike previous hiding based countermeasures or masking countermeasures
the concept of the mutating data paths scramble the circuit of the architecture
of the data path, so as to randomize the physical characteristics of the circuit
in terms of power consumption and execution time. Instead of randomizing the
data for the internal operations, as it is done in case of masking based procedures,
the physical properties of the circuit are manipulated. The manipulation of the
physical behavior in case of applying mutant data paths is not static but changes
continuously, compared to other hiding techniques that also alter the physical
behavior of the circuit, for instance dual-rail logic.
Conservatively, various hiding concepts, such as shuﬄing and noise genera-
tion, are used to create such a mutating data path. By the skillful integration of
the various processes in the data path, the different hiding techniques are effec-
tively embedded as a countermeasure in an implementation of a cryptographic
algorithm. To this end, a design flow for the creation of mutant data paths is
proposed and discussed.
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Notation
Variable types:
x : Vector
X : Matrix
X : Random variable
x : Realization of X
x : Variable
Reserved identifier:
k : A secret key of a cryptographic algorithm
kc : The correct (actually used) key of a crypto algorithm
k(i) : The i-th subkey (a section) of the secret key k
kc(i) : The i-th correct (actually used) subkey of the secret key k
p : Plaintext of a encryption or decryption scheme
c : Ciphertext of an encryption or decryption scheme
GF(p) : Galois field over p
t : Certain time instant
R : Noise
Lt : Side-channel leakage at t
L˜t : Estimated side-channel leakage (based on hyotheses) at t
LMt : Leakage model at t
HW : Hamming wight model
HD : Hamming distance model
Fu : Vector subspace of dimension u
PLt : Exploitable power consumption at time t
POPt,A : Power consumption of operation A at t
PRt : Power consumption of the noise at t
σ : Standard deviation
µ : Mean value
Functions and operants:
E(x) : Expectation of x
Var(x) : Variance of x
Cov(X) : Covariance of X
LFt(·) : Leakage function
D(·) : Side-channel distinguisher
a ⊕ b : a xor b
a ∧ b : a and b
a ∨ b : a or b
¬a : invert a
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Motivation
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1.1 Security Sensitive Application for Embed-
ded Systems
In todays modern communication technology based society embedded electronic
devices get more and more into our daily life in order to make it more enjoyable.
The tasks of these embedded systems are various, starting from opening an
automatic garage door, over streaming video content to an entertainment system,
or collecting medical information of a patients body, to enabling us to withdraw
money at an ATM. Most of these tasks require to transfer data between different
components within the device or even between different devices. Due to the task
of the application the information contained in the transfered data between the
different devices is sensitive and has to be handled with caution. So that not any
device using the same medium of transportation or communication protocol can
just listen to the sensitive data, and thus, an adversary may be able to retrieve
the information in order to exploit them or abuse them for her or his own non
honorable intentions.
Theoretically this problem is solvable due to the area of cryptography. By
encapsulating the security sensitive application with an appropriate crypto sys-
tem only the enabled parties can utilize the sensitive information or can properly
and securely communicate with each other. Intently the challenge to implement
such applications into embedded devices was to cope with the computational
overhead in order to perform appropriate cryptographic operations on the data
that has to be protected. For some application areas, for instance real-time video
encryption or secure routing of network traffic, the density of data is rather high
and the small inexpensive processing units of micro-controller chips are unable to
process that amount of data in the given time period. According to the operation
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environment of some applications the usage of a personal computer or a cluster of
computers is not possible based on mobility aspects, the energy consumption, or
the heat generation. A proper solution to achieve more computational power in
small devices with a considerable power consumption is to design and implement
an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) for the required cryptographic
operations.
The fabrication of ASICs is only affordable for a market with a high sales
rate in order to compensate the production costs in a short time interval. There-
fore, the produced chips have to have a certain life cycle on the market in which
they provide the user with the designed security sensitive application with cryp-
tographic operations. In some application areas like video entertainment the
secured core applications, for instance video codec, are developing so fast, that
a life cycle of a special ASIC design is to short to be reasonable. The same
holds for communication devices in the military section, they also have a strong
demand of being able to update their gear to new and improved algorithms.
Therefore, ASIC implementations are not beneficial in these areas for hardware
based algorithm acceleration, so field programmable gate array (FPGA) based
systems are favored.
Since 1999 a new attacking method has to be considered for the design of se-
curity sensitive applications on embedded systems. These so-called side-channel
analysis attacks are used to reduce the mathematical problem of breaking a
cryptographic algorithm to a feasible effort, by investigating the implementation
of the cryptographic algorithm and exploiting design flaws to extract valuable
information of the algorithm’s secret. Therefore the adversary who is attacking
the implementation, observes the physical behavior of the implementation in the
device under attack while it is active in normal operation mode. Thereby, she or
he exploits for instance the data-dependent execution time, the data-dependent
power consumption or the data-dependent electromagnetic radiation of the im-
plementation under attack. Thus, the adversary needs physical access to the
device under attack in order to capture the emitted physical behavior and the
input and output of the cryptographic algorithm. The passive and non-invasive
conditions to mount such an attack make side-channel attacks so dangerous, be-
cause there may be no trace of a conducted attack on the device. Especially
power analysis attacks are one of the most popular class of side-channel attacks
and so are heavily investigated in academia as well as industry.
In the following the focus is put onto the power analysis attacks among the
side-channel attacks. In order to mount a power analysis attack the adversary
only needs a mid- to high-class oscilloscope (depending on the device under at-
tack) and a personal computer. The ability to execute such an attack does
not directly depend on the architectural properties of the device under attack.
Thus, micro-controller based systems, ASICs, as well as HW/SW-codesign based
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implementations may be vulnerable to such an attack, according to their imple-
mentation.
In the last decades a lot of research has been done in order to find effective
countermeasures against power analysis attacks. The proposed countermeasures
can be classified into the following two different classes: masking and hiding.
Both principles are either applied on the cell level or on the algorithmic level of
the implementations. But the better the countermeasures get, the more effective
attacks are developed, so that the head-to-head race proceeds. Even so specially
secured FPGAs for military applications are not perfectly secure against side-
channel attacks, cf. [SW12]. Thus, several countermeasures are applied in a
secured design to increase the effort of exploiting the data-dependent power con-
sumption. Therefore, embedded devices with security sensitive applications are
hardened against attacks on different levels preventing the leakage of exploitable
information at high costs.
Unfortunately, as mentioned before, there are nearly no countermeasures
against power analysis attacks on the architectural level between the algorithmic
based countermeasure in the software and countermeasures on the cell level in the
hardware. This rises the question if it is possible to integrate a suitable counter-
measure concept on the architectural level of hardware/software codesign based
implementations. Therefore, this thesis investigates the integration of several
hiding based countermeasures on the architecture of implemented cryptographic
algorithms. Furthermore a design flow for the so-called mutating data paths is
introduced and discussed. The core idea behind the principle of mutating data
paths is an architecture that varies during runtime, so that the functionality of
the algorithm is maintained, while the physical behavior of the implementation
changes non-deterministically.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The following second chapter provides the reader with an introduction to two
basic areas used in this thesis to investigate the concept of mutating runtime
architectures as a countermeasure against power analysis attacks. At first the
structure of the used field programmable gate array based devices is introduced
as well as its vendor specific design. The second section of Chapter 2 provides the
reader with an introduction into side-channel analysis with the focus on power
analysis. It is introduced how the data-dependent power consumption may be
exploited to reveal secret parameters of a cryptographic implementation. Also,
different power analysis attacks and different countermeasure techniques against
such attacks are discussed shortly.
4 Chapter 1. Motivation
Chapter 3 describes the key concept that is investigated in this thesis. The
concept of mutating data paths is described and discussed in theory. The con-
cept of the mutating data path countermeasures is compared with the existing
concepts of countermeasures and their application on the circuit. First a general
overview over the fundamental principle on the mode of action of mutating data
paths with respect to countermeasures against power attacks is presented. In
this context the essential properties of a data path structure is discussed to be
randomized during runtime in order to hinder an adversary to extract any ex-
ploitable power consumption from the implementation. Three different mutating
methods are introduced section-wise to design a mutating data path in general.
The methods are discussed in terms of the design specific properties, the effect
on the exploitable power consumption signature, and their application, which is
illustrated on small examples. At the end of the third chapter the design flow of
generating a mutating data path is described based on the previously introduced
mutating methods.
Chapter 4 is the core chapter about the side-channel analysis methods used
to evaluate the mutating data path countermeasure. The theoretic concept of
exploitable side-channel leakage is discussed in the first section of this chapter
as well as the modeling of hypothesis to exploit the power consumption of a
design via side-channel analysis attacks. The concept of constructive side-channel
analysis is used as a fundament for the side-channel evaluation, therefore the
concept of constructive side-channel analysis is introduced in this chapter as well.
At the end of Chapter 4 a new signal-to-noise metric, based on the intermediate
results of the methods of the constructive side-channel analysis is introduced,
which allows a fair comparison of different implementations.
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 provide the application on the mutating data paths
concept on two different cryptographic algorithm schemes. In the fifth chapter
the application of the mutating data path concept on a symmetrical-key algo-
rithm is investigated. First the design properties of the design are discussed,
followed by the implementation of the in Chapter 3 introduced mutating meth-
ods on the selected cipher algorithm. The implementation of the cipher, in this
case an AES, is then configured on a special evaluation and a side-channel anal-
ysis on the design is mounted. With the same procedure Chapter 6 investigates
the application of the mutating data path countermeasure on an elliptic curve
cryptography coprocessor in order to discuss the countermeasure application on
asymmetrical cryptographic algorithms.
A conclusion of the results and the proposed countermeasure investigated
in this thesis is provided in the last Chapter 7. After a short summary, open
questions for further research and improvements as well as applications on other
designs are discussed.
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2.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays
The focus of the thesis is on mutating runtime architectures as countermeasures
against power analysis attacks on Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) plat-
forms. Thus, this section provides some background information about the used
technology platform as an introduction to the subject. First the internal struc-
ture and the functionality of a FPGA based silicon device is discussed followed
by an introduction of the devices special functionality, the partial reconfiguration
during runtime.
2.1.1 Technology Platform
FPGAs are filling the gap between the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of personal
computers or a micro controller and so-called Application Specific Integrated Cir-
cuit (ASIC) in terms of flexibility, power consumption, and performance. While
a CPU is very flexible by offering the ability to program an executable appli-
cation via software, the application of an ASIC is fully customized and thus it
only provides the implemented application specific functionalities. Nevertheless,
ASIC provides a better power consumption and performances based on their
application-specific optimization and therefore, specialized and fixed architec-
ture. For instance, the data path of an AES-128 ASIC can be implemented fully
parallel with a bit-width of 128 bits with a throughput of 128 bits per clock cycle.
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The architecture of a FPGA provides a compromise between the flexibility
of a CPU and the performance of an ASIC by utilizing a huge number of recon-
figurable function blocks, hard-macro function blocks, and programmable inter-
connection networks to implement any arbitrary circuits. Cross-switch matrices
and grid-structures of wires are exploited as routing elements to establish the
interconnection between the basic components of the FPGA. The reconfigurable
function blocks are used to realize a circuit providing the functionality of the im-
plemented application. Look-up table (LUT) structures and registers are used as
basic elements of these reconfigurable function blocks, c.f. Fig. 2.1. The technol-
ogy architecture of such LUTs can either be small programmable memory-cells,
multiplexer structures or programmable anti-fuses. Nowadays, the most common
technology for LUTs in FPGAs are memory-based functions blocks, because they
are multiple times programmable compared to the anti fuse-based LUTs. The
memory-cell based LUTs can either be implemented using the Complementary
Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology or using the FLASH technol-
ogy, while the storage component1 of the function block is usually in COMS
technology [FPG].
In the following focus will be on the architecture of a Virtex 5 platform of the
vendor Xilinx Inc. , which was used in order to conduct the experiments stated
in this thesis. Please note that FPGAs from other vendors have slight differences
in their internal structure and their functionality. The reconfigurable function
blocks on the Virtex 5 platform are called Configurable Logic Block (CLB). Beside
the CLB primitives other specialized hard-macro function blocks are embedded in
the Virtex 5 architecture. These customized components are also attached to the
interconnection network in order to combine their functionality with the CLBs
to implement a specific application on the FPGA. The essential basic primitives
1register or transparent latches
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of the Virtex 5 FPGA platform, used to implement an arbitrary circuit are listed
as seen below:
CLB The Configurable Basic Block of the Virtex 5 architecture consists of two
so-called slices. A slice is the main resource to establish the Boolean functions
for any arbitrary sequential and combinatorial circuit. Each slice is regularly
constructed out of four six-input LUT, interconnection logic, and four storage
elements, which can be configured as register or transparent latch. The six-input
LUT is a Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) based configurable lookup-
table and it is (re-)configurable before or during runtime to express a Boolean
function with up to six parameters. Actually, the six-input LUT is assembled by
two five-input LUTs and a multiplexer, which switch the output of the two LUTs
according to the sixth-input bit to the main output of the LUT. The second
five-input LUT is additionally connected to an auxiliary output of the six-input
LUT primitive, which enables a designer to implement two Boolean functions
with five parameters into one of six-input LUT components.
BRAM The so-called BRAM component is a block primitive of 36Kb Random
Access Memory (RAM). This storage component is structured as a RAM com-
ponent with maximum 36-bit width for data and an address depth of 1024. The
memory content of this primitive is accessible via two independent synchronous
or asynchronous configurable ports. With those properties of a true dual-port
memory block the BRAM can be exploited as a First-In, First-Out (FIFO) com-
ponent in order to connect two circuits working in different clock domains. The
initialization option of this component enables one to use this BRAM as a Read-
Only Memory (ROM) component in order to provide pre-calculated intermediate
values or realize instruction memory for a controlling unit.
DSP48E A specialized arithmetic unit for integer value processing is inte-
grated in the DSP48E hard-macro on the Virtex 5 platform. This unit offers
48-bit width logic and an adder/subtraction unit and two complement support-
ing multiplier units with two differently wide operands. The first operant is
18-bit width, while the second operand is 25-bit width. So this unit can be used
to perform multiplications of two 18-bit width integer values. Due to the internal
structure of this primitive it is possible to perform on the one hand typical digi-
tal signal processing operations like a Multiplier-Accumulator (MAC) operations
and on the other hand 12-bit width Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) lin-
ear arithmetic and logic operations. Furthermore, this unit offers up to 3 pipeline
states in the unit to improve the maximal throughput.
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2.1.2 (Re-)Configuration of a FPGA
An arbitrary circuit can be implemented on the Virtex 5 platform by configuring
the FPGA with a so-called bitstream after the power up phase. A bitstream
consists of header information and configuration data to map the implemented
digital circuit behavior on the FPGA platform. This configuration file is the final
file format resulting in the end of the workflow of the implementation process.
The regular work flow of the design process of a circuit for an Virtex 5 FPGA is
portioned into several steps:
The regular design flow for a circuit design on FPGAs starts with the de-
scription of the circuit in a hardware description language (HDL), for instance
VHDL. In the Synthesis process step is the circuit description translated into a
net-list. This net-list consists of the basic components, which are available on
the FPGA platform including the components settings. The next process step
Map maps the net-list to the actual used FPGA type by allocating the needed
physical basic components on the FPGA to implement the circuits based on
the results of the synthesis step. Based on allocated components the physical
implementation is done in the step Place and Route (PAR). First the allocated
components are individually matched to available and fitting physical instances
of the basic components. Then, the routing resources are utilized in order to
connect the configured physical instances. After the PAR process step the bit-
stream is assembled based on the configuration settings of each used component
of the FPGA platform. The bitstream can then be uploaded to the FPGA using
the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface or the Xilinx Inc. specific Select
Map interface. It is also possible to store the bitstream on a so-called platform
flash, which automatically configures the FPGA after the power up phase.
Figure 3.15a) depicts the regular design flow of a static circuit design for a
Virtex 5 FPGA. With such a design flow the FPGA is configured with a cus-
tomized circuit for a specific task, which does not need to change its functionality
during the runtime of the FPGA. In case an adaptation of the functionality of
the FPGA in terms of a circuit adjustment is required the FPGA design has
to be designed partial reconfigurable. A reason for that request may be a low
amount of resources that can be shared between a sequential order of depen-
dent and isolated tasks. Thus, the so-called partial reconfigurable designs share
basic components of the FPGA in a defined area in order to reconfigure their
functionality according to the executed tasks. The Virtex 5 platform supports
this feature due to its architectural nature of utilizing SRAM-Cells to store the
configuration bits for the routing paths, the hard-macro configuration, and the
Boolean function realization of the LUTs. In order to communicate between the
different sequential configured circuits at least one static component is required,
which organizes the data flow and manages the configuration of the partial re-
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configurable area.
Generally speaking, the regular design flow is slightly extended with three
additional processes to create a partially reconfigurable design. After the cir-
cuit design has been described in HDL the entire circuit has to be portioned
into static and partial parts. One constraint of the in here introduced design
flow is that the top-level circuit is always a static design with a black-box place-
holder for the reconfigurable partial circuits. The different circuit designs for the
shared resources of the FPGA area of the partial reconfiguration area have to be
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assigned. For each partial reconfigurable area at least one circuit has to exist,
even if the same circuit should be copied to different partial reconfigurable areas.
After that each circuit design is individually synthesized to a net-list, so that for
each fragment of the partition HDL-code a net-list exists. The next process step
is to address the different areas of the FPGA and assign them to static or partial
reconfigurable sections. During this Floor planning process step it is crucial to
bind the specific net-lists to the according static or reconfigurable sections of the
FPGA. Bounded to the constrained areas the physical implementation of each
circuit as net-list is done individually tailored to the restrictions of the addressed
section. After the MAP and PAR process steps the bitstream of each circuit,
which is either assigned to a partial section or a static section, is generated. After
this step the bitstreams are merged so that the bitstream of the top-level static
circuit is merged with each of the reconfigurable circuit bitstreams in an own
complete bitstream. The number of merged bitstreams depends on the number
of partial reconfigurable sections on the FPGA and on the number of different
reconfigurable circuits per partial reconfigurable section. Figure. 3.15b) depicts
exemplarily the process steps of the design flow for a design with one static con-
figuration circuit and one partial reconfigurable section on the FPGA with two
different circuit designs for this section.
One advantage of the partial reconfigurable sections is that their multiple
configurable circuits can be altered during runtime. The sections apart from the
reconfiguring section can still be used during the reconfiguration process without
losing their functionality. The so-called internal configuration access port (ICAP)
manages the partial configuration of the reconfigurable sections of a FPGA from
Xilinx Inc.. In case of a Virtex 5 platform each frame (the smallest addressable
reconfigurable section on this platform) is controlled by this interface. This
smallest addressable partial area includes hard-macro cells, CLBs and routing
resources. This interface is fed with the partial bitstreams from a controller in
order to reconfigure the partial reconfigurable sections. The controller can either
be a micro blaze with a special software subroutine or a Final State Machine.
Usually the partial bitstream is then stored in a BRAM on the FPGA, which is
then utilized by the controller and the ICAP.
2.2 Side-Channel Attacks
In the late nineties the side-channel analysis attacks were discovered in the civil
research community as a class of non-invasive implementation attacks. It is not
sure since when the phenomena of side-channel analysis like attacks were studied
in the military area. Implementation attacks target the implementation flaws of
a cryptographic algorithm in order to extract the algorithm secret, for instance
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the secret key of a cipher encryption algorithm. The tremendous threat of a
non-invasive side-channel analysis (SCA) attack is the untraceable indication of
a conducted attack. The attack is performed when the implementation is running
in normal operation mode without any violation to its operational specifications,
cf. [MPO07]
Physical Interaction Every device executing an algorithm, cryptographic or
not, interacts with its physical environment during runtime. Based on the in-
ternal procedures of the implemented algorithm the activity of the device is
controlled and thus the energy consumption and the runtime. Therefore, each
algorithm has its own energy and processing time signature. Even more the
processed data of the algorithm will lead to a specific signature of energy con-
sumption or a specific execution time, if the processed data affects the activity
of the device. In straightforward implementations this is the case due to data-
dependent control flow changes like if-else-instructions or different amounts of
switching activities based on internal computations.
By monitoring the activity of the device the adversary may extract informa-
tion of intermediate values of internal operations or of the current internal state
of the algorithm. The monitoring process of the device’s activity is done by mea-
suring one or more of its physical properties during runtime. The unintended
information leakage from the measured physical properties are then exploited in
order to verify hypotheses about the algorithms internal cryptographic secret.
The hypotheses are expected values of the observed physical quantity caused by
the adversary’s suggested intermediate value changes or state transitions. Only
very little knowledge about the actual implementation of the algorithm is needed
by the adversary in order to construct these hypotheses. Based on the divide
and conquer principle the hypotheses are formulated for every value in the search
space for only a few bits instead for the complete bit width of the operation.
Exploitable Design Properties The first SCA attack was published in 1996
by Kocher [Koc96]. In this publication it is shown on the example of the RSA
algorithm [RSA78] how the so-called timing attacks exploit data-dependent run-
time variations of event-based control flow branches to gain knowledge of the
secret key. Furthermore, Kocher demonstrated that with additional information
based on simple time measurements public-key schemes like Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [DH76] can be compromised. Three years later he and his coauthors
introduced power analysis attacks in [KJJ99]. These side-channel attacks exploit
the power consumption of a device running a cryptographic algorithm in normal
operational mode to reveal information about the used secret key. Besides using
the power consumption as measurable physical quantity other implementation
behavior symptoms can be exploited to monitor the device’s internal activity. In
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2001 the so-called electromagnetic (EM) attacks were introduced, which exploit
the inductive physical law to measure the data-dependent energy consumption
of an implemented cryptographic algorithm, cf. [GMO01, QS01]. Both of the
early works in this area [GMO01, QS01] demonstrate the practicability of theses
attacks by successfully extracting the secret key of the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [DES77] implementation. Another class of side-channel attacks are the so-
called cache attacks [Pag02], which exploit the implementation of cryptographic
algorithms on the architectural level and not directly on the gate-level.
2.2.1 Power Analysis Attacks
The focused side-channel attack methods in this thesis, the power analysis at-
tacks, are one of the most established attack methods in the class of side-channel
attacks and well known in the cryptographic community. Power analysis based
side-channel attacks exploit the data-dependent power consumption, which oc-
curs performing in internal operation at a certain point in time. By pattern
matching over a vector of power consumption values p the adversary extracts
information or verifies hypotheses over internal secrets. The elements of p can
either be power consumption values of an operation POP in a time series over
the period of one measurement:
pTt = (POP1,t0 ,POP1,t1 , · · · ,POP1,tm ) (2.1)
or the elements can be power consumption values of an operation POP at a cer-
tain point in time over a series of n measurements:
pTs = (POP1,t0 ,POP2,t0 , · · · ,POPn,t0 ). (2.2)
For reasons of better distinction a p vector containing elements from a time series
from one measurement is further labeled by pt while the p vector containing ele-
ments from multiple measurements at the same time instant is labeled by ps. In
case the data-dependent power consumption is the focused information leakage,
the power consumption values of a unique sequence of internal calculations are
exploited. This sequence is constructed by performing the same operation with
different input parameters several times, so that for each execution the internal
calculation is performed with different intermediate values at the same certain
point in time.
It is obvious that each performed measurement run has to be performed un-
der the same conditions except for the varying input parameters, in order to
assure that the varying power consumption values over the set of measurement
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runs stems from the same operation. If this is not the case the vector ps contains
randomized power consumption values from various operations and therefore the
data-dependent, unique pattern of the internal operation’s power consumption
values is not exploitable. The following shows in detail how to extract these pat-
tern from the acquired power traces and how to set up hypothesis and estimated
power consumptions supporting the information extraction from the traces.
Information within the Power Traces The acquired power consumption
data of n measurements with m captured samples for each measurement is rep-
resented in the n×m matrix PTr:
PTr =

POP1,t0 POP1,t1 · · · POP1,tm
POP2,t0 POP2,t1 · · · POP2,tm... ... . . . ...
POPn,t0 POPn,t1 · · · POPn,tm
 . (2.3)
The rows of the matrix PTr are equal to the content of the pt-vector of one
measurement over a certain time period enveloping the targeting cryptographic
operation. The number of entries in the rows (number of sampled time instants
n) depends on the capturing length of the recorded power consumption as well as
on the sampling rate of the continuous power consumption signal. The column
of the matrix PTr contains the same information as the ps-vector. The number of
column entries of PTr depends of the number of measurements in the conducted
measurement set. If all measurements in the conducted set of measurements are
aligned the adversary can observe the influence of input parameter changes to
the power consumption of the implemented cryptographic algorithm. On the
one hand strong changes in the column of PTr indicate different data-dependent
power consumption between the time instants. On the other hand differences in
the rows of PTr indicate changes in the control flow of the algorithm depending
on the variation of the input data.
Estimated Power Consumptions Due to the fact that the complete power
consumption of the device is represented in PTr monitoring, the specific activity
of a certain part of the circuit is often not directly visible. Thus, hypotheses
about the power consumption of a specific internal operation are formulated as
stated before in Subsect. 2.2. For each value of the secret parameter of the target-
ing internal operation a hypothesis is set up, so that the number of hypothesis
equals the number of elements in the search space. Each hypothesis provides
an estimated power consumption according to the used input parameter at the
conducted measurement run. The captured values in PTr are then compared to
every estimated power consumption derived from a hypothesis. The comparison
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Figure 2.3: SCA work flow for a cipher encryption algorithm
is done by a so-called distinguisher that evaluates the most likely hypothetical
power consumption and thereby references to the most likely correct hypothesis
assumption. Usually, the distinguisher is a pattern-matching based, statistical
or stochastic based evaluation algorithm.
Figure 2.3 depicts the above-described generic workflow of a power analysis
attack on the example of a cipher encryption algorithm. In this case the target
of the attack is the secret key, which is used for encryption or decryption in the
cipher scheme, but the power consumption is exploited to get the subkeys (bit
parts of the key). The obtained subkeys are then used in order to reconstruct the
complete key following the divide and conquer principle. The device, in which
the encryption algorithm is implemented, executes one encryption or decryp-
tion, depending on the operational mode, with a given plaintext or ciphertext
for each power measurement. For each possible subkey value and for each plain-
text or ciphertext a hypothesis is formulated and the corresponding estimated
power consumption for each measurement run. The distinguisher compares the
estimated power consumption values with the captured power consumption to
determine the most likely correct subkey candidate. In case the intermediate
values of an internal operation are the focus of the exploitation, the estimated
power consumption values of each hypothesis are compared with the rows of PTr.
Further notes on processing a side-channel attack is provided more formalized in
Sect. 4.1 in conjunction with leakage model construction.
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2.2.1.1 Exploitable Power Consumption of CMOS Circuits
In this subsection the power consumption of CMOS-technology gates is discussed
in order to characterize the data-dependent part of the exploitable power con-
sumption during a side-channel attack. From a designing point of view CMOS
technology has the advantage of having nearly no static power consumption, cf.
[JB07]. Thus, the main power consumption bases on the activity of the imple-
mented circuit. Nevertheless, the total power consumption Pt,tot at the time
instant t of a CMOS circuit consist of three additive components:
Pt,tot = Pdyn + Psc + Pstat. (2.4)
The dynamic power dissipation in Eq. (2.4) is labeled with Pdyn, the power
dissipation caused by short circuits is denoted by Psc, and Pstat denotes the
static power dissipation. Please keep in mind that Eq. (2.4) models the total
power consumption ideally. In case of measuring Pt,tot the measurement noise
PRt has to be added for each point in time t:
Pmeasure = Ptot + PR . (2.5)
In the following the components of Ptot and their impact on the exploitable
power consumption will be shown in greater detail. For reasons of clarity the
components will be elaborated on the example of a simple inverter CMOS-gate
depicted in Fig. 2.4.
Static Power Dissipation The static power consumption in CMOS based
technology bases on the leaking current and the supply voltage:
Pstat = Ileak · VDD. (2.6)
The leakage power dissipation occurs only if the corresponding MOS transistor is
"switched off" and has a huge ohmic resistance between the source and the drain.
This leakage current is a physical property of the CMOS technology and increases
exponentially with the temperature. Three components define the leakage cur-
rent in Eq. (2.6): the gate leakage current Igl, the subthreshold leakage current
Isl and the junction leakage Ijl, cf. Fig. 2.4(a). The first component is the leakage
current flow through the gate of the transistor to the drain. The gate leakage
depends on the gate oxide thickness: the thinner it gets the more electrons are
tunneling the gate oxide surface. The problem is usually addressed by using
several high-k gate dielectrics to decrease the leakage current, cf. [RBNB04].
The second leakage component, the subthreshold leakage current, is the current
flow from the source to the drain while the MOS transistor is in cut-off mode. It
directly depends on the physical property of the threshold voltage, and thus in-
creases for newer downscaled CMOS technologies. The junction leakage current
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Figure 2.4: Example of power consumption on an CMOS-intverter
is floating from the source-to-body junction to the drain-to-body junction and
is caused by the need for higher doping levels while the junctions at downscaled
CMOS technology platforms get shallower.
Short-Circuit Power Dissipation At any bit transition on the input of the
CMOS-inverter a shot-circuit current Isc is floating across both transistors from
VDD to ground.
Psc = Isc · VDD (2.7)
When both transistors of the inverter are short cut during the switching process
a short circuit current Isc will be caused, cf. Fig. 2.4(b). The mount of Isc
depends on the fabrication properties of the CMOS transistors, for instance the
parasitic capacity CL, as well as the rise- and fall-time of the incoming and
outgoing bit transitions, cf. [Vee84]. Thus, Isc increases by down scaling the
CMOS technology.
Dynamic Power Dissipation Bit transitions at the input of the inverter
also cause dynamic power dissipation besides the short circuit power dissipation.
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In case of no bit transition only Pstat from Eq. (2.6) dissipates power. In the
following the dominant influence of the parasitic capacity CL on the dynamic
power dissipation is shortly discussed. Compared to the Psc the bit transitions
have to be distinguished form the dynamic power dissipation, cf. [WE93]. CL is
charged or discharged depending on the bit transition and thus causes a power
dissipation in the CMOS circuit, cf. Fig. 2.4(c) and Fig. 2.4(d). In case of a
bit transition 1→ 0 the P-MOS transistor is cut short. Thus, CL is charged by
IL (as depicted in Fig. 2.4(c)), resulting in the following absolute value of power
dissipation under the condition that Vo equals the logical 1:
P1→0 = Pp = 1T
∫ VDD
0
CL · (VDD − Vo) dVo = CL · V
2
DD
2T =
1
2 · CL · V
2
DD · f. (2.8)
For a 0→ 1 transition the P-MOS transistor is opened and the N-MOS transistor
is cut short to ground. Thereby the stored energy in the capacitor CL from the
opposite transition is deployed of the N-MOS transistor to the ground. In this
case the absolute value of power dissipation is calculated by:
P0→1 = Pn = 1T
∫ VDD
0
CL · Vo dVo = CL · V
2
DD
2T =
1
2 · CL · V
2
DD · f. (2.9)
The overall power dissipation of the CMOS inverter is sum of both transitions
for one cyclic transition at the operating frequency f:
Pdyn = Pp + Pn = CL · V 2DD · f. (2.10)
If the switching activity α for each clock cycle is not 100 % then
Pdyn = α · CL · V 2DD · f. (2.11)
Exploitable Power Consumption Since power analysis attacks exploit data-
dependent power consumption, the power dissipation or consumption during the
switching activities are of great interest. As introduced in Subsect. 2.2.1, the
exploitable power consumption PL is measured from the device directly over an
ohmic shunt Rshunt, which is usually placed between the ground line and the
active device, cf. Fig. 2.4(e). The voltage drop VL = IL · Rshunt of the shunt is
then used to estimate PL :
PL =

P0→1 + Psc ≈ V
2
L
Rshunt = (Isc + IL)
2 · Rshunt 0→ 1 input transition
Psc ≈ V
2
L
Rshunt = I
2
sc · Rshunt 1→ 0 input transition
(2.12)
The exploitable power consumption of the inverter depends not only on any bit
transition, but it also depends on a rising edge bit transition or the opposite
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transition. In case the transition goes from 1 to 0 according to Fig. 2.4(c) CL is
charged and only Isc is the current source of IL floating through Rshunt. While
in case of a 0→ 1 transition IL is the sum of Isc and IL stored in the capacitor,
as depicted in Fig. 2.4(e). Please keep in mind that Eq. (2.12) only describes
the power consumption over an ohmic shunt in conjunction between the device
and the ground line. If the shunt is placed in the supply line, then the equation
changes, cf. [GHP04]. The first verification on the observation in [GHP04] on
different micro controller platforms was done in [PSQ07].
2.2.1.2 Attack Methods
The various power analysis attack methods that have been introduced in the
recent years and studied in the side-channel community can be separated into
two groups. The attack scenario as well as the strength of the adversary defines
the two different groups of side-channel attacks. The first group contains all the
non-profiling attacks, in which the adversary has limited access to the targeting
device in terms of time and functionality. He or she is only able to monitor the
power consumption of the implementation and has access to the public data, for
instance the ciphertext or plaintext, for each cryptographic operation performed
by the device.
The second group contains all the analysis attacks, which include a training
phase with a physically and functionally identical device. Thus, the so-called
profiling based attacks are mostly separated into two attack phases. In the first
phase the adversary is constructing patterns, often called templates, for expected
power consumption values depending on the intermediate values or states of the
implemented cryptographic algorithm. After that, in the second phase, utilizing
the created templates of the first phase attacks the targeting device. Thus, the
attack phase is much more efficient and therefore faster to conduct, which is of
high interest in case of very limited time access to the targeting device.
Various Attack Methods Table 2.1 lists several basic power analysis attack
methods, classified into the two main groups with the according references in
the literature. Beside the listed attack methods in the table many derivative
attacks exist in literature, thus the table should provide a basic overview of the
different basic techniques used in order to exploit the power consumption. The
basic methods differ in terms of their statistical or stochastic techniques of the
distinguisher2, the exploited power model, or the focus of exploitation (control
flow or intermediate operations).
For instance, the simple power analysis (SPA) attack exploits unbalanced
2The distinguisher in the attack phase cf. paragraph Estimated Power Consumptions
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Table 2.1: Power analysis attack methods
Type Name Comment Reference
Non-profiling Differential power analysis First attack on the in-
termediate values
[KJJ99]
Correlation power analysis Most popular attack
method
[BCO04]
Mutual information analysis Considers non-linear
dependencies
[GBTP08]
Linear regression analysis Utilizes linear regres-
sion for modeling
[DPRS11]
Power analysis collision Exploits intermediate
collisions
[MME10]
Power Amount Analysis Considers the state-
wise power amount
dissipation
[THH12]
Profiling Simple power analysis First control flow ori-
ented attack
[KJJ99]
Template attack Utilizing power con-
sumption densities
[CRR02]
Stochastic approach Exploits a subspace
representation
[Sch05]
control flow of public cryptography schemes like RSA, ECC, or McEliece3, cf.
[KJJ99, SSMS09, MSSS11]. The different power consumption value patterns of
a captured pt-vector are directly interpretable due to the known control flow
decisions in the algorithm. The other two attack methods, listed in the table
in the section profiling, exploit the intermediate values of internal operations
and thus exploit the information of many ps-vectors. The stochastic approach
differs from the template attack by using a more advanced power model based
on subspaces and linear regression.
All the attacks sorted in the section non-profiling in Tab. 2.1 are also fo-
cusing on the data-dependent power consumption of the internal operations like
the stochastic approach and the template attack. The first four attack meth-
ods, from top to bottom, exploit the switching activity within the circuit and
only differ in terms of used distinguisher functions. While the differential power
3 A post quantum cryptography scheme [SWM+10]
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Figure 2.5: Countermeasure methods for an example function
analysis (DPA) attack and the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack only
exploit linear relations, the mutual information analysis (MIA) attack and the
linear regression analysis attack can exploit non-linear relations. The power
analysis collision attack does not exploit any internal switching activity of the
implementation compared to the other non-profiling attacks. This attack ex-
ploits the significant identifiable power consumption of an internal collision of
two sequentially identical data values. The adversary injects the collisions of the
intermediate values by chosen-plaintext scenario.
The Power Amount Analysis utilizes the concept of the Additive Withe Gaus-
sian Noise model known form the area of communication engineering to more
efficiently extract information out of the captured power traces. The methods
compress a time frame of each capture power traces into one value by calculating
the variance of this frame over the time. According to the assumption of an sta-
tionary and ergodic process the additive noise in the power trace has a constant
value, which is thereby separated from the dynamic exploitable data-dependent
power consumption.
2.2.2 Countermeasures against Power Analysis Attacks
Since the discovery of the outgoing threat of such power analysis attacks counter-
measures have been studied and developed. An overview of the general concepts
of countermeasures against side-channel analysis attacks will be given in this
subsection. In order to lower the success rate of such an attack, an intuitive
approach is to decrease the exploitable physical information leakage, which is
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emitted while the implemented algorithm is active. The exploitable information
leakage can be decreased mainly by two different basic approaches. The first
approach, hiding, focuses on the physical behavior of the implementation. The
principles of hiding methods are to decouple the data specific power consump-
tion from the actual internal processed intermediate values, cf. Fig. 2.5(b). The
second approach, masking, reduces the degree of exploiting the data-dependent
power consumption by internally randomizing the processed intermediate values
by calculating with auxiliary or masked values instead, cf. Fig. 2.5(c).
Masking In the area of side-channel countermeasures the principle of masking
refers to the concept of secret sharing. The incoming public as well as the inter-
mediate values are masked by a randomly chosen value, the so-called masking
value. Hence, the internal operation processes are unknown and thus it is not
possible to directly derive intermediate values from the known input or output
data. In order to achieve the correct output as in the non-masking case the
intermediate results have to be corrected at the end of the crypto algorithm.
Without knowing the mask value the adversary cannot construct correct hy-
potheses about the estimated power consumption depending on the known input
or output of the cryptographic algorithm, as depicted in Fig. 2.5(c). There-
fore, the focusing side-channel information in the unprotected case, as shown in
Fig. 2.5(a), differs from the masked case. Nevertheless, if the adversary combines
both side-channel informations of the masked circuit, cf. Fig. 2.5(c), he can ex-
ploit the power consumption by a so-called second order attack. Thereby, the
attacking effort for conducting a successful attack on a masked circuit compared
to an unmasked circuit increases by the factor of 2number of masking bits.
Over the recent years different masking methods have been developed for
block cipher algorithms as well as for asymmetric encryption schemes. Due to
the algorithmic nature of the masking concept,i.e., secret sharing, this kind of
countermeasure is mainly implemented on the algorithmic layer of an embedded
system and utilizes the existing hardware architecture. Nevertheless, in chip de-
sign some side-channel resistant logic styles have been developed to apply the
concept of masking on cell level as well, but at a high cost of area consump-
tion. Tab. 2.2 provides a basic overview of the most commonly used masking
techniques listed in the literature.
Hiding Compared to masking the hiding concept references to counterfeit the
leakage exploitation on the physical level of the implemented circuit of the cryp-
tographic algorithm. The unmodified intermediate values, which rely on the
input values, can be decoupled from their characteristic power dissipation in two
domains: the time domain and the amplitude domain. Due to the implementa-
22 Chapter 2. Basics
Table 2.2: Countermeasures Methods
Type Name Level References
Masking Arithmetic masking Algorithm [GT02, TSG02]
Boolean masking Algorithm [HOM06, CB08]
Affine masking Algorithm [FMPR10]
Masking logic Cell [TKL04, GrM04, FG05]
Blinding Algorithm [Cor99, JT01]
Masked Dual-Rail Pre-
Charge Logic (MDPL)
Cell [PM05, PKZM07]
Threshold implementation Algorithm [NRR06, NRS11, MPL+11]
Hiding Dummy operations Algorithm [CF05, MPO07]
Shuﬄing Algorithm [MPO07, MSH09, SMH09]
Random delay, clock Cell [LOM10, LBHO10]
Dual-Rail logic Cell [TV04, VK11, HdlTR12]
Triple-Rail logic Cell [LMT+09]
Noise, Random switching Cell [SSI04, GM11]
Register pre-charing Algorithm [LBHO10]
tion of the circuit the signal-to-noise ratio of the exploitable power consumption
to the remaining consumption at one point in time decreases, cf. Fig. 2.5(b).
Increasing the noise of the unwanted power dissipation is one possibility to de-
crease the signal-to-noise ratio. Thereby the amplitude of the exploitable power
consumption is included in the other power consumption by manipulating the
amplitude or shuﬄing the operation time to achieve a lower in the background
noise embedded average level. The second segment of Tab. 2.2 refers to some
countermeasures, which can either by applied on the algorithm level or on the
cell level of a design.
The second possibility to reduce the exploitable power consumption is to bal-
ance the circuit in a manner that always the same power consumption is needed,
regardless of the processed data. The challenge of achieving such a physical
behavior, a circuit with two complementary parts with identical placement and
routing on the cell layer of the design is required. Such tools for placement and
routing are described in[YS07, HdlTR12]. In custom ASIC design the design
goals are easier to achieve than on a FPGA platform due to the full control
over the silicon surface. Another method to balance the power consumption is
proposed in [GM11] by leveling the switching activity.
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The goal of hardening a design with countermeasures against implementation
attacks is to lower and to minimize the amount of exploitable physical informa-
tion. Thus, the utilized technology platform as well as the architectural structure
of the design have to be modified in order to reduce the exploitable physical in-
formation of the implemented circuit. The key concepts of this thesis topic will
be introduced and discussed in theory in this chapter. First, the fundamental
considerations on the mode of action of mutating data paths with respect to coun-
termeasures against power attacks are analyzed. In this context it is discussed,
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Figure 3.1: Overview of countermeasure techniques and related platfroms
which components and properties should be randomized on the architectural
level in order to achieve a higher randomization of the power consumption.
3.1 Principles of Mutating Data Paths
Most countermeasures against power analysis attacks are either applied on the
algorithm level or on the cell level of the implemented cryptographic algorithm,
cf. Subsect. 2.2.2. The reason for this circumstance is schemed in Fig. 3.1: The
developed countermeasures are always bound to the platform, on which the se-
curity sensitive application is running and has to be protected. Therefore, it
sounds reasonable that most countermeasures are developed on the algorithmic
level or on the cell level. In case of protecting a software implementation on a
standardized platform with a fixed CPU core, the countermeasure can only be
implemented algorithmically in software. In case of a full-custom chip (ASIC)
design, for instance a smart card chip, the designer has the freedom to integrate
countermeasures on the cell level. In both cases the physical architecture of the
implementation is considered to be fixed during runtime, due to the platform
properties of an ASIC or a general CPU. Compared to that, the concept of a
FPGA platform offers more flexibility, because of its approach of runtime recon-
figuration. In the context of side-channel countermeasures only one approach
has been published so far which utilizes the concept of changing the architecture
during runtime. The so-called Temporal Jitter countermeasure was proposed in
[MGV08] by Mentens et al. and utilizes the reconfiguration of the data path in
order to freely position the register and the combinatorial logic in the circuit.
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Thereby, the activity of each clock cycle is altered and, similar to shuﬄing, the
adversary does not know when which operation is being processed. The data
path structure and the design architecture can also be changed dynamically in
order to improve the side-channel resistance. In the following, different methods
of mutating the architecture in terms of the data path are discussed, as well as
methods to construct mutating data paths.
Freedom of Design Process In recent years, the research area of computer
aided design has developed different methods and techniques, as well as basic
steps to map an abstract algorithm to an integrated circuit design. The concept
of high level synthesis on processor level is well-known from the area of computer
aided design (CAD) and contains the following three basics design process steps
in order to implement an algorithm:
• Allocation
• Binding
• Scheduling
The necessary basic operations to perform the algorithm are identified in the
basic design process step allocation. Each basic operation is then mapped to one
or multiple types of hardware processing elements, which can generally perform
the operation. The assignment of a specific task of the algorithm, an operational
request at a certain point of the algorithm execution, is done by the basic design
process step binding. The specific assignment of a task of the algorithm to a
hardware processing element is done by this design step in general. Therefore, no
additional information is necessary when the task has to perform the operation.
The basic design process step scheduling is used to schedule the tasks. Thus in
this step the designer can decide how many operations are done in parallel or in
which sequence independent operations are performed.
The architectural properties of the circuit directly rely on the results of the
above mentioned basic design process steps of a CAD process, cf. [GAGS09].
Thereby, the physical characteristics of the implemented algorithm, for instance
the execution time, the power consumption, or the area consumption, can be
influenced by each of the three steps. Additionally, some decisions in one of the
three basic design process steps, for instance binding, will affect the other two
basic design processes as well (in this example allocation and scheduling).
The principle of mutating data paths utilizes the influence of the basic design
process steps on the architecture in order to create a flexible design space explo-
ration. This exploration contains various implementations of the same crypto-
graphic function with different physical properties. During runtime, the different
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designs should be accessible within the design exploration space from any posi-
tion, cf. Fig. 3.2. The method to mutate from one design to another is possible
by an active reconfiguration process. The granularity of the reconfiguration has
to be at a partial level, so that design properties dp(·) can be changed individ-
ually by the settings of the corresponding basic design process step exclusively.
Thereby, the physical behavior of the design, for instance the statistical charac-
teristic of the data-dependent power consumption, can be manipulated directly,
while the implementation maintains the same functionality.
The arising challenge from this mutating approach is to identify design prop-
erties dp(·) which can be controlled by the corresponding basic design process
steps individually or almost individually. Therefore, the reconfiguration scheme
between the designs in the exploration space can be interpreted as a path through
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the design exploration space. Figure 3.2 visualizes the interconnection of differ-
ent modularized designs by slashed arrows inside the design exploration space.
Therefore, the architecture has to have a very modularized structure in order to
manipulate only the intended dp(·).
Modularization of the Design Exploration Space Usually, the CAD-
based basic design process steps are used to transform a formally described
function to a fixed and optimized design with a certain dp(·). Due to the fun-
damental principle of the mutating data path concept the exploration space has
to be modularized concerning the dependency between the basic design process
steps. The first step is to identify flexible design parameters that influence the
physical properties of the circuit, but are nearly independent from each other.
These design parameters are then grouped together into clusters of dp(pv) with
different sets of parameter values pv. Therefore the combination of different val-
ues of each design property leads to a design with new physical features. The
chosen design properties thereby orientate on the classical development flow from
a formal description of function to the dp(·) of the implemented circuit. As vi-
sualized in Fig. 3.3, the known basic design process steps in the area of CAD
rely on each other in general. For the modularization of the design space cer-
tain independent dp(·) can be derived from the design process step by utilizing
different methods, cf. Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3. Each of the proposed methods is
used to create different partial designs regarding the requirements of the design
properties. The second request to the chosen dp(·) is that they should specifically
change the physical behavior of the design. Each design property should influ-
ence the power consumption characteristics significantly, so that each property
affects the statistical behavior of the monitored power consumption signature.
As depicted in Fig: 3.2, the proposed selection of dp(·) manipulates the variance
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σ2P and the mean µP of the exploitable power consumption PLt at time instant t.
In general, the connection between these statistical characteristics of the power
consumption signature and the dp(·) can be expressed by:
{σ2PLt , µPLt} ← dp(·). (3.1)
Based on the assumption of the strongest theoretically possible attack (template
attack, cf. Subsect. 2.2.1.2), where the power consumption is deterministic and
the noise of the power consumption is a multivariable Gaussian process, the
distribution properties µ and σ2 are the focusing properties in the here discussed
concept.
Selected design properties The result from the basic design process step
allocation is the dp(processing unit). It specifies which type of processing unit
is used in the algorithm. The type of the processing unit inherits its parameter
from the process step allocation, but is nearly independent from the process steps
binding and scheduling. Thus, it is possible to change the processing unit by the
method online allocation during runtime without changing the bound task to
neither the unit nor the execution time in the task sequence.
The second identified dp(concurrency) is the degree of parallelism. It inherits
its design parameters from the process step binding. Independent from the type
of the allocated processing unit the degree of parallelism can be varied based
on the amount of available required processing units. The dependency to the
other dp(·) is inherited from the basic design process, thus scheduling is not as
completely independent as binding or allocation. The degree of parallelism can
be only applied if the proposed method dynamic binding process does not violate
any task dependency.
The last dp(task) is connected to the basic design process step of scheduling
and it defines the progression of tasks, which are sequentially executed due to
the task dependencies. The data flow of the sequential or concurrent conducted
tasks is independent from the utilized processing unit on the hardware layer from
a functional point of view. The dependency to dp(concurrency) can be handled
with additional constraints and considerations. Thus, sequentially aligned and
similar tasks may be parallelized by dp(concurrency) and therefore have to be
considered especially in the proposed method flexible task. In this work the
flexible task managing is coped by a middleware approach and micro-machine
based coding for the control flow. The details to this approach will be detailed
in the corresponding section.
The partitioning for a flexible hardware-/software codesign sounds reasonable
on the FPGA platform because of the constraints between dp(concurrency) and
dp(task). Managing the task progression is more flexible and easy to handle in
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software as well as the dynamic binding for the exploited degree of parallelism
of the processing units. Only the online allocation of the different types of the
processing units cannot be done in software due to its hardware dependency.
The modularization of the exploration space can be achieved by two
steps: First, identify design properties dp(·), which can be gained from
the basic design process steps. Note that the selected dp(·) due to their
design parameters are almost independent from each other. Second,
separate the design into partitions in order to perform a more flexible
hw/sw-codesign.
In the following section the different dp(·) and the proposed methods to utilize
the dp(·) will be discussed in detail. The effect of the different dp(·) to the
physical behavior of the circuit will be discussed in general, as well as in terms
of side-channel analysis. For each of the three vectors, which span the design
exploration space, a metric will be introduced in order to verify the setting of
the parameter values pv of each dp(·). Thus, Eq. (3.1) is refined in:
{σ2PLt , µPLt} ← dp(processing unit,concurrency,task). (3.2)
3.2 Online Allocation:
Different Types of Processing Units
The design property type of processing units may be interpreted as an online
allocation of the same maintaining functionality, but executed on a different im-
plementation. The processing unit in this context is a basic operation, which is
exploited by a superior algorithm. The processing unit is a hardware component
(usually an IP-core) of the implemented cryptographic function. It provides a re-
quested functionality to the superior algorithm of the implemented cryptographic
function.
General considerations The algorithm exploits only the deterministic behav-
ior of the processing element at an abstracted level of an event based function
f(·). The function transforms a given input set of intermediate values xinput into
an output set of intermediate values xoutput in the algorithm flow:
xoutput ← f(xinput) (3.3)
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The physical behavior of the processing unit is not considered in the abstract
formalism of the algorithm flow. Neither the power consumption nor the pro-
cessing time is a constraint in the algorithmic description of the cryptographic
algorithm. Therefore it can be modified without changing the algorithm, from
the point of prospective of the allocation step. Please note, the handling of the
correct executions of tasks or the point in time of the requested basic operation
is not in the focus of the allocation process. In embedded devices not every
basic operation, which is utilized in the superior cryptographic algorithm can be
altered, due to hardware constraints. A fundamental request on the selection of
the basic operation to be altered is that a broad variance of implementations ex-
ists so that the influence of the physical behavior can be assured. Also a certain
implementation complexity of the selected processing unit has to be considered
in order to have significant change in the power consumption signature. The
influence of the selected processing unit to the power consumption of the im-
plemented cryptographic algorithm has to be a major part of the total power
consumption.
In the following Subsection the effect on the power consumption signature by
altering the implementation of the basic processing unit will be introduced and
discussed. Therefore, the origin of the different power consumption signatures
will be detailed as well as examples will be highlighted to provide an impression
on the effect of the online allocation. Also a metric will be introduced to support
a designer to evaluate, if the different implementations of the selected processing
unit are working beneficially together in order to increase the noise and random-
ness. At the end of this section different methods for an online reconfiguration
of the processing unit will be introduced.
3.2.1 Influence on the Power Signature
The power consumption of CMOS technology based circuits relies on the switch-
ing activity of the circuit. As introduced in Subsect. 2.2.1.1 the dynamic power
consumption as well as the power consumption based on the short-circuit current
can be exploited for side-channel attacks. Therefore, data-dependent glitches
have a significant impact on the exploitable data-dependent power consump-
tion. In complex circuits the combination and interconnection between the basic
boolean operations are the cause for the circuit data-dependent characteristic
glitches. The combinatorial part of the circuit generates the glitches due to dif-
ferent run-time delays of the individual Boolean function blocks and the so-called
early propagation [HdlTR12] effect of the Boolean function blocks. The switch-
ing probability of the most atomic unit of the utilized hardware platform, for
instance a gate or a LUT, is an indicator for the amount of glitches, which may
be propagated through the combinatorial part of the circuit.
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On the FPGA platform the interconnection and the configuration setting of
the LUT are causing the glitches during the transient phase of the combinatorial
part of the circuit. The different multiplexer components on the Virtex 5 platform
are designed with pass-gate transistor circuits and thus do not cause glitches, cf.
[ug1].
Different implementations of the utilized basic operations within the
cryptographic algorithm will influence the exploitable power consump-
tion signature by its switching activity. The various internal architec-
tures, interconnections, and configuration settings of the LUT of the
FPGA are the origin of the characteristic controlled transient effects or
glitches.
Considerations about the power analysis The statistical properties of the
data-dependent power consumption in terms of the mean and the variance is
thereby strongly influenced by the characteristics of the glitches of the corre-
sponding circuit. In case of a static cryptographic algorithm design this prop-
erty is relatively vulnerable to side-channel attacks, cf. [MPO05, MPG05, FG05,
SHAS09]. The attacks exploit the unique distribution of the power consumption
signature, which is caused by a set of equally distributed input parameters to
the attacked implementation. One possibility to compare the power consumption
signature of different designs is to use a scatter plot like in Fig. 3.4
Example of different SBox designs The scatter plot in Fig. 3.4 clearly visu-
alizes the different power consumption signatures of different SBox designs. Each
of the analyzed circuits consists of one 8 bit register and one of the four different
8-bit AES SBox designs. For the experiment each design was fed with the same
input data and the power consumption was captured by the same FPGA eval-
uation board (SASEBO). The plot compares pairwise the power consumption
of different SBox designs. On the x-axis the power consumption value at time
instant t of one SBox design A is displayed. The y-axis marks the power con-
sumption value of SBox design B. If both designs are completely identical (same
implementation for design A and B) the plotted points of this scatter plot should
be distributed on a diagonal line through the origin of the plot. The diagonal
line is schemed by a dashed line for reasons of clarification.
Based on the plot results in Fig. 3.4 the designs obviously differ from each
other. The scatter plot of the four different SBox designs in Fig. 3.4 clearly
shows which designs are most similar to each other. The comparison between
32 Chapter 3. Concept of Mutating Runtime Architectures
0.9961 0.998 1 1.002 1.0039
0.9961
0.998
1
1.002
1.0039
Power consumption of A [W]
Po
w
er
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
of
 B
 [W
]
 
 
A:PPRM1 − B:PPRM3
A:COMP −  B:PPRM1
A:PPRM1 − B:TBL
A:COMP −  B:PPRM3
Figure 3.4: Scatter plot of the power consumption of different design
the SBox designs PPRM1 and TBL, as well as PPRM3 and COMP, seems to be
more similar than the other two comparisons, because some of the points of their
scatter plots are on the dashed diagonal line. The SBox designs PPRM1 and
TBL are both lookup-table based implementations. The only difference between
these designs is the Boolean representation of the SBox function. Therefore, the
distribution of the power consumption values of theses two designs are in some
cases more similar. While in case of the design TBL every Boolean expression
was used to implement the SBox on the FPGA, for the design PPRM1 only the
Boolean operations XOR and AND were used. The same holds for the SBox
designs PPRM3 and COMP. In their case both designs are based on a composite
fields architecture, but utilizing the same field. Again, the only difference are
the Boolean expressions, which were used to implement the SBox function. The
PPRM3 was in this case the constraint design, which only utilizes XOR and
AND as basic Boolean operations.
This experimental example clearly indicates the difference in the exploitable
power consumption signature of the four different AES SBox designs. Both prop-
erties, the LUT configuration and the interconnection architecture of the LUT
on the FPGA platform cause a different distribution of the power consumption.
The distribution strongly depends on the switching activity, which is based on
the data-dependent transitions and glitches in the implementation circuit.
Implication for the selected design Processing units with different power
consumption characteristics should be selected in order to minimize the ex-
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ploitable power consumption. Therefore, the different characteristic power con-
sumption distributions of the selected processing units should be joint together
into one big complex power consumption distribution. The more similar the dis-
tribution of the different processing unit types are in terms of σ2PLt and µPLt
1,
the less complex is the joint distribution. By selecting different processing units
with a wide-spread σ2PLt and multiple µPLt , a randomization switching between
the processing units will cause a harder characterizable complex joint distribu-
tion. Especially for profiling based attacks, like the template attack [CRR02],
this method will slowly decrease the success of an attack. Thus, there is a need
for a metric, which evaluates how good different designs can be grouped together
in order to minimize the exploitable information about the characteristic power
signature. The disadvantage of the scatterplot approach is that it has to be ana-
lyzed visually and therefore there is no direct metric that supports a quantitative
comparison of different design characteristics.
3.2.2 Requirements for the Type of Process Unit Selec-
tion
As mentioned above the stronger the distributions differ for the same computed
set of data the better is the randomization. A well known metric to compare
distributions based on random variables is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, cf.
[KL51]. Please note that the power consumption of the circuit can certainly be
interpreted as a realization of random variables, because due to the measurement
procedure and the therefore existing measurement noise. Also, the input of the
cryptographic function is randomly selected and thus the intermediate values are
also realizations of a random variable. The discrete Kullback-Leibler divergence
is defined as follows:
Dkl(p, q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) · log2p(x)
q(x) =
∑
x∈X
p(x) · log2(p(x))−
∑
x∈X
p(x) · log2(q(x)) (3.4)
and provides the information how distinguishable the two discrete probability
distributions p and q are. One disadvantage of the Kullback-Leibler divergence
is that it is not a symmetric metric Dkl(p, q) 6= Dkl(q, p). Therefore, it is not
suitable for a distance metric for the purpose of comparing the different power
consumption distributions of different processing units in practice.
Jeffery divergence An alternative symmetrical distance metric to the Kullback-
Leibler divergence is the Jeffery divergence [Jef46]
Dj(p, q) =
∑
x∈X
(p(x)− q(x)) · log2p(x)
q(x) . (3.5)
1Under the assumption of a Gaussian distributed power consumption
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(a) Same design (b) Different designs
Figure 3.5: Jeffery divergence as a metric to distinguish distributions
It is a symmetrical non-zero distance metric. The smaller the value of this
distance is, the more similar are the distributions. The two distributions are
identical, if the result of the Jeffery divergence is zero, cf. [Jef46]. Figure 3.5
exemplary depicts the Jeffery divergence of different power consumption distri-
butions sorted by the Hamming distance classes. n case the Jeffery divergence
has been taken for evaluating the power consumption distribution two 100%
identical designs, a diagonal line across the Hamming distance class establishs,
cf. Fig. 3.5(a). Complementary, is the result in the Figure 3.5(b) visualizing
the Jeffery divergence across the different Hamming distances of two different
designs without such diagonal characteristic. The Hamming distance classes of
both designs are not directly mappable due to the distribution structure of their
characteristic power consumption. In some cases a mapping of different Ham-
ming distance classes seems more likely. For instance, Hamming distance class 0
of design A is more likely similar distributed than the Hamming distance class
8 of design B. The disadvantage of the Jeffery divergence as a metric for select-
ing appropriate processing units is that the metric is not normalized, thus it is
difficult to compare different designs with each other properly.
Total Correlation Another known method to compare random variables is the
mutual information analysis, cf. [GBTP08]. This method stems from the area
of information theory and provides the information on how much redundancy
between two random variables exists. The mutual information I is defined by:
I(X, Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y)log2(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)). (3.6)
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(a) Same design (b) Different designs
Figure 3.6: Total correlation as a metric to distinguish distributions
This symmetrical metric utilizes Shannon’s entropy approach and thus can also
be expressed by using the entropy H(X) and the joint entropy H(X,Y), as well
as the conditional entropy H(X|Y):
I(X, Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y )
= H(X, Y )−H(X|Y )−H(Y |X)
= I(Y,X). (3.7)
The value range of the mutual information I is as follows: 0 ≤ I(X, Y ) ≤ H(X)
and 0 ≤ I(X, Y ) ≤ H(Y ). Thus it can be normalized by the the joint entropy
H(X, Y ) in order to have a common comparable value. In 2003, Yao [Yao03]
introduced the normalized mutual information
C(X, Y ) = I(X, Y )
H(X, Y ) (3.8)
as an useful metric with a value range between 0 and 1, which may be used for
data mining. This normalized version of I is a special case of the total correlation
to compare two random variables.
This metric is still symmetrical due to the symmetrical property of I and
provides information about the nonlinear correlation of the distribution of two
random variables. A value of 1 indicates a strong dependency between the two
distributions based on the analyzed random variables. Therefore, the information
gained from one random variable is completely redundant to the other random
variable. In case of a value of 0 the two random values have unique distribu-
tions, which share no common information. A figure of merit for the selection of
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different types of processing units, in order to generate a complex distribution,
is a very low total correlation value.
Figure 3.6 depicts the total correlation value plots of the same design com-
parison as seen in Fig. 3.5. The maximum values of each Hamming distance class
comparison between the designs is highlighted by a frame of a black rectangle.
The diagonal of highlighted segments in Fig 3.6(a) is intuitive, because of the one
to one mapping of the Hamming distance classes of two identical designs. A more
non-linear mapping is given in case of two different designs, which is depicted
in Fg. 3.6(b). Therefore, the power consumption distribution of the Hamming
distance class 7 of design A is more likely mapped to several power consumption
distributions of Hamming distance classes of design B. This is very beneficial for
the strength of switching randomly between design A and B, because this will
lead to a complex non-bijective mappable distribution.
A low overall total correlation value between the different designs is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient condition. Designs with a non-bijective mapping of the
Hamming distance classes or other clusterings are a sufficient condition to achieve
a complex joint distribution ({σ2PLt , µPLt} ← dp(processing unit(1,··· ,n),·,·)). There-
fore, the design will be more resistant to side-channel attacks by randomly switch-
ing between n different processing units with those conditions.
A low overall total correlation value between different designs is a nec-
essary, but not sufficient condition to generate a complex distribution
based on switching randomly between the individual distributions of dif-
ferent types of processing units. A better figure of merit is the total
correlation value of Hamming distance classes between different designs
of a processing unit.
3.2.3 Methods of Randomizing the Processing Units
The FPGA technology offers multiple methods and techniques to implement the
concept of online allocation in a practical sense. The exchange of differently
implemented processing unit types can be applied on different technical layers.
First, the randomization can be done by switching network level and second,
on the platform level by utilizing the reconfiguration properties of an FPGA.
The approaches differ in the amount of resource consumption and total power
consumption as well as the implementation time due to the complexity and tool
support.
One of the first approaches to exchange the processing units in order to ma-
nipulate the power consumption signature is reported in [BMM+03a, BMM+03b].
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Benini et al. proposed to utilize two different implementations of a processing
unit and to randomly switch between both implementations using a multiplexer.
The request on the switching probability is demanded by a probability of 0.5
in order to hinder power analysis on the design. Compared to this thesis, in
their contribution they do not specify the power consumption properties of both
implementations in terms of statistical properties in detail.
Switching network Using a switching network, e.g., based on a multiplexer
layer or a butterfly network, is the most elementary approach to ‘reconfigure’
the data path architecture. The advantage of this technique is the short amount
of time needed to mutate the data path behavior in terms of power consump-
tion. The costs for this fast ‘reconfiguration’ are the incrementation of the data
path depth, which decreases the throughput as well as it increases the amount
of required resources. Especially, the cost of the not used resources of one com-
plete processing unit implementation while the other processing unit is active is
noticable.
An improvement to this approach in terms of resource consumption and through-
put is given in [MSH09]. In this contribution Madlener, Stöttinger and Huss
demonstrate that it is beneficial to compose the processing unit based on dif-
ferent elementary operations. Then, instead of switching between two complete
processing units to mutate the data path behavior, the randomization is per-
formed on the elementary components of the processing units. Thereby, a lot
of resources on the primitive layer of the FPGA platform can be shared and
the data path depth incrementation can be controlled finer. They propose a
novel multiplier type for GF (2n), which is very supportive to embed methods
to hinder side-channel attacks. In this publication the basic operations are ex-
ploited in a switching network to generate various power consumption signatures
independent of the processed data.
The proposed multiplier for GF (2n), the enhanced Multi-Segment-Karatsuba
multiplier (eMSK), is a further development of the Multi-Segment-Karatsuba
(MSK) [EJM+02]. The MSK generalizes the divide-and-conquer concept of the
Karatsuba multiplier by not being constraint to divide a big number into a
number of segments being a power of 2. A further improvement is the eMSK
scheme that it combines the efficiency of the recursive Karatsuba scheme with the
flexibility of the MSK scheme. The special properties of GF (2n) are exploited as
well as the application of different small MSK schemes in a sub-sequential order,
which is generatable for any required segmentation.
For instance, an eMSK scheme with six segments, an eMSK6, utilizes an
ordinary halving of the original width-bit number and a MSK scheme for three
segments (MSK3). First the n-bit operand is halved by the normal Karatsuba
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Algorithm 1 Multiplication with eMSK z ← x · y [MSH09]
Require: (x, y) Bitvectors
n := Number of basic multiplications
z := accumulation register
N [ ] := array of all basic multiplications
if Execute first time then
N [n] := {0, 1, 2, ...., n}
for i = 0 to n do
r ←rand(1, n)
Ntemp ← N [r]
N [r]← N [0]
N [0]← Ntemp
for i = 0 to n do
ztemp ← Execute N [i]-th basic operation
z ← z + ztemp
z ←reduce(z)
return z
scheme, after that the eMSK3 scheme is applied in order to achieve 6 segments,
such as n6bit width of the two multiplicative operands. This sequential procedure
of the eMSK2∗3 reduces the number of required multiplications on the segments
width from 21 basic multiplications (in case of using a MSK6) down to 18 basic
multiplications. Please note that all basic multiplications are independent to
each other. Thus, they can be executed randomly, due to the commutative and
associative nature of GF (2n) .
The ability of the out-of-order execution of the basic multiplication is an ideal
property to shuﬄe their sequence. Compared to well-known shuﬄing procedures
of independent operations, for instance in an AES, this proposed procedure af-
fects the intermediate values of the complete multiplication. Therefore, the order
of the operation in the sequence strongly affects the power consumption due to
the reliability of the previous intermediate value, which is stored in the same
big register that is utilized for the next basic multiplication. The randomization
procedure of the secured eMSK version is described in Algorithm 1. This pro-
cedure causes a randomization in the time and amplitude domain of the power
consumption. The varying order of the basic multiplication has a strong impact
on the glitches in the combinatorial multiplier logic as well as on the bit flips in
the accumulator, cf Fig. 3.7. The additional resources2 to harden the multiplier
against power analysis attacks increase the resource utilization by 2% only, be-
2Occupied slices on the FPGA
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Figure 3.7: Block diagram of the hardened eMSK multiplier
cause only a swapping unit and a bigger dual-port BRAM are needed. The thesis
author provided the basic idea of randomizing the sequence of elementary opera-
tions of the basic mutliplications in this contribution, while Madlener optimized
the multiplication scheme by combining the benefits of the recursive Karatsuba
scheme with the benefits of the MSK.
A similar approach applied on the AES block cipher is given in [JSG+12].
In this contribution the techniques of composite field constructed SBoxes are
exploited in order to switch between different SBox implementations. The prin-
ciple of composite field constructed AES SBoxes is investigated and described
in [Can05]. The concept of the in there presented approach is to exploit mixed
bases for the composite field in order to get different intermediate representa-
tions. Compared to many other masking schemes, for instance [RYS11], the data
path does not need to be doubled as in these schemes, which saves resources and
makes this countermeasure suitable for resource constraint designs.
For instance, the one-element on different subfields of the composed tower
fields in GF (2n) will lead to 8 different possible representations3: 0x01, 0x03,
0x05, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x33, 0x55 and 0xFF. Therefore, the one-element can be
3independent of the irreducible polynomials setting the upper bound of the subfields
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Algorithm 2 Novel Masking Scheme [JSG+12]
Require: 128 bit secret key k, 128 bit plaintext m, 10 random masks
Q{q1, · · · , q10}
Ensure: 128 bit ciphertext c.
1: set round counter rc = 0;
2: Iv = m;
3: while rc ≤ 10 do
4: rk =GenRoundKey(rc, k);
5: Iv = Iv ⊕ rk;
6: Select i-th isomorphic representation i = Q{rc}
7: Isomorphic transformation GF (28) i→ GFi(((22)2)2)
8: Inversion of Iv in GFi(((22)2)2)
9: Isomorphic transformation GFi(((22)2)2) i→ GF (28) combined with affine
transformation
10: Iv = ShiftRows(Iv)
11: if rc < 10 then
12: Iv = MixColumns(Iv)
13: rc = rc+ 1;
14: c = Iv
15: return c;
mapped to different Hamming weight classes. Such a kind of masking the inter-
mediate values also has an impact on the data-dependent glitches in the combi-
natorial section of the circuit and thus, causes a different power consumption.
Algorithm 2 describes the composite field randomized masking scheme on
algorithmic level. The intermediate subfield representation bases on a random
number, which is used to select one of the appropriate isomorphic representations
of the subfields. Please note that the isomorphic representation has to match
with the utilized subfields in order to transform the intermediate value back into
the normal intermediate representation after the SBox operation. Thus both
transformations between the isomorphic representations in Algorithm 2, before
and after the computation of the inverse into the corresponding GF (((22)2)2), has
to be correct. In order to save resources the transformation after the inversion
can be combined with the affine transformation part of the S-box.
Stöttinger provided the basic concept of exploiting different composite field
structures of the AES SBox by means of randomized switching between the
subfields. The conceptional implementation and the composition of the suitable
subfields was mainly done by the co-author Jungk.
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Figure 3.8: Example application for utilizing the CFGLUT5 components
Partial reconfiguration The Virtex 5 FPGA platform also offers partial re-
configuration to the designer, which can be exploited for the purpose of mutating
data paths. Instead of using more active reconfigurable resources, like LUTs and
routing resources, for different processing units in parallel, the partial reconfigu-
ration can be utilized to save such resources. The data path depth incrementation
is not as high as with a switching network, also the total power consumption is
lower. The partial reconfiguration can be applied on two different levels on the
Virtex 5 platform: on the CLB, a special Macro-Cell, and Routing level as well
as on the level of the LUTs. Figure 3.15 in Chapter 2 visualizes the area and
components of the FPGA that are utilized during a partial reconfiguration. The
figure also depicts the necessary procedures in order to create a partial reconfig-
urable design. This partial reconfiguration scheme is useful if the different types
of processing units have different structures, internal architectures, or utilize
special macro-cells like BRAM or DSP-slices.
The Virtex 5 platform also supports a finer level of partial reconfiguration.
Instead of reconfiguring a complete frame, which is the smallest reconfigurable
area or number of components of the above mentioned reconfiguration scheme,
the primitive CFGLUT5 can be exploited, cf. [UG612]. This primitive of the Vir-
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tex 5 platform is a LUT, which is reconfigurable via a serial port. The CFGLUT5
component can be used to create any boolean function with up to 5 variables.
The LUT is reconfigured with its new function within 32 clock cycles of the re-
configuration clock, which is independent from the system clock. This partial
reconfiguration scheme can be used for different processing units that utilize the
same architectural interconnection between the LUTs.
Figure 3.8 depicts an exemplary circuit in which the reconfiguration property
of the CFGLUT5 is utilized. The circuit depicts two PRESENT SBox types,
which are pipelined. The difference between SBox type 1 and SBox type 2 is the
boolean functions in the LUTs, which compose the substitution function of the
PRESENT SBox by the first and the second pipeline stage. Due to the different
boolean functions for composing the SBox function the switching activity of both
PRESENT SBoxes is different and thus, leads to different signatures.
The two PRESENT SBox modules are reconfigured by a reconfiguration bus.
This reconfiguration bus interconnects each serial input and output of the cor-
responding LUT components of each SBox with each other. Thus, the boolean
expression of one CFGLUT5 can be transferred to the corresponding CFGLUT5
of the other SBox within 32 clock cycles of the reconfiguration clock. During
the transfer the functionality of the reconfiguring CFGLUT5 is not correct until
the transfer has finished. In order to hide the reconfiguration time the reconfig-
uration clock can be driven at a higher clock rate than the actual clock rate of
the system, so that the reconfiguration of the CFGLUT5 is done after the falling
clock edge and before next the rising edge of the systems clock.
3.3 Dynamical Binding:
Degree of Parallelism
The second design property dp(concurrency) provides another degree of freedom
to span the design exploration space, cf. Fig. 3.2. This degree of freedom has a
more significant impact on the physical behavior of the circuit than the influence
on the functional behavior of the implemented cryptographic algorithm. The de-
gree of parallelism influences the amount of noise due to the in parallel working
process units. Therefore, the variance of the captured power consumption at a
certain point in time is manipulated. Variance manipulation strongly compro-
mises the learning phase of a template attack, in which is tried to establish a
multivariable Gaussian based model for the noise distribution. In addition, the
selection of different processing units working in parallel also manipulates the
characteristics of the noise of the measured power consumption.
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General considerations Usually during the design phase, the degree of par-
allel working instances is partially controlled by the binding process step. The
binding also clarifies which operational task type is assigned to which type of
processing unit, so that a mapping exists, which connects (not in general) a task
operation with the conducting processing unit for the processing of a certain
step of the implemented algorithm. After this design process step typically the
binding does not change anymore. The method of dynamical binding adds a
certain degree of freedom to this constraint design procedure.
One efficient method to perform a dynamic binding is by utilizing the concept
of virtualizing hardware components. The virtualization is an abstraction layer,
which can change the binding between a processing unit and an assigned task
during runtime. Therefore, different tasks which are bound to one or multiple
resources, such as processing units, can be shared or reorganized. This kind of
context switching on a processing unit is handled transparently and does not
need any modification of the superior scheduled sequence of tasks of the crypto-
graphic algorithm. In conjunction with the previous described online allocation
an algorithmic operation type can be executed concurrently on different types of
processing units. Due to the abstract interface of the virtualization the online
allocation and dynamic binding can be performed individually.
The influence of the dynamic binding of different types of processing units on
the power consumption signature will be discussed in the following subsections.
In specific, the influence of the virtualization process of the different types of pro-
cessing units on the variance of the power consumption signature will be detailed
in an example. Before the proposed virtualization method is introduced, some
constraints, in order to achieve a suitable manipulation of the noise distribution
of the power consumption signature by the principle of dynamic binding, will be
discussed.
3.3.1 Impact of Non-Static Parallel Processes on the Noise
The influence on the characteristic power consumption is mainly contributed by
the implementation of the processing unit. In order to capture the characteris-
tic signature of the power consumption or the characteristic power consumption
value of a certain value transition, multiple measurements have to be performed.
On the one hand the noise is reduced or its behavior can be approximated by mul-
tiple measurements, on the other hand the average value of the expected power
consumption value for a certain internal value processing can be determined.
Shuﬄing processing units Increasing the noise is one known appropriate
method to increase the number of measurements. An increased number of mea-
surements is necessary to determine the mean value of the power consumption
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Figure 3.9: Impact of the concurrency on the power consumption distribution
µPLt of a certain transition. Please note that the power consumption signa-
ture of an internal operation can be characterized by the mean value under the
assumption of a normal distributed power consumption of the processing unit.
One way to increase the noise level is to randomly shuﬄe between the differ-
ent types of the processing unit implementation, cf. Algorithm 3. As depicted
in Fig. 3.9(a), a shuﬄing between three different types of processing units in-
creases the noise and influences {σ2PLt , µPLt} ← dp(processing unit,·,·), cf. Sub-
sect. 3.2. Shuﬄing is applied by randomly binding an existing processing unit
to a corresponding operational task. The distribution of the shuﬄed scenario
Xdp(processing unit,·,·) is expressed in Eq. (3.9). A measured realization of the distri-
bution with 50,000 captured power traces is depicted in Fig. 3.9(a).
Xdp(processing unit,·,·) ∼ pi N (µPLt ,sh(i), σ2PLt ,sh(i)) (3.9)
Algorithm 3 Shuﬄing between m different types of processing units PUm
Require: a given set of m different processing units types PUtypes =
{PU1, PU2, ....,PUm} that can execute the processing unit operation opPU,
equal distributed random variable R1 = {1, 2, ...,m} and a set of u processing
unit operations, opPU
1: for 1≤ w ≤ u do
2: select a realization of the random variable r1,w ← R1
3: assign each opPU,w to the processing unit type PUr1,w
4: Conduct each operation opPU,w on the assigned PU
5: return
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This joint distribution in Eq. (3.9) is based on i=3 normal distributions
N (µi, σ2i ), which are equally random selected with the probability of pi = 0.33¯.
The corresponding plot in this figure clearly depicts that the variance of the
shuﬄing scenario is bigger than the variance of the individual distribution of the
power consumptions. Nevertheless, still two out of the three mean values of the
processing units µPLt contributions are identifiable in Xdp(processing unit,·,·).
Constantly parallel execution An intuitive way to increase the variance of
the distribution, the noise, is to increase the amount of parallel working process-
ing units. Thereby the ratio between the variance of the power consumption of
each i processing unit type σ2PLt ,i and the variance of the power consumption of
the in parallel working processing units ∑i σ2PLt ,i decreases. This ratio is some-
how similar to a common metric in signal processing, the so-called signal to noise
ratio and provides information on how good the signal is extractable. In this case
it provides the information of how much the variance has increased compared to
the distribution of the power consumption of each type of processing unit.
Figure 3.9(b) clearly shows that the three constantly in parallel working pro-
cessing units have a bigger impact on the variance of the power consumption
than the shuﬄing approach. Nevertheless, similar to the shuﬄing scenario, the
variance ratio to the various processing unit types is significantly different. This
fact may be exploited in order to determine which of the used processing units
are working constantly in parallel. Another drawback of the constant in parallel
processing approach is the additional resource consumption. If only one task
has to be processed on one processing unit the other two units have to process
the same data or random data, with the same statistical structure and behavior
as the actual processed data. This request is necessary in order to prevent the
identification of the active processing unit working on the current data and to
hinder a constant statistical property of the distribution
Xdp(·,parallel,·) ∼
3∑
j=1
N (µPLt ,j, σ2PLt ,j). (3.10)
The distribution in Eq. (3.10) is the sum of the normal distributions of the
three power consumptions due to the static parallel activity of the units.
Randomly concurrent binding An improvement in terms of decreasing the
variations ratio between the randomization scenario and the processing units is
the concept of concurrently active processing units. In this proposed concept the
number of parallel running processing units varies as well as the binding of the
operation to the processing unit. Therefore, different combinations of processing
unit types, provided by the previous concept of online allocation, running with
46 Chapter 3. Concept of Mutating Runtime Architectures
Algorithm 4 Randomized parallel execution on n different types of processing
units PUn (concurrently)
Require: a given set of n processing units of m different types
PUset = {PUtypes1 , PUtypes2 ,....,PUtypesn } with PU
types
k = {PU1, PU2, ....,PUm},
1≤ k ≤ n and two equal distributed random variables R1 = {1, 2, ...,m},
R2 = {1, 2, ..., n}
1: for 1≤ w ≤ u do
2: select a realization of the random variable r1,w ← R1
3: assign each opPU,w to the processing unit type PUr1,w
4: repeat
5: repeat
6: select a realization of the random variable r2,w ← R2
7: until r(2,w) ≤ number of currently in parallel executing opPU,w+
8: Execute the following k operations in parallel
9: for 1 ≤ k ≤ r(2,w) do
10: execute opPU,k with the assigned processing Unit PU
11: w=w+r(2,w)
12: until w > u
13: return
a different degree of parallelism and binding together. Algorithm 4 describes the
procedure of this randomization in pseudo code.
As depicted by Fig 3.9(b), the impact on the variance ratio by this principle
of concurrently active processing units achieves the lowest variance ratio of all
discussed randomization methods. Additionally, the ratios of the different types
are grouped closer together than in the other cases, which makes it harder to
distinguish, which processing type is utilized.
The joint complex distribution Xdp(processing unit,concurrency,·), generated by the
random concurrent binding scenario, is a composition of normal distributions of
the individual power consumption of the n=3 utilized processing units. Equa-
tion (3.11) describes the composition procedure of that complex joint distribu-
tion Fk(x). The variables i and k are used to randomly compose the distribution
Fk(x), thus they have to be equally distributed. While the variable i marks the
selected type of the processing unit, the variable k refers to the utilized degree
of in parallel working processing units. The variable j is utilized for summing
up the normal distributions of the power consumption over the selected in paral-
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lel running processing units. The probability of selecting a certain combination
of processing units type performing the basic operation at a certain degree of
concurrency is denoted by pij.
Xdp(processing unit,concurrency,·) ∼
k∑
j=1
pij N (µPLt ,ij, σ2PLt ,ij) with
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (3.11)
As depicted in Fig. 3.9(a), the distribution of the power consumption of the
three concurrently active processing unitsXdp(processing unit,concurrency,·) is flatter and
broader than the other distributions in Eq. 3.9 and in Eq. 3.10. Therefore, more
measurements are necessary to reduce the noise and to determine the average
power consumption value of a certain internal value transition. Please note that
in the experiment for the concurrency running scenario the correct point in time
of the targeting operation was chosen. In a real world scenario, without full
control over the implementation the adversary has to perform an exhausting
pre-processing phase to sort the power consumptions.
The principle of concurrently active processing units varies the degree
of in-parallel working processing units and is combinable with the pre-
viously discussed method of online allocation. The combination of both
methods leads to a combination of independent distributions with a
broad variance, which considerably increases the effort of characteriz-
ing templates for a profiling attack.
3.3.2 Questions on how to Establish a Randomized Con-
currency
There are two main questions in order to successfully conduct the concept of
dynamic binding in practice. The first request encounters the question when to
use the dynamical binding in the algorithm. The second request is of technical
nature, in terms of implementing the dynamic binding practically. These two
requests will be discussed and solutions will be presented in the following.
A reasonable and efficient execution of concurrently processed operations on
processing units in terms of resource consumption needs a sufficient amount of
operational tasks to be processed. Furthermore, the processed tasks have to
be independent in order to execute them in parallel without compromising the
intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm. Thus, a sequence of type
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Algorithm 5 Identifying processing units for random concurrency
Require: data flow graphs DFG(V,E) of the cryptographic algorithm with V=
{opi, i=1,2,...,n} and E ={{opi,opj}, i,j=1,2,...,n}, and the lower bound dp
of degree in execution in parallel the processing unit operation opPU on a
given set of processing units PUset = {PU1,...,PUdp}
1: calculate tASAP,i= ASAP(DFG(V,E)) ∀ opi
2: calculate tALAP,i= ALAP(DFG(V,E)) ∀ opi
3: calculate slack of all i processing unit operations opPU,i ∈ V
slackPU,i ←ALAP(opPU,i) - ASAP(opPU,i)
4: fill opPU,i from tASAP,i to tALAP,i ∀ slackPU,i 6= 0
5: give each of the opPU an unique identifier
6: create a resource conflict graph G −(V−,E −) with
V − ={opPU,i ∈ V } and E − ={{opPU,i,opPU,j}, i,j=1,2,...,n}
7: partition G −(V−,E −) by applying vertex coloring to determine the chro-
matic number χ(G −(V−,E −)) by applying the left-edge algorithm
8: create m clusters cl of individual colored and with each other interconnected
vertex of V−
9: return cli ∀ |cli| ≥ dp
identical operations working on independent data is needed in order process
the data concurrently. In addition, the type of identical operations should be
executable on different types of processing unit implementations with varying
physical behavior. In specific, with different characteristic power consumption
signatures and thus different statistical properties (σ2PLt , µPLt ).
The request of utilizing different types of processing units concurrently is
handled by the online allocation approach, while the degree of parallel execution
depends on the structure of the data flow. Without rescheduling a given data flow
graph (DFG) the maximum degree of parallel executable tasks for a processing
unit can be determined by applying known techniques from CAD. One of the
techniques to identify the data-independent, in parallel executable task vertex of
processing units operation, is first to generate a resource conflict graph (G −) and
then to color the vertex of G −, cf. [Mic94]. The chromatic number χ(G −(V,E))4
of the graph G −(V,E) equals the number of the maximal in parallel executable
identical operation types to the given data flow structure of the DFG. An efficient
algorithm to determine the chromatic number χ is the left-edge algorithm, cf.
Appendix A.2.
An extension to the above described technique to determine the maximum
4Minimal number of used colors to color the vertex so that each adjacent vertex has a
different color.
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Figure 3.10: Visualisation of Algorithm 5 for a point doubling algorithm for ECC
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degree of in parallel executable operational tasks is given in Algorithm 5. This
algorithm is more flexible in rescheduling the DFG to a certain kind of degree
and it can handle the slack of the focused processing unit operation opPU due
to different scheduling schemes. The calculation of the slack of a DFG is done
be exploiting the scheduling algorithms As Soon As Possible (ASAP) and As
Late As Possible (ALAP), both algorithms are given in Appendix A.2. In case
of Algorithm 5 only the slack of the focused processing unit operation opPU
is calculated instead of every operation in the algorithm. Therefore, only the
execution positions of the operational task types of opPU are changed in the data
flow. The calculated slack of opPU is then used to identify the possible positions
of conducting an opPU task and to evaluate how it affects the amount of in
parallel executable tasks of opPU of the DFG in general. Thus, a rescheduling of
the opPU tasks without violating the complete execution duration can be handled
by the algorithm in order to identify the in parallel executable opPU. Based on
the information of the maximum number of in parallel executable opPU tasks the
required number of processing units can be derived to a certain degree with regard
to a flexible rescheduling of opPU. In other words, Algorithm 5 describes which
opPU of the superior cryptographic algorithm has to be randomly concurrent
executed of the processing unit in order to manipulate the power consumption
signature most effectively.
A visualized procedure of the algorithm is depicted in Fig. 3.10. On the
left side of the figure is the original data flow depicted. After applying the
first five steps of Algorithm 5 to this data flow the result of the transformation,
as visualized on the right side of the Fig. 3.10, is a new data flow graph with
additional nodes. The different multiplication tasks, the focusing operation to
be virtualized, are renamed with lower case letters for a clear identification of
the different tasks. All multiplication tasks by a certain slack value (opPU,i ∈ V
slackPU,i) are marked with an dashed circle. The dashed marked tasks with a
certain slack value are placed in all possible (according) time slots, in which they
may appear due to different possible schedules of these tasks. At the bottom of
the figure, the result of the transformation steps 6 to 9 of the Algorithm 5 based
on the data flow graph on the right side is depicted. The different multiplication
tasks are clustered into several groups according to their independency of each
other. In this example, the task marked with d should be virtualized because it
is the one most independent of all other tasks.
The second question is related to the need of a flexible architecture in order
to bring the dynamic binding concept to practice. Therefore, the implemented
architecture has to be able to reroute the data transfer between different types
of processing units without compromising the overall data flow of the superior
implemented algorithm. The concept of virtualization seems to be a sophisticated
answer to the need of a flexible interconnection. The virtualization of the selected
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types of processing units will be discussed in the next section due to its strong
relation to the implementation of the dynamic binding.
3.3.3 Randomized Concurrency by Virtualization
In this subsection the concept and the realization of hardware virtualization on a
FPGA platform is discussed. The application fields for the need of hardware vir-
tualization is very broad, beginning from server clusters over operation systems
on personal computers up to embedded devices. Also multiple purposes exist to
conduct hardware virtualization, such as reliability (e.g.,[Yeh03]), integrity and
security (e.g.,[SE08]), or resource sharing (e.g.,[BSCH11]). The focus of apply-
ing and utilizing virtualization in this case is on flexibility and dynamic resource
binding for a cryptographic algorithm implementation. The benefit of such an
architecture is an improved side-channel resistance by applying the principle of
mutating data paths jointly with the action of a dynamic binding.
Virtualization Hardware virtualization is a method to abstract and decouple
the executing hardware platform and the conducting algorithms. The proposed
hardware virtualization of Stöttinger, et al. in [SBH10] uses virtualized hardware
components on the FPGA platform and is used as the basis for the here described
approach. A virtualized hardware component is shared by different tasks of a
subroutine or algorithm, which is addressed individually by the utilizing task.
The tasks of the subroutine or algorithm occupy the hardware resource without
knowledge which units are shared with another set of tasks of another subroutine
or algorithm. Therefore, virtualization may remove the binding between the basic
processing operation and the control flow of the implemented algorithm.
Nevertheless, the tasks managed by the virtualization are transparently exe-
cuted on the underlying corresponding processing units. Due to the transparent
handling of the virtualization technique, it is also possible to share the same
type of operational tasks between multiple corresponding processing units. So,
the units may perform a set of identical and data-independent types of opera-
tional tasks in parallel, even if the original control flow of the algorithm is not
intended to proceed in that manner. The property of sharing processing units be-
tween corresponding operational tasks and to share tasks between corresponding
processing units qualifies the virtualization technique to implement the dynamic
binding principle in practice. In conjunction with the method of online alloca-
tion, the sharing of identical operational tasks can be concurrently processed on
the corresponding processing unit type with various kinds of implementations.
By utilizing the virtualization concept the cryptographic algorithm can be ex-
ecuted concurrently. The maximum degree of parallelism is given by the amount
of utilized processing units and by χ obtained from Algorithm 5. Thus, the corre-
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sponding opPU,i of the differently colored vertex of DFG(V,E) can be virtualized
to change the degree of parallelism. By virtualizing one of these processing unit
operational tasks, the degree of parallelism is controllable by the virtualization
scheme and has a strong impact on the power consumption signature of the com-
plete cryptographic algorithm. In addition, the virtualization concept seems to
be a suitable interface to combine the various proposed methods of manipulating
{σ2PLt , µPLt} ← dp(processing unit,concurrency,task), cf. Fig. 3.3.
The following objectives are achievable by utilizing the concept of virtu-
alizing processing units:
• Online allocation during runtime
Identifying corresponding processing units for the operational exe-
cution of the task.
• Dynamic binding during runtime
Mapping the (virtualized) operational tasks to appropriate process-
ing units.
• Flexible rescheduling of the control flow
Adapting the control flow of the superior algorithm during and after
the virtualization phase without changing the original control flow
sequence.
Middleware concept The application of virtualization between the execu-
tion processing units and the sequence of tasks based on the data flow of the
implemented algorithm can be established by an intermediate layer. This in-
termediate layer has the same functionalities as a so-called middleware, which
is a commonly used method in the distributed computing area,e.g., [Ber96]. In
distributed computing the middleware concept is used mainly for protocol spe-
cific tasks, like controlled data transfers and task assignments between different
tasks and processing units, cf. [TS01]. Thus, the middleware principle may be
used as an executive additional layer to apply the concept of virtualization for
the dynamic binding approach. As depicted in Fig. 3.11, the middleware layer
has an administrative task to organize the binding between the processing tasks
and the executing resources. Usually this administrative process is done by an
arbiter unit, which adapts the processing tasks. The basic functionality of an ar-
biter inside the middleware architecture is exemplarily described in Algorithm 6.
First, all in parallel executable tasks T of the current schedule Scur are identified.
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Figure 3.11: Middleware concept for dynamic binding
After that the binding of all the unprocessed tasks is checked and sorted into two
groups. One group binds all the tasks labeled with Th. These tasks are assigned
to processing units Rh, which are available at the required moment in time and
can be executed according to the initial binding from the original scheduling.
The other group lists all tasks, label with Tf , which cannot be executed due to
their original binding, because the processing unit is not available.
In case the second group is empty, the original schedule for the current time
instant Scur can be executed. In the other case a new schedule for the tasks of
both groups is required. Hence, the tasks Th of the previous, not actual schedule
Scur will be updated to the schedule Saux1. At the next step of the algorithm
a new schedule (Saux2) is generated based on the tasks Tf and the resources
of the group Rh. After both new schedules, Saux1 and Saux2, are established,
they are executed sequentially in order to prevent execution errors due to data
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Algorithm 6 Virtualization by middleware concept [SBH10]
Require: (current schedule)
n,m := 0
Scur ← current schedule
t← getNumOfAllTasksOfCurrentSchedule(Scur)
T [t]← getAllTasksOfCurrentSchedule(Scur)
for i = 0 to t do
if (!(checkAvailabilityOfResourceOfTask(T [i]))) then
Rf [n]← getResourceOfTask(T [i])
Tf [n]← (T [i])
n+ +
else
Rh[m]← getResourceOfTask(T [i])
Th[m]← (T [i])
m+ +
if (isEmpty(Rf [ ])) then
ExecuteTasksOfSchedule(Scur)
return
else
Saux1 ← RescheduleTasks(Scur ,Th[m])
Saux2 ← makeScheduleOf (Rh[m],Tf [n])
while (ExecuteTasksOfSchedule(Saux2 )) do
stallOtherTasks()
ExecuteTasksOfSchedule(Saux1 )
return
dependencies between the schedules. The schedule Saux2 has a higher priority in
this scheme and, thus, is conducted before the Saux1. This prioritization is done
due to the fact the Saux1 is a subset of the original schedule, which requires no
scheduled changes. After all tasks of schedule Saux1 are processed, the algorithm
starts all over until all tasks are processed.
Virtualization by middleware An architecture to perform hardware compo-
nent virtualization requires more functionalities than a normal data transfer and
an initialization to trigger a processing unit in order to let it execute the previ-
ously provided data. The before mentioned administrative functionality requests
more than the functionality of a normal data bus architecture. The middleware
layer has to control the data flow, like a data bus architecture, and to perform a
control flow manipulation by means of an arbiter algorithm, cf. Algorithm 6.
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In the area of computer system architecture several methods exist to extend
the normal data bus data routing and data transfer functionality. The basic
methods to apply the middleware to a computer system architecture are (1) an
arbiter controlling a switching network for data and control signals or (2) an
arbiter modifying the Very Long Instruction Word (VLIW) commands of this
flexible and in parallel working architecture. In both cases the arbiter algorithm
is able to inject a new sequence of control steps and data streams in order to the
corresponding processing units to execute a new alternative schedule of tasks.
Both realizations have specific advantages and disadvantages:
1. The advantages of the data and control bus extended arbiter is that it
is easy to be integrated in existing non-virtualizing bus architectures of
an implemented cryptographic algorithm. On the downside, it will slow
down the throughput of the data bus system due to the switching network.
Also, the correct processing of the data strongly depends on the correct
rescheduling and monitoring of the tasks by the additional arbiter unit.
2. The VLIW approach has the advantage that the virtualization is done
only by manipulating the VLIW instruction sequence, which will not affect
the throughput properties of the non-virtualizable design as much as the
switching network approach. But the programming of the VLIW virtual-
ization rescheduling sequences is more challenging than for the switching
network.
Example of a middleware architecture for ECC In [SBH10] an implemen-
tation of an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based algorithm was extended by
a middleware architecture in order to be able to virtualize the concurrently used
multiplier units. The cryptographic algorithm operates on an elliptic curve rep-
resented in GF(2n). The original motivation of the authors was to propose a
virtualizable cryptographic public key scheme, which is tolerant against faults
by utilizing virtualization and still does not compromise the user storage of the
virtualizing unit at runtime.
As depicted in Fig. 3.12 the middleware architecture is realized by an arbiter
unit and a switching interconnection network for both control signals and data
transfer. The arbiter unit exploits the administrative process described in Al-
gorithm 6 to virtualize up to two of the three multiplication units by one unit.
The virtualization CBus is used to reroute the control signals of the original in-
struction word to the multiplication unit, which virtualizes the inaccessible unit,
while the virtualization DBus reroutes the data transfer to the executing unit.
This hardware middleware approach for virtualizing inaccessible multiplication
units can also be used to control the degree of in-parallel executing units in order
to manipulate the overall power consumption signature.
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3.4 Flexible Scheduling:
Progression of Tasks
In this Subsect. the last design property, progression of tasks (dp(tasks)), is
discussed. This design property, as well as the previous ones, modifies the char-
acteristic power consumption of the implemented cryptographic algorithm. The
proposed method flexible scheduling is used to change the execution behavior of
the cryptographic algorithm and spans the design exploration space by the third
variable, cf. Fig. 3.2. This method influences the physical design behavior of
the implementation by manipulating the scheduling of the tasks during runtime.
The impact on the power consumption signature of the design will be detailed
in this subsection, as well as the technical realization of the approach in general.
General considerations In the area of CAD, the scheduling is done during
the design phase and is fixed afterwards, so that during the operation mode
the progression of operations is stringently repeated for each time the crypto-
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graphic operation is performed. The fixed schedule of the implemented algorithm
provides the sequence of performed tasks, which includes operations to be per-
formed. As mentioned before, after the binding is setup in the design phase in
the area of CAD, the scheduling for the algorithm execution is done, thus there
is a strong dependency between the scheduling and the binding.
A well partitioned control flow of the algorithm allows a feasible handling
of the binding and scheduling of the resources very flexible, considering their
dependency. Orientating on the control flow concepts in the area of compilers,
e.g., the LLVM compiler [LLV], the control flow path consists of certain basic
elements: A basic block element, a control element to fork the control flow, and
a control element to join the control flow. The basic block in the control flow
includes a certain amount of tasks or operations and can be abstracted as a
routine in an algorithm. Routines may appear several times in the algorithm,
but they only consist of a progression of tasks performed on basic operations.
The flexible scheduling method is applied to the relationship and composition of
such routines in the algorithm, while the dynamic binding focuses on the basic
operations in a routine of the algorithm. The execution length of a routine is,
of course, influenced by the degree of in parallel processed basic operations of
the processing unit type within the routine. The varying execution length of the
routine can be handled by the previously introduced virtualization concept of
the middleware approach. Therefore, the two methods dynamic allocation and
flexible scheduling, are changing the design properties of the implementing algo-
rithm on two different hierarchical levels in conjunction with the virtualization
concept, which alleviate their common application.
3.4.1 Effect on Power Consumption Patterns
The impact on the power consumption signature due to the design property
dp(tasks) is comparable with the commonly used method of shuﬄing indepen-
dent operations in a cryptographic algorithm, if the granularity of processed
operations per clock cycle does not change. Therefore, the flexible scheduling
recomposes the routine in a manner that only the sequence of data-independent
basic operations within the routine is manipulated. This effect also holds for the
shuﬄing of the sequence of complete routines swapped in the algorithm, if this
does not compromise original results of the cryptographic algorithm in terms of
correct calculation. The increased approximation of the effort for attacking a
system, which shuﬄes its data-independent operations, is reported in [MPO07].
Based on this approximation for a design with shuﬄing5 the effort can be ex-
5The operation shuﬄing is equally distributed with fixed amount of operations per clock
cycle
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pressed in nmeasure times additional number of power traces, cf. Eq. (3.12).
nmeasure = (number of shuﬄing operations)2 (3.12)
Increasing the effort can be achieved by chaining the amount of atomic oper-
ations in a routine, in terms of numbers of operations that are executed within
one clock cycle. This approach is similar to the mentioned countermeasure Tem-
poral Jitter in Subsect. 3.1. The varying number of performed operations within
one clock cycle influences the variance of the power consumption within the
clock cycle and thus decreases the signal-to-noise ratio. An approximation for
the influence of a changed signal-to-noise ratio is given in [MPO07], but this
approximation bases on the utilization of CPA.
Another improvement to increase the effort of extracting exploitable informa-
tion by terms of a flexible scheduling is to recompose the routines of the algorithm
with different basic operations. The advantage of recomposing the routines with
different progressions of basic operation tasks compared to shuﬄing the execu-
tion order of the basic operations is that the intermediate values of the routine
are changed, instead of being misaligned in the time domain. Therefore, the
attack gets more complex because more possible intermediate values have to be
considered for the estimation of the power consumption.
Comparing the previous methods of online allocation and dynamic binding
for mutating dp(processing unit,concurrency) at first glance the flexible schedul-
ing method seems to be the same method on the software level. At a closer
look, the first two methods work on the same type of basic operation in the
algorithm in order to mutate {σ2PLt , µPLt}, while the manipulation of dp(task)
works on different types of basic operations and thus different types of hardware
components. By this the variations on the during runtime reconfiguring process-
ing unit with the most significant power consumption profile is enveloped in the
randomization process caused by the method of flexible scheduling. Therefore,
a pattern detection via a SPA attack on specific {σ2PLt , µPLt} by exploiting the
connection of the corresponding dp(processing unit,concurrency,·) to the power
consumption signatures gets more difficult. Otherwise, if an SPA attack could
gain enough information to confidently distinguish the different design properties
an attack in two phases is possible, similar to a second order attack. In the first
phase, the traces are clustered according to their distinguishable SPA signature
and then, in the second phase, each cluster can be attacked individually. Thus,
the third dp(·,·,task) extends the possibilities of causing a specific {σ2PLt , µPLt}
as well as it is expanding the design exploration space.
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Figure 3.13: Subroutine rearrangement by routine (re)shaping
3.4.2 Partitioning the Algorithm
In this subsection the implementation of partitioning is discussed based on the
investigated algorithm. Thereby it enables one to rearrange routines of the algo-
rithm or to completely recompose the routines. The flexible scheduling exploits
the modularized structure of cryptographic algorithms. The intuitive procedure
to capsulate frequently used functionalities or procedures of an algorithm into
routines supports the partitioning process in order to establish a flexible schedul-
ing. The interface6 of the routines to the algorithm has to be identical for each
different type of routine implementation. In contrast to the interface, the com-
putational sequence and intermediate values of the routine itself has to vary.
For each of the randomization techniques of the flexible scheduling method an
example will be provided in the following.
Rearrangement of the basic operations in a routine Most cryptographic
algorithms are constructed on basic operations or exploit other cryptographic
6Routine parameter provided from the algorithm and the returned result of the routine
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functions, which are composed of basic operations. For instance most block
cipher algorithms, which are members of the symmetric-key cryptographic algo-
rithms, e.g., AES or PRESENT, are round oriented algorithms. As depicted for
the example of an AES data path in Fig. 3.13(a), each different round function of
the AES can be implemented in its own routine, which utilizes the operations out
of a common set of basic operations. Each of the three routines can be manipu-
lated in their physical behavior by means of different executed basic operations
in one clock cycle, without changing neither the degree of parallel processed bits,
nor the hardware implementation of the basic operations.
In the example provided in Fig. 3.13, the basic operation of the SBox is
handled as the mutable processing unit, which can be reallocated online while
the device is active. In addition, the degree of in parallel processing SBoxes can
be manipulated by the dynamic binding method. As the rearrangement example
in Fig. 3.13(b) demonstrates the first round of the AES, which is one of the
two common targeting scenarios of a power analysis attack, can be merged with
some basic operations of the second routine. Therefore, the number of operations
executed within one clock cycle is changed from the usual scenario on the left
side of Fig. 3.13(b) to the rearranged routine, on the right side of Fig. 3.13(b). Of
course, it is also possible to change the amount of basic operations of routine II for
each clock cycle. The power consumption signature is disturbed by a sum of the
Gaussian distribution that is caused by the different active operations during one
clock cycle over the observed set of experiments with varying operational activity.
Thus, the resulting complex joint distribution differs from the distribution in
Eq. 3.11 and it includes the dynamic binding activity as well as the changes of
the processing unit design due to the online allocation.
Recomposition of the basic operations in a routine In case of a more
complex algorithm, with multiple hierarchical arithmetic layers, for instance like
in elliptic curve cryptography, the routines of the higher hierarchical levels can
be composed from various basic operations. The method of recomposing the
routine is demonstrated on the example of the point doubling operation ([2]P)
for an elliptic curve E in GF(p). The projective representations are exploited to
compose two different routines for the point doubling operation.
As depicted by the abstractly denoted Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 8, the
intermediate values of both routines differ due to their own procedures of com-
putation. Of course, due to the different point representations, the results of
the two routines are not the same as well, but they can be transformed to a
commonly affine representation for exchanging the values between the routines.
3.4. Flexible Scheduling:
Progression of Tasks 61
Algorithm 7 Point doubling pro-
jective, [2]P = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) based
on algorithm from [CF05]
Require: A point (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
on curve E
Ensure: An affine point (x,y) on E
equals (X1Z1 ,
Y1
Z1 ) with Z1 6= 0
1: A = a4Z21 + 3X21
2: B = Y1Z1
3: C = X1Y1B
4: D = A2 - 8C
5: X3 = 2BD
6: Y3 = A(4C - D) - 8Y21B2
7: Z3 = 8B3
8: return (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
Algorithm 8 Point doubling Jaco-
bian, [2]P = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) based
on algorithm from [CF05]
Require: A point (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
on curve E
Ensure: An affine point (x,y) on E
equals (X1Z21 ,
Y1
Z31
) with Z1 6= 0
1: A = 4X1Y21
2: B = 3X21 + a4Z41
3: C = -2A
4: D = 8Y41
5: X3 = C + B2
6: Y3 =D + B(A - X3)
7: Z3 = 2Y1Z1
8: return (X3 : Y3 : Z3)
Two different routines to perform a point doubling operation ([2]P) on a
curve E, described by the affine form y2 = x3 +a4x + a6
One important issue to notice is that the composition variants of the routine
should not be executable in one clock cycle, especially if the procedure of com-
putation is different, but lead to the same final value. Multiple clock cycles
should be used and, if necessary, an additional hardened version to transform
the result into a common representation in order to hinder an exploitation of
register transition of this final value. The recomposition of a routine has to lead
to different computations and thus, to different intermediate values stored in the
shared registers of the compositions of the routine. In addition, the composition
schemes of the routine should exhaust the same amount of clock cycles in order
to prevent an identification of the schedules by a timing analysis. Utilizing the
flexible scheduling method to recompose a routine is more complicated to achieve
than merging different operational tasks of different routines into one clock cycle,
but it has a bigger impact on the power consumption of the implementation.
3.4.3 Randomized Micro-Program Selection
Due to the similarity of flexible scheduling to dynamic binding as well as to online
allocation, its implementation orientates on the previously discussed techniques
of the other two proposed methods. Therefore, a data path implementation with
a flexible scheduling ability requires the following two main characteristics:
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1. A transparent interface scheme to handle the control flow from the algo-
rithm to the various implementations of the routines as well as between
the different routine types.
2. A flexible data access to the requested parameters each routine needs in
order to perform its computational procedures at any state of the algorithm.
The technique of virtualization is well-suited to meet theses requirements. A
hardware/software-codesign (HW/SW-codesign) structured architecture there-
fore seems the most effective solution for the implementation of a data path that
supports flexible scheduling as well as the other two proposed methods. There-
fore, the theoretical, into routines partitioned algorithm is then implemented
into different micro-code programs. A micro program has to be implemented
for each routine and for each computational procedure of the different routine
types. In addition, the main control flow of the implementing algorithm has to
be provided.
When utilizing the previously introduced virtualization in conjunction with a
VLIW architecture each micro program can be easily executed within the control
flow of the algorithm. In the HW/SW-codesign architecture the micro programs
can be executed by the main control flow via their start address. The control flow
is then handled by the middleware of the virtualization scheme. An important
design criterion for establishing the memory map of the programs is to consider
the start address of every routine. In order to prevent power analysis attacks on
the routine call or, to be more specific, on the kind of implementation of a routine,
the addresses of each routine entity should have the same Hamming weight.
Figure 3.14 depicts an example of how to position the micro programs in the
memory to prevent a side-channel leakage by the Hamming weight of their routine
addresses. In this example the addressing of the implementation versions of the
routines can be done by a random generator in order to randomly address the
one-hot coded implementation version of a routine. As visualized in Fig. 3.14 the
four most significant bits are used to randomly select an implementation version,
followed by the next four bits to select the routine type. The other bits down to
the LSB are used to address the basic operations within each implementation of
each routine.
A shared memory architecture is one possibility to achieve the second re-
quest for the flexible scheduling method in practice. This memory concept
provides multiple access to differently stored values and thus it can store all
necessary values for the cryptographic algorithm as well as for the different
routine implementations. Thereby, the processing units and hardware com-
ponents can access the values following the schedule of the randomly selected
routines of the cryptographic algorithm. With this proposed architecture the
dp(processing unit,concurrency,task) of the data path can be adjusted during
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(one hot coded)
Figure 3.14: Addressing scheme of the micro programs
runtime by using flexible scheduling in conjunction with dynamic binding as well
as online allocation. They will not interfere with each other in a functional man-
ner, but in a way, where the power consumption characteristics will be blurred.
3.5 Design Flow of Mutating Data Paths
In this Subsect. the overall design flow for creating mutating data path struc-
tures is detailed. The design flow utilizes all the previously described proposed
methods to manipulate the dp(processing unit,concurrency,task) during runtime.
The described procedures are to be performed step by step and are not yet com-
pletely automated. Figure 3.15 visualizes the procedure of the design flow of
getting a design with a mutating data path starting from a given cryptographic
algorithm, for instance a block cipher.
At first a partitioning of the hardware and software for the implementation of
the given algorithm has to be made. Usually, all the procedures dominating the
control flow are grouped into software while the basic operations to be performed
are grouped into hardware. Procedures, which are composed of basic operations,
can also be mapped to the software partition in order to reuse hardware resources
on the data path.
The information clustered in the software partition are then used to establish
different schedules by utilizing the flexible scheduling method. As mentioned be-
fore the flexible scheduling method can either be used to recomposition routines
or to rearrange the procedures within the routines, cf. Sect. 3.4. At first for both
methods the routines are identified in the control flow of the software partition.
After that the different schedules for both methods are generated, if possible.
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Figure 3.15: Design flow to create a mutating data path and its generic archi-
tecture
If not, only the corresponding schedule for the applicable method is generated.
The scheduling of the rearrangement method is then used to generate micropro-
grams and storing them in a sophisticated scheme in the program memory, cf.
Subsect. 3.4.3. The other schedules for the recomposition are made available to
the processing step utilizing the method of dynamic binding.
3.5. Design Flow of Mutating Data Paths 65
The information within the hardware partition is used for the previously pro-
posed methods, i.e. online allocation and dynamic binding. At first, the basic
operation conducted on a processing unit with the most exploitable power con-
sumption opPU is identified. The processing units performing the other basic
operations can be implemented directly in order to be used in the data path
architecture as depicted at the bottom of Fig. 3.15. The provided schedules are
then analyzed in the basic design process dynamic binding in order to identify
the usage of opPU in the schedules. After this step, the dynamic binding proce-
dure generates the virtualization schemes for opPU according to the description in
Sect. 3.3. These schemes are than utilized to construct the related virtualization
unit. In parallel to the dynamic binding and flexible scheduling process the basic
design process online allocation can be performed. As reported in Sect. 3.2 this
basic design process method is used to identify suitable different implementations
of a processing unit to hide the data-dependent power consumption. At first, dif-
ferent implementations of the same provided functionality of the processing unit
PU are implemented for the operation opPU. After that the power consumption
behavior of the various implementations are compared and the most suitable
ones are selected, cf. Subsect. 3.2.2.
In the end after all three design steps have been performed the components
can be assembled to the mutating data path architecture with a virtualization
unit and various different types of processing unit implementations. The ran-
domization of the active processing unit is handled by the middleware (the vir-
tualization unit) via a switching network or by exploiting partial reconfiguration
for Xilinx FPGAs, cf. Sect. 3.2.3.
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For side-channel resistance evaluation it is crucial not only to detect side-channel
flaws in the circuit, it is even more important to characterize the unintended
information leakage. A quantitative characterization of both the exploitable
leakage and the corresponding circuit section are used to pinpoint the origin of
the side-channel leakage.
In this chapter the elaborated framework of this thesis for the side-channel
evaluation against power attacks is introduced. First, a general overview of the
state of the art in side-channel evaluation is given before the analysis framework
of this thesis is described. The generic framework for any side-channel evaluation
consist of an acquisition setup and related side-channel analysis tools. The ac-
quisition setup is used to capture the measurable leakage from the device during
its normal operation mode, while the analysis tools are intended to character-
ize the thread of power analysis attacks of the analyzing implementation. A
direct comparison between the different implementation approaches is therefore
applicable in order to improve the side-channel resistance of the circuit. Thus,
the dedicated analysis tools detailed in the sequel gain the insight of the here
proposed hardened design techniques in terms of their power analysis attacks
resistance.
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4.1 General Evaluation of Side-Channel
Resistance
The basic goal of a side-channel resistance evaluation is to gain insight of a
circuit and to identify exploitable leakages that compromise the implemented
algorithm’s secret. In case of detecting an exploitable leakage the circuit has to
be evaluated how feasible it is to conduct an attack on the implementation and
to which degree the secret is being revealed. In 2009 Standaert et al. followed
these general concepts and introduced a generic side-channel analysis framework,
cf. [SMY09].
Nevertheless, it seems that there is no common understanding and usage in
the community, of the term leakage and no standardized mathematical identifier
or formal description of the transfer-function that shall characterize the leakage
based on the algorithm’s parameters. There are multiple and very coarse descrip-
tions of the term leakage. Also the understanding of a leakage model seems to
vary among different authors or is not stated precisely yet, cf. [MOS09, WO11a].
For instance, in some cases there exists an understanding of leakage models,
which represents more or less a functional description of mapping the internal
behavior of the circuit to the emitted leakage [MPO07, EG10]. In other cases the
mapping is done by a so called leakage function, which relies on a physical under-
standing of the internal circuit behavior, cf. [MR04, SMY09, KSS10, SVCO+10].
The basic concepts in [SMY09] seem to be solid at a first glance, but not all def-
initions are free of term collisions with the area of circuit design, for instance the
definition of an implementation:
"An implementation is the combination of a cryptographic device and
a leakage function." [SMY09]
This definition may hold for the manufactured silicon at the end of the design
process, if each implementation of the algorithm is hosted in a new device. It def-
initely holds for implementing a cryptographic algorithm in software on a CPU
or on an embedded device with an fixed hardware architecture, for instance a
µC. But it does not hold in case of implementing different circuits with the
same algorithmic functionality on one and the same FPGA device, which may
feature considerably different non-functional properties. Thus, the definitions
of [SMY09] can not be used directly in this thesis, which has a strong focus on
FPGAs. So, it seems substantial to provide a foundation in this thesis for a com-
mon understanding of the basic terms in order to increase the transparency and
understanding of this thesis and the proposed evaluation techniques and meth-
ods. The definitions for the common basis of terms and transformations given
here aim at a general understanding of side-channel analysis and thus are not
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restricted to the area of power analysis attacks only. Nevertheless, explanatory
examples of these terms are provided on instances of the areas of power analysis
only as they are in the focus of this thesis.
Definition 1 provides a general understanding of a leakage Lt that is emitted
from the implemented circuit inside an active device. This unintended source
of information may be compromising the security of the implemented algorithm.
So, it should be clarified that leakage Lt is an observable physical quantity in
the environment of the device. Therefore, the leakage Lt features both a real
number value and an appropriate physical unit.
Definition 1
A leakage Lt is an unintended information source about the device’s cir-
cuit internal secrets, which is observable by phenomenas in the physical
domain at certain points in time. Lt ∈ R and has the unit of the corre-
sponding physical domain.
The second definition, Def. 2, is crucial for an understanding of the origin
of the unintended secret information broadcast. By this definition a leakage
model LMt is a deterministic relation between the internal activity of the circuit
and behavior and the leakage Lt. Furthermore, it quantifies that the emitted
leakage Lt is a reaction of internally processed values and thus any leakage also
depends on the algorithm’s internal states or transitions. These internal states
and transitions are caused by public and secret algorithm parameters and thus
establish a link to the physical domain. For instance, the Hamming distance
model or Hamming weight model are commonly used leakage models in power
analysis attacks for CMOS based designs. These two models exploit in contrast
to the static case the higher dynamic power consumption in CMOS technology-
based circuits caused by their switching activity.
Definition 2
A leakage model LMt gives a causal relationship between a reasonably
measure-able leakage Lt emitted from the implementation at the time
instant t and an estimated leakage L˜t based on the processed data on the
device at t.
The leakage model LMt utilizes one or multiple leakage functions LFt(x,y) to
characterize the circuit’s internal behavior that causes the measurable leakage Lt.
It is essential for deriving the leakage function LFt(x,y) to exploit both the
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knowledge on the implemented algorithmic procedure and on the technology
of the platform. Please note that a leakage model LMt can utilize different
leakage functions LFt(x,y) to characterize the same leakage Lt. In general,
the input parameter x denotes one or multiple public or accessible algorithm
parameters, which may be exploited by its or their functional relationship to
a secret algorithm parameter (y) within an algorithm’s intermediate operation.
Thus, the LFt(x,y) can be exploited to reconstruct intermediate values of the
algorithm, which cause an exploitable leakage and therefore compromises the
algorithm’s secret. The input parameters of the leakage function LFt(x,y) are
parameters of the implemented algorithm, like a fragment of the ciphertext or the
plaintext, and a part of the secret key (subkey) in case of modeling an encryption
cipher.
At least one secret parameter is needed in the function to map the informa-
tion theoretical data to the physical leakage. The output of the function is the
leakage Lt. Definition 3 mathematically defines the term of a leakage function
used in this thesis:
Definition 3
One or multiple leakage functions LFt(x,y) are contained in a LMt quan-
tifing the relationship between the leakage Lt and the estimated leakage
L˜t. Therefore, any leakage function LFt(x,y) maps the input parameters
(x,y) with x ∈ X n,y ∈ Υm to the exploitable leakage Lt of the device
with Lt ∈ R. The sets X and Υ and their sizes (n, m) depend on the
implemented algorithm running on the device. The public or accessible
algorithm parameters, like device specific input or device output parame-
ters, are denoted by x. The algorithm’s secret parameter is marked with
y. Those two types of parameters are called algorithm specific parame-
ters.
For instance, in case of a power analysis attack on an 8 bit xor-operation, a
leakage function relying on a Hamming weight (HW) model can be expressed as:
LFt,(a⊕ b),HW(a, b) =
8∑
i=1
ai ⊕ bi =
8∑
i=1
(a⊕ b)i,
with a =
8∑
i=1
ai · 2i, b =
8∑
i=1
bi · 2i (4.1)
Based on the definitions Def. 1 - 3 the basic tasks of a side-channel evalua-
tion are leakage characterization and design issue correction. The following task
description is given in a general case for power analysis and thus can be applied
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in a straight-forward manner to any of the different power analysis methods. In
addition to the above stated tasks, the area of constructive side-channel analysis
(CSA) emphasizes the quantification of the leakage characterization due to the
analyzed circuit properties, cf. [KSS10].
Leakage characterization Based on the designer’s or the evaluator’s knowl-
edge about the implementation itself and the circuit-realization of the algorithm
certain possible leakages from the security sensitive parts of the implementation
are assumed. The accuracy of the evaluation (identification and characterization
of the assumed leakages) strongly depends on the selected LFt(x,y) and thus on
LMt . The better the LFt(x,y) maps the physical circuit behavior, the better
the physically measured leakage from the target circuit can be characterized. In
case of a power analysis the power consumption on the target device is captured
multiple times in a separate acquisition process, cf. Sect. 4.3. Usually, the char-
acterization of the leakage is only the evaluation of the attack feasibility in terms
of the effort during the acquisition and the needed computational power in order
to perform the attack in a feasible time interval. This characterization of the
side-channel is done by one of the different evaluation metrics used in the end of
the evaluation process, cf. Subsect. 4.1.2.
Design issue correction The results of the side-channel resistance evaluation
should provide the designer or evaluator with an insight into the attack vulner-
abilty of the analyzed circuits parts. Please note that the evaluation results
strongly depend on the selected LMt and LFt(x,y). Thus, not sophisticated
versions of these may lead to a false confidence about the security of certain cir-
cuit components, cf. [EG10, HKSS11]. The insight into the circuit also strongly
depends on the leakage functions LFt(x,y) from another point of view. The
result of the evaluation phase provides only the information whether the as-
sumed leakage described by the LFt(x,y) exists and how much effort (e. g.,
amount of captured power traces) has to be considered to prove the correctness
of the hypothesis. Depending on the designer’s or evaluator’s expertise, the im-
plementation flaws of the attackable circuit component are identified based on
this binary insight and the source of side-channel leakage is estimated. In other
words, the more leakage functions an evaluator used during the evaluation, the
better she or he can identify the implementation flaws and try to correct these
weaknesses.
CSA-based aspects The focus of CSA is to give a designer or an evaluator
a more detailed feedback about the circuit issues instead of verifing a leakage
assumption depending on the selected LFt(x,y) in a binary way. The CSA ap-
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proach can extend the basic concept of a straight forward side-channel resistance
analysis, as described in the two paragraphs above. The additional gain is mainly
achieved by a more complex LMt , leading into a LFt(x,y) that still depends on
an intuitive leakage assumption of the implementation weaknesses, but also may
include a circuit specific expertise of the designer. Thus, the granularity of the
model can be varied depending on the implementation knowledge level and the
focused circuit components properties. Due to the profiling-based approach a
verification of the accuracy of the selected LFt(x,y) to counteract false confi-
dence about the security may also be supported. The ability of checking the
leakage model by the CSA concepts will be more detailed in the Subsect. 4.2.
The extended LFt(x,y) and its suitability for the side-channel evaluation in this
thesis will be discussed in this Subsection too.
4.1.1 Evaluation Procedure
The evaluation procedure of power analysis may be divided into four different
phases. All these phases are detailed in the following paragraphs and the algo-
rithmic description at the end clarify their positions in the general workflow of
a power analysis evaluation procedure. All tasks are described independently
from the different power analysis attacks, cf. Subsect. 2.2.1.2, in order to depict
the core concepts, which are applicable to leakage exploitation in the power con-
sumption domain. The focus of these tasks is side-channel evaluation of a data
oriented leakage exploitation, like the DPA in the area of power analysis. Nev-
ertheless, with minor adaptions the evaluation procedure works also for control
flow orientated analysis1 as a subset of the described tasks.
Leakage consideration In the beginning, depending on the insight of the
algorithm implementation on the device, sophisticated assumptions about the
unintended information leakages can be formulated. Thus, information leaking
critical security-sensitive components can possibly be identified. For each critical
component an exploitable leakage Lt is assumed by the designer or evaluator due
to his expertise. Based on these assumptions and the utilized technology platform
an appropriate LMt and consequently a sophisticated LFt(x,y) for each Lt are
derived. The leakage functions LFt(x,y) are later on utilized to calculate an
estimated hypothetical leakage L˜t caused by x and related hypothetical possible
values of y.
Captured leakage The actual leakage of the implemented algorithm within
the device under test can either be captured from an active implementation of
1such as SPA for power analysis
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a physical device or from a simulated physical model of the envisaged imple-
mentation. These captured data, so-called traces, are generated by varying the
accessible public parameters x and keeping the secret parameter y static. After
all the traces with one static value of y are recorded, the value of y is changed
and the capturing process is repeated with the the same values of x used with
the previous y value. In case of performing an evaluation with profiling-based
analysis methods2 traces are captured for all possible y values with an identical
set of x. Later on these traces are used to specify the model for the power con-
sumption by customizing the LMt to the analyzed implementation. The varying
algorithm parameter x, which is fed into the device or simulation, is also stored
in order to estimate the hypothetical leakage L˜t for every possible value of the
secret parameter by utilizing the LFt(x,y). For instance, in case of capturing
the leakage from an encryption scheme, these parameters would be the plaintext
and the secret key, respectively. The captured leakage can be interpreted as
a random variable with an unknown distribution depending on the algorithm’s
public and secret parameters.
Calculate secret-based hypothetical leakage The LFt(x,y) is utilized to
calculate the hypothetical expected L˜t for each tuple (x,y) based on every pos-
sible value of y and the stored values of x. The stored values of x stem from the
leakage capture procedure. In general, the hypothetical expected leakage is de-
termined in two steps. A leakage function LFt(x,y) exploits intermediate results
and states of an algorithm and, thus, calculates intermediate values depending
on the values of x and y. The afterwards performed transformation of the num-
ber values into the estimated leakage values in the physical domain is done with
regard to the underlying LMt . For profiling-based evaluation methods the pre-
viously additionally captured traces for all possible values of y are utilized to
customize the LMt to the analyzing implementation. In general, this customiza-
tion of LMt is done by reconstructing the probability distribution of the Lt value
for every y by deploying LFt(x,y) of the primarily LMt , cf. [CRR02].
Evaluate side-channel leakage The evaluation phase of the side-channel
leakage is separated into two steps. First, it has to be verified whether there
exists an exploitable leakage. Therefore, a side-channel distinguisher D(Lt, L˜t)
is used. It compares the hypothetical leakage L˜t for every value of the secret
algorithm parameters with the captured leakage Lt taken from the device under
analysis. By this procedure all the leakage assumptions and their estimated
hypothetical leakage from the previous phase are verified. The goal of the first
step is to get a ranking of the most likely y value, which causes the most similar
2see Subsect. 2.2.1.2
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Algorithm 9 Common side-channel evaluation of implementation I of algo-
rithm A
Require: Known functional behavior of algorithm A
1: Consider possible emitted Lt,I of I
2: Select appropriate LMt,I
3: Formulate LFt,A, I (x,y) based on LMt,I
4: for i-times select a y ∈ Υm do
5: while Performing j ∈ {1, · · · , N1} measurements the running implemen-
tation I on the device with selection of a x ∈ X n do
6: Capture the emitted Lt,I i,j and the parameter of (x,y)
7: for l = 1 to dim(Υ ·m) with y˜ ∈ Υm do
8: Estimate the expected L˜t,I i,j,l predicted←−−−−− LFt,A, I (x, y˜)
9: Post-processing of the captured traces to reduce noise
10: Use a distinguisher D(Lt,I i,j , L˜t,I i,j,l) to rank all y˜ (from min to max)
11: Store ranking in resi
12: Evaluate resi with evaluation metric
13: return Averaged metric result over all i-test cases
L˜t compared to the captured Lt. In the second step of the evaluation phase
the level of exploitation of the identified Lt is determined by utilizing one or
several evaluation metrics. The metrics focus on the effort to successfully exploit
the side-channel leakage emitted from the analyzing implementation in order to
reveal the secret parameters of the algorithm. They provide the information of
how many traces have to be considered in the evaluation to guess the secret
correctly, i.e., to distinguish between exploitable Lt and noise.
Algorithm 9 depicts the typical workflow of a side-channel evaluation investi-
gating an implementation I of an encryption algorithm A. The description of
this generic example focusing on the area of power analysis is to depict the appli-
cation in the focused side-channel area of this thesis. In case of a power analysis
Lt,I is the exploitable data dependent power consumption PLt,I of the device.
Due to the platform dependability of LMt,I , it is most likely to use the switching
activity based HD power model in case the implementation I bases on CMOS
technology. Thus, the corresponding leakage functions LFt,A, I (x,y) are utilized
to estimate the data-dependent power consumptions caused by a certain value
of y and multiple values of x. The x values have to be members of the set X n,
which represents all possible values of the used public parameter in LFt,A, I (x,y).
In a power analysis evaluation the estimated leakage L˜t,I of the implementa-
tion I is an estimation of the power consumption value P˜Lt,I , which bases upon
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Figure 4.1: AES circuit example
hypothetical values of y, symbolized by y˜. For every assumed y˜ value of the
set Υm 3, L˜t,I is determined by using the same fixed set of x values for different
values of y˜. All estimated P˜Lt,I values are grouped by the used y˜ values. This
procedure is repeated for all i different y values, which are used during the acqui-
sition phase. In the evaluation process a side-channel distinguisher D(Lt,I , L˜t,I )
compares the captured power consumption of the implemented circuit PLt,I to
the estimated hypothetical power consumption P˜Lt,I . The group with the most
likely same P˜Lt,I values as the captured PLt,I is ranked at the top and thus refers
to the most likely y˜. Thus, a fully exploitable Lt,I of the design yields y˜ = y.
4.1.2 Evaluation Metrics
Several different side-channel metrics have been proposed in literature in the last
years with the goal to pinpoint the side-channel resistance of an implementation
or to compare different side-channel distinguishers. The most frequently used
metrics in the area of power analysis will be discussed here in detail by means of
two, rather simple circuits. These circuits are “toy” versions of AES and func-
tionally describe the processing of just one byte at the last round of AES as
depicted in Fig. 4.1. Therefore, the secret round key k and the input p is are
of 8 bit width only and, thus, Υm = Υ, X n = X and y = k ∈ {0, · · · , 255},
x = p ∈ {0, · · · , 255} hold in this case, cf. Def. 3. Both versions are identical,
except for the implementation of the SBox. In one case a straight forward, algo-
rithmic implementation of a composite Field SBox COMP is realized according
to the description in [SMTM01]. The other SBox PPRM3 is realized from an im-
plementation published in [MS02] and is a three stage XOR-AND representation
of a composite field SBox.
The small difference of the SBox structures in the designs affects the amount
of exploitable leakage at a certain degree of effort. All metrics utilize the sorting
3represents the search space of all values of y
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Figure 4.2: Correlation result: All key values and their convergence over the
number of traces are depicted (a), (b) for the PPRM3 circuit and in (c), (d) for
the COMP circuit, respectively.
results of the same side-channel distinguisher in order to get the vulnerability
level of these circuits. For a better understanding of the origin of the identified
leakage of the corresponding circuit, the information quality of the results of the
evaluation metric is of special interest. In the illustrated example the correlation-
based distinguisher was used, which was introduced by [BCO04] as part of the
CPA method. For both designs the same LMt was exploited. This model stems
from a distance model, which exploits the value transitions inside the register of
the circuit. Thus, the resulting leakage function is given by:
LFt,toy-AES(k, p) =
8∑
i=1
(p⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))i (4.2)
The result produced from the inner term is summed up bitwise to calculate the
Hamming distance of the value transition inside the register, cf. Hamming dis-
tance in Eq. 4.1. LFt(k, p) is used to estimate L˜t for the all possible k values.
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Figure 4.3: Results of the different evaluation metrics based on the outcome of
the distinguisher, as depicted in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.2 depicts the results gained from DCPA(·, ·) with an used set for 100
captured traces of each implementation. These results are the basis for the dis-
cussion of the following side-channel metrics. Various metrics will be introduced
and their quality of information for the design process will be discussed.
Guessing entropy The guessing entropy provides the information of how
many key values have to be tested after the performed side-channel evaluation.
This metric simply delivers the position of the correct y˜c = yc out of a list of all
y˜ ranked by the distinguisher. Figure 4.3(a) clearly shows the different numbers
of needed traces to get DCPA(Lt, L˜t,kc(0)) of both designs ranked at position 1.
Guessing entropy was originally introduced in [KB07] as an information theoret-
ical metric and was applied as a practical metric for side-channel evaluation by
[SMY09]. However, this metric does not provide any useful information about
how good the hypothetical leakage L˜t based on y˜c is distinguishable from its
nearest neighbors.
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Standard score The standard score as given in Eq. (4.3) was introduced in
[GHP04] and is similar to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) mentioned in [MPO07].
Compared to the guessing entropy this metric provides the information on how
distinguishable the exploitable Lt is from noise. The down side is, as Fig. 4.3(b)
depicts, that it is not directly readable at what position the correct y˜c = yc is
ranked or if it is at the first position at all. Thus, a high standard score does not
need to reveal the correct yc and thus does not necessarily lead to a successful
exploitation of Lt.
Standard Score = D(Lt, L˜t,yc)− E(|D(Lt, L˜t,y)|) |∀y√
Var(D(Lt, L˜t,y)) |∀y
(4.3)
Relative distinguish margin This metric was introduced in [WO11b]. It
combines the guessing entropy and the standard score to a certain degree. Equa-
tion 4.4 formalizes the distance based evaluation metric.
Relative Distinguish Margin = |D(Lt, L˜t,yc)| −max(|D(Lt, L˜t,y)| |∀y 6= y
c)√
Var(DCPA(Lt, L˜t,y)) |∀y
(4.4)
The distance between the highest ranked alternative D(Lt, L˜t,y) value and the
value of the D(Lt, L˜t,yc) is caused by the correctly estimated secret parameter
yc. This distance is normalized by the standard deviation over all D(Lt, L˜t,y)
including the correct D(Lt, L˜t,yc) value. If the relative distinguish margin is
above zero, then the Lt is clearly exploitable and a side-channel attack would be
successful. A failing side-channel attack would be indicated by a value below zero.
Therefore, this metric provides the needed information for the design process to
differ between the design’s side-channel properties, cf. Fig. 4.3(c).
Success rate The success rate returns the average probability that the correct
secret value yc is ranked on the first position on a set of side-channel attacks with
an individual set of captured traces for each attack. As depicted in Fig. 4.3(d),
the more side-channel resistant an implementation is, the more traces are re-
quired to reach the 100% boundary. The figure displays the success rate over
50 CPA attack experiments for both designs, i.e., the PPRM3 and the COMP.
Thus, this metric is very similar to the guessing entropy method, but compared
to that metric it considers the average vulnerability of an implementation. The
designer deduces the same information from the success rate as from the guessing
entropy.
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Figure 4.4: Template-based power consumption characterization of the imple-
mentations given in Fig. 4.1
From all the discussed side-channel evaluation metrics the relative distinguish
margin seems most promising for the purpose of quantifying different implemen-
tations of the same functionality. Besides the information of how many traces
are required to exploit the Lt in order to compromise the circuits secret, the
metric also provides the insight of the SNR. Thus, it yields directly how good
the L˜t,y of the correct secret value yc is distinguishable from all the other L˜t,y.
Another metric, which might be useful, is the mutual information. The mutual
information is mainly used as a side-channel distinguisher, the so-called MIA, cf.
[GBTP08]. In [SMY09] it is proposed as a means to compare the vulnerability
of different designs according to a certain attack hypothesis. Nevertheless, these
authors argue that less entropy not always yields a better success rate. In this
case MIA is not directly used as a metric, because profiling-based approaches
are used to determine the vulnerability of the implementation. However, a non-
linear model seems to be more efficient than the combination of a linear model
and a non-linear distinguisher, cf. [WOS12].
4.2 CSA-Based Evaluation Metric
The discussed metrics in Subsect. 4.1.2 utilize the results of the selected side-
channel distinguisher in order to provide the essential information from the dis-
tinguisher results. This information yields the distinguishability between all
L˜t,y˜ | ∀ y˜ 6= y˜c and L˜t,y˜c , which best fits the emitted Lt of the implementation.
The confidence of those outcomes are premised on the result of D(Lt, L˜t,yc),
which strongly depends on the selected LMt and LFt(x,y). According to that
circumstances it is crucial to select both an appropriate LMt and an appropriate
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LFt(x,y). None of the previously discussed metrics provide the insight about
the quality of the selected LMt or even the origin of the side-channel leakage in
terms of the selected LFt(x,y). A straight-forward approach to cope with the
problem of selecting appropriate LMt and LFt(x,y) in order to generate adequate
L˜t,y˜ is to use the template method firstly proposed in [CRR02]. As depicted in
Fig. 4.4, this method constructs a distribution of the power consumption for
every parameter set or, like presented in here, based on a simple LMt such as
HD.
From these distributions it is clearly visible that some groups of Hamming
distances are more easy to distinguish than others, which yields a better exploita-
tion of the Lt. But still there is neither a constructive feedback on the origin of
the side-channel leakage of these implementations nor a quantification of the as-
sumed Lt. A concept, which satisfies the request for a quantitative analysis aimed
to an identification of the side-channel origin inside a circuit, was introduced re-
cently. The concepts of the so-called constructive side-channel analysis for FPGA
platforms was firstly mentioned in a previous joint publication [KSS10]. In this
cooperative work the author’s own contribution was to empirically verify the the-
oretical concepts of the quantitative feedback between the LMt and the design.
This includes the adaption of the theoretical approaches to a practical example
in terms of interpreting the results of the constructive side-channel analysis and
to compare them to an in-depth analysis of the example circuit. During this
empirical verification it was demonstrated by comparison to another design that
a different design with the same functionality yields completely different results
from the constructive side-channel analysis. Thus, this thesis exploits these basic
concepts and extends them to cover the focused purpose.
4.2.1 Constructive Side-Channel Analysis
The core idea of the constructive side-channel analysis (CSA) is to gain insight
into implementation flaws after or during the construction phase of a design.
One of the central elements in the proposed approach is to provide quantita-
tive information on the side-channel leakage of a design, which can be used in
a constructive manner to improve the circuit subsequently. The quality of the
evaluation results based on a CSA is improved by providing additional informa-
tion about the quantification of the exploitable vulnerabilities of the analyzed
design. Due to an extended profiling-based LMt the model properties unveil the
origin of the side-channel leakage. Additionally, it was demonstrated in the pre-
liminary joint publications [HKSS11] and [HSS12] that CSA offers verification
methods in order to check the LMt suitability and accuracy. Thus, the usage of a
CSA-based approach truly supports the evaluation of runtime mutating counter-
measures against power analysis attacks in terms of quantifying the side-channel
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resistance improvement provided by these methods.
The first phase of the Stochastic Approach4 (SA) is used as the basis for CSA.
Originally, this approach was developed to attack block cipher schemes by ex-
ploiting the data-dependent electrical current consumption. This profiling-based
method was developed to exploit side-channel information more efficiently than
non-profiling based attack methods. The improvement can be equally efficient
to classical template attack, but with less profiling effort, cf. [SLP05, LRP07,
Sch08]. The efficiency of the Stochastic Approach is comparable to the efficiency
of template attacks especially for a small set of profiling traces, cf. [GLRP06].
For designing side-channel resistant circuits one of the strongest possible at-
tack has to be considered in the evaluation phase in order to get the correct
confidence level of security of the implementation and its vulnerabilities. Thus,
it is crucial to utilize profiling-based evaluation methods in order to gain a better
knowledge of the vulnerability than in case of a non-profiling analysis. The SA
is more suitable as the underlying means for the CSA methods than the clas-
sical template attacks, because it gains more quantitative insight. Due to the
adaptation of the LMt in the profiling phase via a linear regression method, the
impact of the different leakage assumptions formulated as LFt(x,y) is directly
yielding the origin of the Lt inside the circuit. Therefore, the result of the CSA
is more transparent with respect to the circuit activity in combination with the
exploitable side-channel leakage than the classical template method introduced
by [CRR02]. This transparent quantitative relationship between the cause of the
Lt inside the circuit and the Lt itself is of great interest for investigating espe-
cially the impact of mutating countermeasures on the side-channel resistance. In
the following a short outline of the CSA approach will be given in conjunction
to the Stochastic Approach.
CSA based on the first phase of the Stochastic Approach Typically,
like all other side-channel attack methods, the SA utilizes the divide-and-conquer
principle. The realization of the random variables for the subkeys are denoted
by k and the plaintext or ciphertext is denoted by x. In order to indicate the bit
width s and p of these values the following properties are applied: k ∈ {0, 1}s
and x ∈ {0, 1}p, cf. [Sch08]. In this thesis, the meaning of the designator x
still holds, while k equals to the denotation y regarding Def. 3. The captured
physical observable,i.e., the power consumption5, is interpreted as a random
variable, which is sampled precisely at the moment when the traces are captured
by a measurement device. These sampled physical instants Pt(x,y) at a certain
point in time t are a composition of a deterministic part ht(x,y) and normally
4see Subsect. 2.2.1.2
5originally the electrical current consumption
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distributed noise Rt6. Thus, the general assumption of the LMt of the SA is:
Pt(x,y) = ht(x,y) +Rt (4.5)
The distribution of Pt(x,y) depends on the tuple (x,y), but it is unknown.
The parameter (x,y) affects the also unknown deterministic additive component
of the power consumption ht(x,y). This term ht(x,y), in [KSS10] denoted as
leakage function, refers directly to the exploitable Lt of the analyzing circuit,
because this component is the only deterministic element of the unknown distri-
bution Pt(x,y) that responses to the algorithm parameters (x,y). The unknown
function ht(x,y) equals to LFt,CSA(x,y) and quantifies the LMt,CSA . The task of
the linear regression in the profiling phase is then to estimate this unknown
function ht(x,y) by an approximator, denoted as h˜t(x,y). The core idea is to
represent h˜t(x,y) as a function for mapping every value of y in a 2p-dimensional
subspace Fy (where p is the bit-width of x). These functions directly map all
tuple combinations of x and y onto R:
Fy := {h′ : {0, 1}p × {y} → R} (4.6)
The ‘clue’ of this approach is that the search space for the estimated leakage
function h˜t(x,y), represented as a subspace Fy, can be reduced to the relevant
and, hence, the appropriate dimensions. Thus, the approach is aiming at the best
approximator h˜∗t (x,y) for the unknown leakage function LFt,CSA(x,y) described
by an u-dimensional subspace Fu,t;y. This subspace is spanned up by u basis
functions gj,t;y with j = 0, . . . , u− 1:
Fu,t;y := {h′ : {0, 1}p × {y} → R | (4.7)
h′ =
u−1∑
j=0
β′jgj,t;y with β′j ∈ R}.
The functions gj,t;y represent the basis vectors of the subspace Fu,t;y and
should cover the assumed relevant sources of the implementation Lt, cf. [KSS10].
The impact of the basis functions to the correct estimation of h˜t(x,y) is scaled
by the value of the weighting coefficients β′ in Eq. 4.7. Thus, LFt,CSA(x,y) can
be estimated depending on each basis function by determining its β-coefficient
by means of a linear regression. This regression utilizes the profiling phase of
the SA, in which a set of N1 measurements is captured with known values for
y and x at a certain point in time. It is proceeded in that manner so that the
measured power consumptions Pt(x,y) can be arranged within a vector of the
6it is assumed that the distribution is normally distributed with E(Rt) = 0 and is indepen-
dent from ht(x,y)
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(a) β-coefficients 2 to 9 of PPRM3
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(b) β-coefficients 2 to 9 of COMP
Figure 4.5: Results of the CSA evaluation on the AES example circuits by uti-
lizing a F9,t;y as base for the LMt
dimension (N1 × 1). Based on the used x values for the N1 measurements, a
(N1× u)-matrix is then composed:
A :=

g0,t;y(x1,y) . . . gu−1,t;y(x1,y)
... . . . ...
g0,t;y(xN1 ,y) . . . gu−1,t;y(xN1 ,y)
 . (4.8)
Usually, A contains the switching activity of each of the basis vectors of the
subspace. By utilizing the linear regression the equation system A b = Pt(x,y)
has the solution
h˜∗t;y(·,y) =
u−1∑
j=0
β˜∗j,t;ygj,t;y(·,y) with β˜∗j,t;y := b˜∗j , (4.9)
which is estimated by the least square method of h∗t;y. In the preliminary work
[KSS10] it was demonstrated that the β-characteristic provides quantitative feed-
back and is applicable for (re-)design methods. The own contribution to this pub-
lication was the major part of applying this theoretical concept to a practical
FPGA implementation. So, the β-characteristic was exploited to methodically
reveal the flaws of implementation.
LFt(x,y) for the AES example After this informative overview of the first
phase of the Stochastic Approach enlightened in an constructive context (CSA),
it is now demonstrated how to utilize this approach for the example circuits.
Afterwards, improvements of the CSA concept with new methods and models
are introduced. Since then, the weighting coefficients of the linear regression are
referred to as β-coefficients and are not further specified in a physical context.
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Figure 4.6: Scheme of the effects captured by different leakage models
At a closer look these β-coefficients are the averaged amount of consumption per
basis of the subspace of the measured medium, for instance the power consump-
tion. For the 2-dimensional F2,t;y the basis 2 directly refers to the consumption
of a HD or HW approach. Concerning F9,t;y, the basis 2 to 9 refer to the bit
lines independently and thus the averaged sole consumption of each bit line is
depicted.
In case of analyzing toy-AES7 circuits from Subsect. 4.1.2 the Hamming dis-
tance based LFt,toy-AES(k, p) from Eq. (4.2) refers to the following gj,t;y(x,y) of
the 2-dimensional LFt,toy-AES,CSA2 (k, p):
g0,t;k(p, k) = 1 (4.10)
g1,t;k(p, k) =
( 8∑
i=1
(p⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))i
)
− 4
As usual, the first basis of the subspace is set to the constant value of 1 to
capture all non-zero expectation values of the measured power consumption by
the least square estimation in order to fulfill the requirements E(Rt) = 0 and
E(gj,t;y(·))|∀j 6= 0. The subtraction of four for the second basis vector assures that
the basis is at least normalized, cf. [Sch08]. The depicted results of Fig. 4.5 stem
from the 9-dimensional F9,t;y, which is analogously constructed to the subspace
F2,t;y. The LFt,toy-AES,CSA9 (k, p) of the subspace F9,t;k refers to the following basis
vector functions:
g0,t;k(p, k) = 1 (4.11)
gj,t;k(p, k) = (p⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))j −
1
21 for j = 1, . . . , 8
7Note, the case specific setting of x and y in the beginning of SubSect. 4.1.2
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Figure 4.7: β-coefficients of LFt,toy-AES,CSA12 (k, p) exploiting basic FPGA compo-
nents
As before, it is ensured that basis vectors have an expectation value of zero by
the subtraction of 121 to normalize the basis. The shapes of the plots of the abso-
lute value of the β-charaterstic in Fig. 4.5(a) and Fig. 4.5(b) clearly indicate the
different implementation properties of these two functionally identical designs.
These figures provide the information that for both designs the seventh bit has
the biggest impact on the power consumption. While the COMP circuit has
only two significant bits yielding a significant power consumption, the PPRM3
design has more significant bits with a higher consumption. This information is
not provided by the result of the distribution analysis depicted in Fig. 4.4. How-
ever, the absolute values of the plots cannot be compared directly, because the
β-coefficient values depend on the absolute value of the overall captured power
consumption value Pt(x,y). Thus, the β-characteristic of a design is not directly
comparable with any other design in terms of side-channel resistance.
In the preliminary joint work of [KSS10] the relationship between this signifi-
cant position in the plot and the more power consuming structure of the circuits
was validated by the thesis author. In this, as in all the other joint publications
relating the SA, the value transitions inside registers were always exploited in
order to construct the activity matrix A, cf. Eq. (4.8). Thus, the power con-
sumption of the switching activity and the different load properties of the bit
lines to the registers were exploited bitwise only.
As suggested in [DPRS11], the leakage may also arise from interactions within
the circuit between two or even more bit lines. The so-called higher dimensional
subspace based leakage models are more reasonable, if some additional switching
activity of the combinatorial circuit, for instance hazards, occurs, which depends
on several parameters, cf. Fig 4.6. In the joint preliminary work [HKSS11] this
property was investigated and the results clearly show that the Lt based on the
interaction between bit lines has a great impact on the side-channel resistance
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of a design. More precisely, the subspace of dimension 37, 93, and 163 were
investigated. The interaction of these subspaces is shown in the Fig. 4.6 and
their leakage functions are listed in the appendix B.
Concerning the architecture of an FPGA-based design and the gained insight
from higher dimensional subspace based leakage models following questions rise:
What degree of granularity does the CSA approach offer? Is it possible to
model a LFt(x,y) to characterize the Lt caused by a basic element of the FPGA,
for instance a LUT?
To answer these questions in this thesis the LFt,toy-AES,CSA9 (k, p) of the F9,t;y is
extended by 4 additional subspaces, which each holds the boolean description of a
basic element of the FPGA. For this experiment lookup tables of the SBox circuit
were selected, which are directly connected to the input of the SBox area of the
circuit. The originally exploited value transitions inside the circuit described by
LFt,toy-AES,CSA9 (k, p), as denoted in Eq. 4.2, are adapted to the transitions of the
value changes at the SBox input. Thus, the basis vectors of LFt,toy-AES,CSA12 (k, p)
are defined as:
g0,t;k(p, k) = 1 (4.12)
gj,t;k(p, k) = ((p⊕ k)⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))j −
1
21 for j = 1, . . . , 8
gj,t;k(p, k) = Flutj−8 ((p⊕ k)⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))j for j = 9, . . . , 12.
The coefficients to weight the switching activity describing functions are moved
to the lookup table functions (Flut·), which are presented in more detail in the
Appendix B. The results in Fig. 4.7 depict that only one of the basis vectors,
which models the LUT switching activity, has an equally significant impact to
the solely bit transition oriented basis vectors 2 to 9. Nevertheless, the empirical
validation of the possibility to characterize or to measure the vulnerability of ba-
sic FPGA components by the CSA approach is a very useful feature of the CSA.
This feature indeed provides the possibility to specify the required structural
changes by means of a mutation of the data path, while the functional behavior
is still maintained by the modified circuit.
4.2.2 Signal-To-Noise Based Evaluation Metric
A common method to characterize the quality of a measured trace is the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR). It has a great influence on the success rate of a side-channel
evaluation and thus is an important characteristic for security implementations,
cf. [GHP04, MPO07, GMS+11]. For instance, the SNR may be used to quantify
the strength of countermeasures. In this section it is introduced how to use the
first phase of the SA to estimate the SNR. In particular, this method has the ad-
vantage that it is not constrained to some fixed leakage model (like the Hamming
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Distance), it may be viewed as a means to combine the SNR with any appropri-
ate leakage models. This metric also solves the incompatibility when comparing
the weighting coefficients (β-coefficients) of two different designs. Thus, the SNR
metric is an useful extension of the supportive CSA methods. As Fig. 4.8 shows,
the two different implementations of the example circuit in Subsect. 4.1.2 are
now directly comparable in terms of the relationship between the exploitable
leakage Lt and the noise Rt at certain points in time.
SNR Leakage Estimation The signal-to-noise ratio is an important metric
to distinguish a determinable signal or elements of a distribution of high interest
from signals or elements of a distribution of no interest, which is often denoted
as noise (R). In general, the SNR is defined as
SNR = Var(signal)Var(noise) , (4.13)
which characterizes the ratio between the variance of the determinable signal or
elements of a distribution and the noise of the measurement. A more accurate
ratio for a power analysis orientated SNR is given in [MPO07] by
SNR = Var(PLt)Var(POPt,others + PRt)
, whereas Pt = PLt + POPt,others + PRt . (4.14)
Comparing the SNR oriented standard score metric8 with the metric in Eq. (4.14),
the SNR Eq. (4.14) is not constrained to a deterministic fixed-value of a side-
channel distinguisher result. Thus, the metric in Eq. (4.14) is more suitable to
be adapted to the linear regression result of the CSA.
Please note that the power consumption Pt and its composing components are
interpreted as a realizations of random variables, which are yielded from sampling
these random variables at the measurement process. PLt denotes the exploitable
power consumption, which is approximated by the data-dependent deterministic
part h∗t;k. Furthermore, PR denotes the power consumption due to the noise,
which is captured by Rt. Finally, POPt,others denotes the power consumption of
parallel running activities of the circuit and, of course, the approximation error
of the linear regression.
As mentioned before, SA originally exploits the electrical current consump-
tion, which is proportional to the power consumption due to the measurement
over an ohmic resistor shunt, c.f., Eq. (4.15). Of course, this also holds for
the additive components of the measured power consumption. Similar to the
description in the joint publication [HSS12], the following relation holds:
Var(ILt)
Var(IOPt,others + IRt)
∼ Var(PLt)Var(POPt,others + PRt)
. (4.15)
8mentioned in Subsect. 4.1.2
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Figure 4.8: SNR-based CSA evaluation of different designs of the AES example
In this preliminary work the concept and the idea of utilizing a signal-to-noise
ratio like metric to rate the LMt accuracy for the CSA approach as well as a
major part of the empirical validation was contributed by the thesis author.
For the following equations it is considered that the mapping expressions of the
functions g0,t;y(·,y), . . . , gu−1,t;y(·,y) construct a Fu with an orthonormal basis in
order to assure correct relationships between the different weighting coefficients.
Straight-forward computations for the determinable information yield
Var(PLt) = VarX(h∗t;y(X,y))
= EX(h∗t;y(X,y)2)− E2X(h∗t;y(X,y))
=
u−1∑
j=0
β2j,t;y − β20,t;y =
u−1∑
j=1
β2j,t;y . (4.16)
The computation of the variance of the noise is done in a similar way,
Var(POPt,others + PRt) = VarX,R(∆ht;y(X,y) +Rt)
= VarX,R(Pt(X,y)− h∗t;y(X,y)) . (4.17)
The term ∆ht;k(X,y) denotes the approximation error due to the least square
estimation. Equation (4.18) follows from the fact EX(PLt(X,y)−h∗t;y(X,y)) = 0.
Using (4.16) and (4.17) together, they result in an estimator for the signal-to-
noise ratio
(S˜NR) =
∑u−1
j=1 β˜
2
j,t;y
Var
(
pt(x1,y)−h˜∗t,y(x1,y), . . . , pt(xN,y)−h˜∗t,y(xN,y)
) . (4.18)
Var(·) denotes the variance, which is taken over the distance between the esti-
mated exploitable power consumption by h∗t,k and the realization of the power
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Table 4.1: Comparison between success rate ratio and S˜NR ratio
Design type PPRM3 COMP Ratio
# Traces for success rate=1
based on DCPA(L, L˜) at time 96 125 0.768
instant 2877
SNR level at time instant 2877 1.223 0.932 1,309= 10,763
consumption pt (due to sampling in the measurement process) over a set of N
elements. For side-channel evaluation the S˜NR quantifies the relation between
exploitable information and the ’sum’ of the power consumption POPt,others of
other circuit activities that run in parallel and the noise Rt. Equation (4.18)
requests an orthonormal base such as for the F9,t,k. If the selected subspace of
the LMt is not directly orthonormalizable, the following equation can be used:
(S˜NR) =
V arX(h∗t;y(X,y))
Var
(
pt(x1,y)−h˜∗t,y(x1,y), . . . , pt(xN,y)−h˜∗t,y(xN,y)
) . (4.19)
In case of comparing several subspaces, this method quantifies how much use-
ful side-channel information the corresponding leakage model extracts from the
traces in relation to the existing noise.
In [HSS12] it was demonstrated that the S˜NR relationship between two dif-
ferent evaluation runs yields the same relation between the success rates. In that
case the same captured traces were evaluated with different leakage models LMt .
Applying the S˜NR metric in the same context to the two different example test
circuits from Sect. 4.1.2, again the metric approximated the coefficient of the
success rate to each other quite well, cf. Tab. 4.1. In case of approximation the
affect of the SNR on the success of the attack compared with an attack under
idle SNR condition, the derivation the SNR relationship based on CPA, provided
in [MPO07], could be affirmed experimentally. The success rate values of this
experiment stems from the results depicted in Fig. 4.3(d), while the values of the
S˜NR stem from the results displayed in Fig. 4.8. The fourth column of Tab. 4.1
displays the relationship between the two metrics. They are inverse proportional
to each other as observed empirically:
Success rate
(
DCPA(Lt,PPRM3, L˜t,PPRM3)
)
Success rate
(
DCPA(Lt,COMP, L˜t,COMP)
) ∼ S˜NR (COMP )
S˜NR (PPRM3)
(4.20)
The small difference in the coefficient values seems to result from approximation
errors of the linear regression within CSA.
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The SNR metric provides the information on how good the exploitable in-
formation extracted from the captured power traces based on the learned linear
regression model is, which is established at the end of the first phase of the
stochastic approach. This is an advantage for using profiling based attacks with
a powerful learning phase, because a designer can directly see the effect of his
countermeasure directly by the SNR value. In addition, due to the linear regres-
sion coefficient the designer gets an quantitative feedback about the contribution
of the exploitable power consumption per basis vector function, which can be sued
to model a specific property of the circuit. Especially for hiding based methods
this metric can be utilized for the design evaluation of countermeasures in order
to determine how much the distinguishability between exploitable leakage infor-
mation and noise is decreased. Another advantage is that, due to the variance
relation analysis of the current consumption based on the linear regression model
and its subtraction of the actual captured current consumption of the targeted
device, different implementations can be compared more fairly.
4.3 Acquisition Setup
The required physical determination of Lt in the second side-channel evaluation
phase9 is provided by an acquisition setup. The acquisition setup as detailed in
this thesis is an electric laboratory measurement setup and consists of a platform
target device, a digital oscilloscope, a laboratory power supply, and a personal
computer, cf. Fig. 4.9. The power supply is used to provide a direct current
source of appropriate quality. Thus, the power traces are actually measured
from the target platform running the design under test implementation in nor-
mal operation mode. The need for physically capturing the exploitable power
consumption is caused by the circumstances that the vendor of the target plat-
form (Xilinx, Inc.) does not provide the needed accurate models. The supported
power consumption models by Xilinx and the architectural insight at the simula-
tion tools level are not precise enough for the purpose of side-channel evaluation
of different implementations at the accuracy degree, which this thesis is investi-
gating.
In order to reduce the systems methodical measurement errors in terms of
measurement noise, the complete setup was composed with low noise compo-
nents. Thus, the measurement platform the SASEBO-GII evaluation FPGA
board [SAS] was used in this thesis, which has been meanwhile established as
the standard platform for power analysis in the community of side-channel anal-
ysis. The utilized oscilloscope in the measurement setup provides a high sample
9see Subsect. 4.1.1
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frequency of 500 MHz and a sample rate of 2 Gsa/s10 to quantify the power
consumption at a sufficient resolution. The evaluation platform is separated into
segments. One segment establishes the communication with the host, while the
other one is considered for the side-channel measurement exclusively. Theses
segments are electrically separated and only connected by a filtered bus con-
nection between the FPGA of each segment. Beside a separate voltage supply
and stabilizer the SASEBO-GII board offers measurement points for accessing
the power consumption values. The power consumption is captured via a shunt
measurement over the Virtex 5 target FPGA, cf. Fig. 4.9. A 1 Ω shunt resistor
is exploited to measure the voltage basis to calculate the power consumption via
the ohmic law. Please note that the power consumption is directly proportional
to the measured voltage drop due to shunt measurement over an ohmic resistor.
Test environment on the Sasebo-GII The environment to test implemen-
tations on the evaluation board has been modified from the original version
of the board manufacturer and a new architecture has been developed. Based
on the results of a supervised bachelor thesis [Tha09] a transparent modular
master-slave based communication architecture has been established. One re-
quest on the architecture was to provide an efficient and reliable communication
10Giga samples per second
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protocol. Thus, the interconnection of the two FPGAs has been realized by an
Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB), which bases on the Advanced Microcontroller
Bus Architecture (AMBA) technology. The bus master (Spartan3A device) man-
ages the data transfer between an onboard USB-chip device and the bus slave
(Virtex 5 device) as an arbiter, cf. Fig. 4.10. A shared memory realizes the data
exchange between the analyzing cryptographic implementation on the Virtex 5
and the APB slave module. The cryptographic implementation under analysis
can directly access the data in the requested word width without any synchronous
control element. Thereby, the core under test is solely running on the target de-
vice after the data is transferred into the shared memory. The shared memory
also offers a 16 bit width status register and a command register, which are both
connected to a small control automaton that starts the analyzing core. This au-
tomaton also writes the result of the core implementation back into the shared
memory, so that it is accessible over USB via the APB bus master. The status
register is only readable while the command register is completely accessible over
USB. Due to the fully customizable automata, implemented cores with multiple
functionalities are supported as well.
Host PC management On the host side drivers at the operational system
level provide appropriate functions and operations to communicate with the eval-
uation board via the USB protocol. As depicted in Fig. 4.10, these drivers are
encapsulated in Matlab scripts, which offer services to the measurement applica-
tions. Thereby the user has a transparent handling of the data exchange between
the host and the analyzing core implementation. Due to the modular structure
and standardized functions, the Matlab measurement application is generic and
can easily be adapted to new algorithms. The USB interface to the SASEBO-GII
is also utilized by a small script to reconfigure the Virtex 5 via a configuration
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file from the host PC. Thus, the measurement application is able to directly
reconfigure the device before the actual measurement routine starts.
Besides the reconfiguration and data exchange with the evaluation board the
host PC also controls the digital oscilloscope via the measurement application.
The application sets up the oscilloscope to the appropriate measurement settings
before it is used in the measurement routine. The measurement routine coordi-
nates both components, the evaluation board and the oscilloscope. Furthermore,
the application is responsible to keep the set of the captured L from the eval-
uation board and the used parameter x and y of each of the measurements
runs consistent. This requirement is of great importance to assure an error-free
processing of this data in the evaluation phase, which yields the side-channel
resistance confidence of the analyzed core.
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In this Chapter the application of the concept of mutating data paths on
symmetric-key based cryptographic algorithms is demonstrated. The Advanced
Encryption Algorithm (AES) has been selected, because it is one of the most
frequently used encryption algorithms today.
First, the general implementation structure of the example will be discussed.
After the general partitioning considerations of the AES-128 architecture the
countermeasure concept for the AES Mutate is introduced. All the proposed
basic design methods, including online allocation, dynamic binding, and flexible
scheduling, are executed in order to get an AES implementation with a mutating
data path. The impact of manipulating the dp(processing unit,concurrency,task)
of the AES Mutate aimed for decreasing the exploitable characteristic power
consumption will be evaluated with the metrics introduced in Sect. 4. In the end
the proposed side-channel hardened AES design is compared with an assimilable
AES design with countermeasures proposed in the literature .
5.1 Considerations about the Architecture
In this chapter the presented application example, using AES, demonstrates
the feasibility of applying the mutating data path concept on symmetric-key
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Figure 5.1: SW/HW partitions of the AES Mutate architecture
cryptographic algorithms. Due to the structure of the block cipher algorithm the
attacks and the architecture of the decryption part are quite similar and thus
would not gain additional insight for reasons of demonstrating the feasibility of
the proposed concept of mutating data paths.
One property of mutating data paths is the manipulation of in parallel pro-
cessed data, therefore the planned architecture of AES Mutate has to be able
to process a 128 bit-width data word within one clock cycle. The four basic
operations of the AES, which transform the data from the plaintext after 10
rounds into the ciphertext, should also be modularized into efficient hardware
components in order to achieve a 128-bit data processing. Therefore, the key
scheduler has to be able to provide a new complete roundkey every clock cycle.
The interface for handling the AES Mutate as well as the handling of the
algorithm itself should be very similar to the handling of a non-mutating hard-
ware AES implementation. An additional port is needed to provide a source of
entropy, e.g., a random number generated by a secure random number genera-
tor, to the architecture for mutating the data path non-deterministically. The
architecture should be able to process incoming encryption requests without a
larger latency between the incoming plaintexts, so that the data can be streamed
to the AES Mutate core.
5.1.1 Partitioning of the AES Modules
The general overview of the software/hardware partitioning of the AES mutate
is given in Fig. 5.1. As depicted by the figure the major part of the software
partition controls the data flow as well as the configuration of the architecture.
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Figure 5.2: Applied methods on the AES Mutate architecture
Therefore, the behavior in terms of reconfiguring the system and executing an
encryption from the controlling point of view is easy to adapt. The VLIW op-
code for the configuration of the data path as well as the opcode to control the
in hardware implemented basic operation for an encryption is stored inside the
program memory. A BRAM module of the FPGA platform can be utilized for
this purpose. A small micro-machine addresses the program memory in the cor-
rect order. The functionality of the middleware is separated into a software part,
embedded into the micro-machine, and into a hardware part. The software part
of the middleware manages the control flow and the execution order in case of
changing the binding. The hardware part of the middleware is embedded in the
data path, where it controls the data flow. The basic operations for executing a
round operation are embedded in a reconfigurable data path as hardware compo-
nents. Also the needed operations for expanding the secret key to the according
round key are grouped to the hardware partition. The hardware area of the key
scheduler is also reconfigurable, so that the variation of the round execution in
terms of in parallel processing intermediate values or execution length does not
affect the computational correctness of the result.
Figure 5.2 depicts the design-specific reasons for the mutating procedure to
partition the functionalities in that manner. The interface between the two pro-
posed methods flexible scheduling and online allocation is the dynamic binding
layer. This layer is realized by components of the micro-machines as well as
architecture entities with the data path and the key scheduler. In detail the
middleware components are used to realize the dynamic binding as it is a cen-
tral element according to the proposed design flow in Fig. 3.15. The other two
methods are strictly partitioned into either the hardware or software domain.
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5.2 Implementation of the Mutating Data Path
In this section the implementation procedure of the mutating data path is de-
tailed. First the attack threat on AES is discussed in order to identify, which
basic operation is most vulnerable due to its power consumption signature and
thus has to be secured. Based on this discussion the different properties of the
mutating data path are reasoned in terms of which parts of the data path have to
be reconfigurable to increase the effort of a power analysis attack. The develop-
ment of the data path is oriented on the design flow and will include all proposed
methods of the mutating data path to increase the security of the design.
Threatening scenarios The most focused targets of power analysis attacks
on block cipher are the key scheduler or the first and last round operation of
the encryption process. As the key scheduler is planned to be implemented in
hardware with a fixed runtime and the key expansion is done in parallel, no power
analysis attacks, as reported in [Man02], can be conducted efficiently. A bigger
threat therefore is the attack of the first or the last round of the AES. These two
rounds are of great interest because the adversary is able to recalculate every
possible intermediate value for those rounds with the knowledge of the plaintext
or the ciphertext. In both attack scenarios the adversary usually tries to exploit
the power consumption of a bijective operation with a strong value diffusion.
Therefore the substitution functions,i.e., the SBoxes, of a block cipher algorithm,
is the ideal candidate for this exploration. Of course, the processed value of the
SBox has to be dependent on the secret key value of the encryption algorithm.
In case the adversary can not directly exploit such a substitution function for
his or her attack, he or she can try to exploit the operation, which processes the
secret value directly with the current intermediate value. Usually this function
is a non-bijective function of two parameters, e.g., a XOR-operation, thus the
attack is not so effective, because multiple combinations of the two parameters
lead to the same result and power consumption.
The scenario of attacking the final round of AES usually exploits the bit flips
of the register transition from the previous intermediate value of the state to the
final ciphertext value stored in the register. Thus, the leakage function of attack-
ing the i-th subkey k(i) of the last round LFt,AES_last,CSA9 (k(i), c(i)) is composed by a
9-dimensional subspace F9,t;k and refers to the following j basis vector functions:
g0,t;k(c(i), k(i)) = 1 (5.1)
gj,t;k(c(i), k(i)) =
(
c(i) ⊕ Sbox−1(ShiftRows(c(i) ⊕ k(i)))
)
j
− 121 for j = 1, . . . , 8
where c(i) denotes the corresponding byte of the ciphertext, which is processed
with k(i) in the last round. Instead of using a subspace F9,t;k to describe the
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Figure 5.3: Leakage function of an exemplary AES data path
bit flips, the Hamming distance over the lower expression in Eq. 5.1 without the
subtraction of 12 can be used as well. The switching activity of the SBox in the
final round of the AES is the targeting activity to be exploited, cf. the Hamming
distance in Eq. 5.2.
LFt,AES_SBox,HD(k(i), c(i)) = HD
(
c(i), Sbox−1(ShiftRows(c(i) ⊕ k(i)))
)
= HW
(
c(i) ⊕ Sbox−1(ShiftRows(c(i) ⊕ k(i)))
)
(5.2)
With small changes to the Hamming distance model in Eq. 5.2 the SBox output
of the first round can be attacked by the following leakage model:
LFt,AES_SBox,HD(k(i), p(i)) = HD
(
p(i), SBox(p(i) ⊕ k(i))
)
= HW
(
p(i) ⊕ SBox(p(i) ⊕ k(i))
)
(5.3)
Of course, an equivalent leakage model, LFt,AES_SBox,CSA9 (k(i), p(i)), with a sub-
space, F9,t;k, can also be used for attacking the SBox of the first round:
g0,t;k(p(i), k(i)) = 1 (5.4)
gj,t;k(p(i), k(i)) =
(
p(i) ⊕ SBox(p(i) ⊕ k(i))
)
j
− 121 for j = 1, . . . , 8
In order to exploit a register transition of the first round either the previously
stored register value has to be determined or the next register value has to be
calculated. For hardware implementations it is possible that the next register
value after the first round is the complete second round including the Mix Column
function, which puts the intermediate calculation at a not affordable cost. The
effort of calculating the intermediate values of a targeting byte rises in that
case from 28 to 240. Figure 5.3 visualizes the described leakage on an example
data path. The attack scenarios of both leakage functions are depicted on the
schematic of an AES data path.
Properties of the mutating data path Based on the threat scenarios the
mutating data path should have the following properties:
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• Executing the SBox operation on several different implementations
• Dynamically changing the degree of in parallel processing SBox units
• Merging round operations into one clock cycle
• Manipulating the word-width that is processed during a clock cycle
• Randomizing the state representation in the shared memory
The SBox operation is selected for the online allocation as well as for the
dynamic binding, because it is the most vulnerable operation in two of three dif-
ferent round operations. In two of the three presented exemplary attack scenarios
the SBox operation was a central element to determine the estimated exportable
power consumption of the block cipher. It is a bijective operation with a high
amount of diffusion and, as reported in [MS02], it has the highest power con-
sumption of all the different basic operations of the AES. Also there are a lot
of different kinds of implementations of SBox processing units reported in the
literature with different design specific properties, cf. [SMTM01, MS02]. This
design specific properties are exploited to manipulate the characteristic power
consumption of the operation processing the same data.
Due to the higher power consumption of in parallel processing SBox imple-
mentations the variance of the power consumption signature will get broader.
Thus, the SNR of extractable information within the captured power traces will
decrease and thereby increase the attacking effort. The varying of the operation
per clock cycle as well as merging round operations (routines of the AES, cf.
Fig. 3.13) are used in order to hide the number of concurrently active processing
SBoxes. In order to apply flexible scheduling this property can be seen as a
mixture of shuﬄing [MPO07] and the temporal jitter countermeasure [MGV08].
The last action point of the previously listed properties shall prevent such an
exploitation of the XOR operation by a sort of randomized register pre-charging
and shuﬄing. Please note that the design specific properties of the mutating
data path are mentioned in Subsect. 5.1 and have also be considered.
5.2.1 Mutating SBoxes
In this Subsect. the different SBox implementations for the online allocation
are described. First, the structure and design properties of each utilized SBox
type is introduced, focusing on the designing properties from a CAD point of
view. Therefore, the amount of resources are compared as well as the timing
properties. After that the different implementations are evaluated according to
their common power consumption signature. Therefore, the introduced method
in Subsect. 3.2.2 is used to compare the different designs. The comparison is
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conducted on real measurements and not simulated power traces in order to
analyze the behavior of the implementations and the interference on the power
consumption in practice. The measured power consumption is derived from a
voltage drop over a measurement shunt and the value of the shunt, cf. Fig. 4.9.
5.2.1.1 Implementation of Different SBoxes
Due to the flexibility of the mutating data path, the design requirements and
the runtime properties of the AES Mutate, all SBox implementations have to be
implemented by combinatorial logic only. So, in terms of using the Virtex 5 as
FPGA platform, the SBox implementations are constrained to only utilize LUT
and MUX primitives of the FPGA architecture, as well as the interconnection
network for linking the different basic primitives. Therefore, no specialized macro
cell modules of the Virtex 5 platform, e.g., BRAM cells, are used.
As foundation for the different SBox implementations two different basic ap-
proaches of implementing a SBox are selected. The first basic approach is a
lookup-table based SBox implementation, where the mapping of the SBox is done
directly by a large value array. The second approach is to exploit the mathematic
nature of the irreducible polynomial in GF(28) by tower field constructions or by
so-called composite field implementations.
SBox implementations Six different SBox implementations were selected for
the online allocation method of the mutating data path. All analyzed implemen-
tations are embodied based on a description of the given reference in the liter-
ature. The various SBox implementations are listed in Tab. 5.1 together with
their design properties. The two main design properties of the FPGA platform,
occupation of LUT and the delay of the critical path, are also important selection
criteria of the SBox types of the mutating data path in order to meet the design
requirements.
The first SBox implementation, TBL, is a look-up table based implemen-
tation. The second design PPRM1 formulates the input and output mapping
of the non-linear substitution function as a boolean expression in the Reed-
Mueller notation1 for each bit line. The design PPRM3 utilizes the approach
of a composite field based SBox and partitions the SBox design into three sec-
tions and describes the functionality again in the Reed-Mueller notation. The
pre-inversion section (isomorphic mapping and scaling to subfield), the inversion,
and the post-inversion section(inverse isomorphic mapping and affine transfor-
mation) are individually expressed by a Reed-Mueller notation based equation.
1The functional behavior is constructed only by the boolean functions featuring XOR and
AND operations only
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Table 5.1: Resource consumption of the different SBox implementations
SBox design Based on Type LUT Critical path delay
TBL [PP10] Lookup-table 32 4.5 ns
PPRM1 [MS02] Boolean expression 80 5.6 ns
PPRM3 [MS02] Composite field 64 8.5 ns
COMP [SMTM01] Composite field 50 9.2 ns
COMP2 [Koc08] Composite field 63 9.7 ns
HYP1 [Koc08] Lookup+Composite 55 10.4 ns
The COMP design is partitioned into five sections, but using the same subfield
composition as PPRM3. The isomorphic mapping is not merged with the subfield
scaling in one boolean expression and also the inverter is separated into two
sections, which are expressed by the boolean operations AND and XOR. The
design COMP2 uses the same approach as PPRM3 and COMP by representing
the different sections of the design in the Reed-Mueller notation but utilizing
another combination of subfields. The design HYP1 is a modified form of the
COMP2 implementation: the inversion module in GF(4) is not constructed by a
boolean expression. Instead, it is modeled by a lookup-table.
Due to the requests of the design properties only the four fastest design are
considered for the evaluation of their characteristic power consumption signature.
Evaluation of the different types For the evaluation of the data-dependent
power consumption signature the total correlation is used. A set of 50,000 power
traces of each SBox implementation was captured, mentioning that the different
designs were stimulated with the same input data during the capture process.
The total correlation evaluation compares the power consumption distribution
of Design A of each Hamming distance (HD) class with the power consumption
distribution of design B of each HD class, cf. Subsect. 3.2.2.
Figure 5.4 visualizes the result of the evaluation of the SBox implementations
against each other. If the total correlation is 1 the distributions are identical,
if the value is 0 they are completely uncorrelated. The black colored frames
indicate, which HD class of design B fits best to a HD class of design A due to
the correlation of their power consumption distribution of the HD classes. It is
evident that in most cases the mapping of the power consumption distribution
of one HD class of design A does not most likely fit to the distribution of the
same HD class of the comparing design B. For instance, in Fig. 5.4(a) the power
consumption distribution of HD class 0 of design A (PRPM1) is likely more sim-
ilar to the HD class 4 of design B (PPRM3). Figure 5.4(a) also displays another
beneficial feature of using the both designs together for the online allocation.
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(a) PPRM1(A) vs. PPRM3(B) (b) PPRM1(A) vs. COMP(B)
(c) PPRM1(A) vs. TBL(B) (d) PPRM3(A) vs. COMP(B)
(e) PPRM3(A) vs. TBL(B) (f) COMP(A) vs. TBL(B)
Figure 5.4: Evaluation of the SBox implementations by the total correlation over
the different Hamming distance classes
Multiple power consumption distributions of HD classes of PPRM3 are mapped
to the power consumption distribution of HD class 8 of the PPRM1 design.
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A similar kind of information compression2 can be observed in four other
evaluation cases. The evaluation further reveals that the weakest combinations
of designs for the online allocation are the combination of the SBox designs
PPRM3 and COMP. For both designs the power consumption distribution of
the HD class 0 is most likely and no other HD classes are mapped to the HD
class 0. Therefore, the power consumption of a Hamming distance of 0 is nearly
similar for both designs, and thus does not disturb the power consumption by
changing from a PPRM3 design to a COMP design in this special case. This
issue can be addressed by the dynamic binding and flexible scheduling method in
order to vary the amount of in parallel processing operations in order to envelop
the exploitable power consumption in noise.
5.2.2 Concurrent SBoxes Management
Due to the structure of AES four different types of SBox implementations should
always be used to process the intermediate data of the current AES round. In
order to save space on the FPGA platform the following concurrent SBox man-
agement is used to change the SBox type of each byte section of the AES. The
previously introduced virtualization method is used to change the binding be-
tween the state register and the SBox implementations in addition to the partial
reconfiguration. Not every SBox in the data path is partially reconfigurable by
the reconfiguration design flow, as depicted in Fig. 3.15 in order to save resources
and execution time.
Figure 5.5 provides a general overview over the structure and architecture
of the mutating data path. As mentioned before the data path for the trans-
formation of the plaintext to the ciphertext (upper circuit part) as well as the
data path for the key expansion (lower circuit part) have to be mutable. The
key scheduler circuit is extended with a multiplexer in order switch between the
updated bytes of the round key value or the previous bytes of the round key
values. Thus, the key scheduler can process the next round key at once 128 bit
in parallel or in 96 bit, 64 bit, or 32 bit wide chunks.
The mutating data path is able to perform with the same granularity of the
in parallel processed bits. Furthermore, the degree of in parallel processed data
is scalable in 8 bit steps, reaching from 8 bit up to 128 bit per clock cycle. The
challenge of changing the degree of in parallel processed data through the SBox
processing unit stems from the entangled data dependency between the columns
and the rows of the AES round state matrix. The P-units work on the columns
of the matrix and they are interconnected by a reconfigurable ShiftRows function
(RSR), cf. Fig. 5.6(b) in order to process the complete state matrix. The RSR
2The used side-channel distinguisher D(Lt, ·) maps the power consumption value of Lt to
the wrong HD class.
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Figure 5.5: Scheme of the mutating data path
can shift each byte of a rows from one byte to the right up to two bytes on
the left, as well as bypass the shift operation in order to maintain the word
position of the 4 bytes on the rows. This unit can also be used to either shuﬄe
the state representation on-the-fly as well as to change the binding to a specific
SBox implementation. In case of shuﬄing the state, the subkeys have also to
be shuﬄed in the same order, thus an additional RSR unit is attached between
the P-units and the key scheduler. Therefore, the state randomization can be
inserted within a round operation without needing additional clock cycles for the
reconstruction of the original value of the state register position.
The SBox is embedded in the so-called P-unit, which also offers the func-
tionality of the AES specific basic operations MixColumn and AddRoundkey, as
well as a bypass functionality. The AddRoundkey function is merged with the
MixColumn function to the so-called MXOR, which is configurable to perform
the MixColumn operation following by an XOR operation for the AddRoundkey
functionality or only to perform the XOR operation. Thus, the P-unit provides
three functionalities, which can be performed combined at any level or be exe-
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Figure 5.6: Hardware realizations of the Basic AES operations
cuted individually3 and a bypass functionality, cf. Fig 5.6(a).
In order to support the partial reconfiguration on the Virtex 5 platform at
moderate costs in terms of resources and execution time, a so-called reconfig-
urable P-unit (rP-unit) is added to the data path instead of a forth P-unit, cf.
Fig 5.5. The rP-unit contains an additional layer of multiplexers to route the
data flow between the partial reconfigurable areas for the SBox implementations,
cf. Fig 5.6(c). While one reconfigurable area is updated with a new configuration
the other area can perform the SBox operation.
Virtualization Scheme As mentioned in Subsect. 5.1.1 , the data flow rout-
ing functionality of the middleware is embedded in the discussed data path.
The virtualization in this design can be conducted by utilizing the RSR units
to reroute or shuﬄe the content of the register states. Thereby, different SBox
implementations are utilized for each byte-width entry of the AES state matrix,
if each P-unit/rP-unit instance has different SBox implementations. The config-
3SBox, MixColumn, AddRoundkey
5.2. Implementation of the Mutating Data Path 107
uration settings of the P-unit/rP-unit are the other control element supporting
the virtualization in order to realize the method of dynamic binding. Due to
these settings the amount of in parallel working SBoxes per clock cycle can be
controlled.
The software side of the virtualization can be realized by a VLIW opcode.
The VLIW architecture is clearly integrated in the proposed data path of AES
Mutate as well as the VLIW opcode commands that are controlling the config-
uration settings of the P-units/rP-unit and the RSR units. Table 5.2 provides
an overview of the command schemes of the AES Mutate VILW opcode struc-
ture. Due to the flexible VLIW architecture and the hardware architecture of
the embedded middleware functionality into the data path the virtualization is
a suitable interface between dynamic binding and flexible scheduling. The con-
figuration settings P-unit/rP-unit can also be used to change the amount of in
parallel working hardware components. For instance, the execution of multiple
XOR operations can be manipulated in order to change the degree of in par-
allel working XOR operations, as well as the amount of basic AES operations
executed within one clock cycle.
5.2.3 Merging Round and Routines
The last proposed method of realizing a mutating data path, i.e., flexible schedul-
ing, is not only applicable on the XOR-operation. Due to the modularized, flex-
ible, and reconfigurable HW/SW-codesign architecture of the AES Mutate the
execution of every basic AES operation can by randomized. The application of
flexible scheduling offers the ability to change the degree of in parallel working
processing units of all basic AES operations in this data path. The processing
word width of the data path is adaptable for all operations from 32 bit over
64 bit and 96 bit up to 128 bit within one clock cycle. The HW/SW-codesign of
the micro-machine in combination with the embedded middleware infrastructure
inside the data path provides a flexible rescheduling via the VLIW operations,
independently of the current data path processing width. Therefore, the number
of different data-dependent operations processed within one clock cycle is ran-
domizable and thus, basic operations of different AES round operations can be
merged.
5.2.3.1 Flexible Micro-Programs
The flexible rescheduling of the AES encryption is possible by utilizing the
VILW opcode commands in small micro-programs. Each AES round operation
or merged round operations are composed of such micro-programs and consist of
at least one micro-program. The micro-program is executed by the small micro-
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Table 5.2: VLIW structure of AES with mutating data path
Bit 35 34 33 32 31:24 23:16 15:12 11:8 7:0
Function last rEN loD loK RSRdata confP newRK prKey RSRkey
Function Description
last Indicates the last operation of a round.
rEN Enables the registers to store the current intermediate values
if they are set to logical one.
loD Enables the data path to load a new plaintext for encrypting
it.
loK Enables the key scheduler to load a new key value, which is
then used to derive the round key values.
RSRdata Configures the ShiftRows function in the data path.
confPU Configures the functionality of the P-unit.
newRK Indicates to the key scheduler that a new round key is
needed.
prKey Enables the processing of the current round key in the data
path.
RSRkey Configures the ShiftRows function for the key scheduler to
the data path.
machine attached to the data path. In every clock cycle the program counter of
the micro program is incremented and executes one VLIW opcode command. In
this clock cycle the opcode-command controls the processing units of the basic
AES operations and sets the configuration of the data path, thus, the word width
of the data path is defined by the opcode command.
Table 5.2 depicts the VLIW structure of the AES Mutate and details the
VLIW opcode. One opcode command is 36 bit wide and thus is perfectly storable
in a BRAM module of the Virtex 5 platform. The first four most significant bits4
of the opcode are control signals, which do not reconfigure the data path of the
AES Mutate. The MSB bit, bit 35, is used as a delimiter in order to identify
the end of a round operation. This delimiter alerts the micro-machine to load
the next micro-program by jumping to a randomly selected start address of a
suitable micro-program instead to increment the program counter. Therefore,
the complete AES encryption can be composed by randomly selecting micro-
programs for each round operation of the AES algorithm.
4Little endian is used and thus the MSB is on the left side
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The lower 32 bits are used to reconfigure the data path during runtime in
order to randomize the power consumption. The micro-programs are therefore
more or less reconfiguration settings to change the architecture of the data path
dynamically. This context based reconfiguration approach was selected, because
the partial reconfiguration done by the Xilinx Inc. design flow takes too long. Re-
configuring a P-unit by this procedure will take at least 25 msec, in that amount
of time the design can perform 25 encryptions. In order to hide the reconfigu-
ration time all P-units have to be replaced by rP-units, which will significantly
increase both, the resource consumption and the minimal delay of the critical
path. Therefore, the tradeoff with only one rP-unit and a flexible micro-program
structure has been selected. The depicted AES Mutate design in Fig. 5.5 con-
tains three P-units and one rP-unit. This design is also used for the side-channel
evaluation of the AES Mutate.
For instance, the opcode of a micro-program for executing an intermediate
AES round within one clock cycle is 0xC1BFFFF00 with or without partial re-
configuring the rP-unit in parallel. It is also possible to compose micro-programs
for dummy operations or to perform the shuﬄing of the register states in an in-
dividual clock cycle, which both will affect the throughput performance.
5.2.4 Side-Channel Analysis of the Data Path
The SNR metric, introduced in Subsect. 4.2.2, is used for the side-channel evalu-
ation of the AES mutate in order to determine its vulnerability to power analysis
attacks. All three already described threat scenarios are considered during the
analysis of the AES Mutate. In order to visualize the increased effort, an unse-
cured AES design is evaluated with the same threat scenarios. The unsecured
implementation is a fully parallel implementation using the COMP SBox design
and will from now on be denoted to as AES COMP. The data path width of the
design is 128 bit so that it can also process 128 bits per clock cycle.
The evaluation is conducted with 500,000 power traces, which are captured
from the SASEBO-GII platform. The measurement procedure, where and how
the power traces are captured, as well as the acquisition framework is detailed
in Sect. 4.3. In case of the analysis of the AES Mutate design an additionally
implemented trivium stream cipher [PP10] is used to provide the required random
input for the unpredictable data path mutation. For both designs the SNR metric
is evaluated for the time interval of interest. By comparing the SNR values of
the COMP and Mutate designs, the increased attack effort is derivable due to
the relationship of the SNR value of both evaluations, cf. Eq. (4.20). The AES
COMP design is similar to the design of the DPA V2 contest [DPA] and, thus,
a good reference point in order to estimate the increased resistance to power
analysis attacks due to the application of the mutating data path concept.
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Figure 5.7: Results of the SNR metric analysis of AES Comp and AES Mutate
Figure 5.7 depicts the result of the evaluation. It displays the SNR metric
values for attacking the AES COMP and AES Mutate with the leakage functions
of the two previously introduced attack scenarios. The corresponding subspace
descriptions for the leakage function are given in in Eq. (5.1) and Eq. (5.4).
During the measurements all proposed methods for mutating the data path have
been activated5. The attack on the reference design COMP is only successful
for the first attack scenario with LFt,AES_last,CSA9 (k(i), c(i)), while the attack on the
SBox with LFt,AES_SBox,CSA9 (k(i), p(i)) is not successful. Comparing the SNR values
of the attack on the last round of both designs, the SNR level of the AES Mutate
is at least nineteen times smaller as the SNR level of the AES COMP. Table 5.3
Table 5.3: SNR levels of the different subkeys
Subkey 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SNR(COMP)
SNR(Mutate) 70.97 75.16 192.98 114.04 19.32 36.86 23.66 34.51
Subkey 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
SNR(COMP)
SNR(Mutate) 87.35 604.01 192.95 81.66 32.58 235.28 85.74 101.65
provides the ratio between the SNR levels of both designs for the leakage function
focusing on the last round.
5Online allocation by remapping the SBox types by virtualization as well as partial recon-
figuration of the rP-unit, dynamic binding and flexible scheduling using the VLIW architecture
together with the micro-program approach
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Figure 5.8: Analysis of the correctly found subkeys over number of traces
None of the subkey values of AES Mutate could be revealed by using 450,000
traces for the linear regression in the profiling phase and 50,000 traces for the
attack phase. In case of analyzing the reference design, AES COMP, with 450,000
traces in the profiling phase and 20,000 traces in the attack phase, all subkey
values can be revealed by using LFt,AES_last,CSA9 (k(i), c(i)).
The history of the correctly found subkeys was analyzed in order to iden-
tify the needed number of traces to successfully attack the AES COMP design
using LFt,AES_last,CSA9 (k(i), c(i)). Thus, the attack result of the third phase of the
stochastic approach for both designs was evaluated and recorded after every 100
steps. The result of this analysis is depicted in Fig. 5.8. All subkeys of the AES
COMP can be revealed after using 17780 traces. After this amount of traces the
result is stable, while the subkey values of the AES Mutate design seems to not
converge to the correct value of any subkey. As visualized in Fig. 5.8 the analysis
does find one subkey value at maximum after a certain number of traces, but
then chose a false subkey value.
5.3 Discussion of the Evaluation Results
The inhere discussed countermeasure for sure belongs to the class of hiding based
countermeasures. Well-known from the literature, hiding countermeasures "only"
increase the required effort of the attack by increasing the noise compared to
masking based attacks, which scramble the intermediate value to secure the com-
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Table 5.4: Resource consumption of various AES designs
Design Ref. LUT Reg. BRAM Freq. Throughp. Cycles Platform[Mhz] [ Bitscycle ] for enc.
AES-128 without countermeasures
TBL 1225 276 0 284 128 11 Virtex 5
PPRM1 1881 276 0 264 128 11 Virtex 5
PPRM3 2028 276 0 187 128 11 Virtex 5
COMP 1726 276 0 164 128 11 Virtex 5
AES-128 with countermeasures
Mutate 2957 387 0 101 32-128 14-51 Virtex 5
Boolean masking [RYS11] 4772 904 0 100 128 11 Virtex 5
Multiplicative masking [OO07] 7628 1291 0 44 128 - Virtex-E
Threshold [HF12] 12627 1438 0 79 128 - Virtex 5
SDDL [SVKH10] 1410 518 20 37 128 - Spartan3
WDDL [HF12] 7292 1160 0 56 128 - Virtex 5
MDPL [HF12] 12140 1205 0 44 128 - Virtex 5
Intra-masking [HF12] 5898 546 0 141 128 - Virtex 5
putation. But considering second order attacks masking also "only" increases the
required effort of the attack. A classical second order attack like in the masking
case is not directly applicable for this countermeasure, because the computational
secret is not shared. Nevertheless, it may be possible to conduct an attack on the
micro-machine in order to gain the executed opcode of the VLIW architecture.
But due to the parallel processing and the balancing of the addressing scheme
for the micro-programs, it seems more promising to sort and cluster the different
power traces based on the power consumption signature. The development of
an efficient sorting scheme to cluster the different traces and identifying them is
one open question for future research of this thesis. Due to the combined hiding
methods based on online allocation, dynamic binding and flexible scheduling the
normal approach to fight shuﬄing or dummy operation countermeasures with the
known method of windowing is not directly applicable. The changing amount
of operations per clock cycle in terms of types of operations and degree of in
parallel processed bits makes this new countermeasure not directly comparable
to shuﬄing or dummy operations.
Another criterion to rate the efficiency of a countermeasure is the additional
resource consumption in order to harden the design. Table 5.4 provides an
overview of the resource consumption of designs with and without countermea-
sures. The unsecured implementations are realized by utilizing the same types
of SBox designs that are used for the online allocation. Thus, the unsecured
designs provide a good comparison of the additional resource consumption of the
AES Mutate. The table also lists other countermeasures reported in literature
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of both countermeasure classes6, which are applied on the Virtex 5 architec-
ture or at least implemented on a Xilinx FPGA. The discussed countermeasure
AES Mutate is followed by three masking countermeasures, then by two hiding
countermeasures, and in the end two 1 bit masking schemes are listed. One
advantage of the here presented AES Mutated is that the resource consumption
is only nearly doubled, while the speed is only halved. In terms of the least
speed lost the AES Mutate is the second best design, while in terms of the least
additional resource consumption it is the design with the lowest used amount
of LUTs, registers, and BRAMs. Note that the mutating data path design is
still combinable with a classical masking scheme, for instance boolean masking.
Mutating data path seems to be an efficient hiding implementation method for
this block cipher.
The cost for the improvement against power analysis attacks of the AES
Mutate is the longer execution time and thus a drop down in throughput. The
amount of required clock cycles for encrypting a plaintext may vary from 14 to 51
clock cycles, because it depends on a random number. Nevertheless, the decreas-
ing throughput is moderate compared to other countermeasure proposals listed
in Tab. 5.4. So, this countermeasure is very appropriate for embedded systems
utilizing a small FPGA module, which do not want to spent much additional
resources and still want to achieve a moderate computational speed.
6Hiding and Masking
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Next to the symmetric-key cryptography the asymmetric-key cryptography
is an important field of algorithms in order to secure data, communication, or
systems. The application of the mutating data path concept on an asymmetric-
key cryptography algorithm is demonstrated in this chapter. The elliptic curve
cryptography algorithm (ECC) has been chosen for these studies, as it has been
in the practical field for several years and is used in many systems for electronic
signature schemes or key-exchanges. An ECC-coprocessor has been designed
in order to accelerate the central operation of this asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm with a hardware based scalar multiplication.
A general overview of the design and architecture of the coprocessor will be
provided to the reader at first. In the following section after the partitioning of
the architecture of the ECC-coprocessor design the countermeasure concept of
the inhere introduced ECC Mutate designs are discussed. This discussion also
includes several threat scenarios of side-channel attacks to the ECC algorithm.
Based on these scenarios the properties dp(processing unit,concurrency,task) will
be adapted by all the introduced proposed methods of the mutating data path1.
1Online allocation, dynamic binding, and flexible scheduling
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Figure 6.1: SW/HW partitions of the ECC Mutate architecture
The impact on the varying dp(processing unit,concurrency,task) due to the ap-
plied methods of the mutating data path like dynamic binding is evaluated in
terms of decreasing the exploitable power consumption signature. The side-
channel evaluation is done by the metrics discussed in Sect. 4. After the side-
channel evaluation the results are discussed by comparing the introduced ECC
Mutate design to assimilable ECC designs and published countermeasures found
in literature.
6.1 Hardware Architecture Considerations
The application example of applying the concept of mutating data path on the
ECC algorithm focuses on the point multiplication operation of the elliptic curve
arithmetic. Therefore, the main task of the coprocessor ECC Mutate is to per-
form the point multiplication on a curve in GF(p) by utilizing a mutable data
path architecture. The coprocessor should support the point multiplication on
arbitrary prime field based elliptic curve with a bit length of up to 384 bits.
In specific it should be able to process the recommended curves of the NIST
institute: P192, P224, P256, and P384 by NIST, cf. [GFD09].
A hardware acceleration should be considered to achieve the appropriate com-
putational throughput even for the point multiplication on the P384 curve. The
manipulation of the second design property by dynamic binding is done on the
finite field operational level. Therefore, an appropriate number of redundant
hardware operation units is needed to achieve a suitable degree for the manipu-
lation of concurrent processing units.
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Figure 6.2: Applied methods on the ECC Mutate architecture
The ECC-coprocessor should provide a simple interface, which does not dis-
tinguish too much from a non-mutating implementation, thus ports for the key
data, the basis point, and the multiplication result should be present. An ad-
ditional port for the mutating version is needed in order to provide a random
number from a secure random number generator to the coprocessor. This ran-
dom input is used as entropy source in order to mutate the data path architecture
in a non-deterministic way.
6.1.1 Partitioning of the ECC Coprocessor
The architecture of the ECC-coprocessor is based on a hardware/software code-
sign. The foundation of the design is based on the results of a diploma thesis
[Kus10] and a bachelor thesis [Ema11] investigating an ECC implementation on
the Virtex 5 platform. The implementation of the ECC-coprocessor architecture
of the design for further investigations in this thesis was done in a student project
[Ema12]. Figure 6.1 depicts the partitioning of this architecture in a software
and hardware section. The functionality of the finite field arithmetic is mapped
to the hardware section in order to accelerate the computation of the operations:
Multiplication, addition, subtraction, and inversion are the basic finite field op-
erations, which are provided as related processing hardware units. Thus, the
ECC-arithmetic operations are also improved, because the finite field processing
units are utilized to compose the different operations of the ECC-arithmetic.
The software of this heterogeneous architecture controls the data flow and the
execution of the ECC-arithmetic operations as well as the configuration of the
architecture. The multiple necessary operation and control sequences to perform
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a scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve are grouped in the ECC-arithmetic
layer, which is implemented in software and is executed on a small micro-machine.
The software procedures, describing the ECC-arithmetic operation, are flexible
to adapt in order to use different mathematical procedures or algorithms to com-
pose a scalar multiplication with basic finite field operations. A VILW opcode
infrastructure is utilized to provide a virtualizeable middleware architecture in
the hardware section of the data path to achieve a higher degree of freedom for
a flexible instruction handling and a high hardware reuse on this architecture.
The software for controlling the sequence of basic finite field operations, as
well as the configuration of the data path, is stored inside the instruction memory
of this architecture. The intermediate values and the final computational results
are stored in an extra data memory. Every basic finite field hardware module
is able to access the data memory, so that it can be used as a shared memory
storage between the processing hardware units. For both memory modules, for
storing instructions and data, the BRAM primitives of the Virtex 5 platform
have been utilized.
The partitioning for the different sections of application of the three proposed
methods for mutating data paths are depicted in Fig. 6.2. The method online
allocation is applied on the finite field basic operations in order to manipulate
the first of the design properties dp(processing unit,concurrency,task). The other
two methods, dynamic binding and flexible scheduling, are applied on the ECC-
arithmetic layer and thus manipulate the behavior of the architecture by varying
the control flow of the composed scalar multiplication.
6.2 Realization of the Mutating Data Path
After the general overview of the architecture of the coprocessor ECC Mutate has
been provided, the implementation of the mutating data path will be discussed
in the following. Before the mutating properties of the constructing mutable
data path are discussed, different threat scenarios on the coprocessor are inves-
tigated. In specific, the vulnerability of different operational steps due to the
corresponding power consumption signature is discussed and thus certain attack
scenarios are identified. With the result of this analysis the different properties
for the mutating data path are reasoned in order to increase their resistance to
power analysis attacks. The transformation of the data path into a mutating
data path is oriented on the design flow, introduced in Sect. 3.5, and includes
the different proposed mutating design methods.
Threatening scenarios The scalar value n of a scalar multiplication [n]P with
a basis point P on the elliptic curve E is the secret an attacker is interested to
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reveal. With the knowledge of the secret scalar valuean adversary may be able
to break the security or the trustworthiness of an ECC based cryptographic
system. The secret, i.e., the scalar value or the key (from a cryptographic point
of view), controls the composition of the scalar multiplication, which is based on
the ECC-arithmetic operations point-doubling and point-addition, cf. [HMV03].
Thus, each combination of P and n refers to a certain point on the curve E.
An adversary may exploit the side-channel characteristic of the point-doubling
and point-addition operation in order to reveal the composition of the scalar
multiplication and thus the secret key.
The two ECC-operations point-doubling and point-addition are arithmeti-
cally different due to the mathematical nature of the elliptic curve in GF(p)
and thus have a different sequence and amount of basic finite field operations
to be performed. Therefore, the first threat scenario is to identify two different
patterns in the captured power traces pointing to the scalar multiplication com-
position and, thus, to extract the secret value of n. In some straight-forward
implementations only one captured power trace is needed in order to perform a
successful SPA to extract the secret value from the exploitable power consump-
tion signature.
In case of a balanced implementation of the point-doubling and point-addition
operations the attack of the first threat scenario will not work. The SPA at-
tack will also be not successful in case that the sequence of the executed ECC-
operations is identical for every value of n. The Montgomery ladder algorithm
provides such properties for the scalar multiplication, cf.[CF05]. Another at-
tack vector to overcome these circumstances is to attack the register transitions
of the intermediate values after the a point-doubling or point-addition is done.
To be more precise, the intermediate values of the base point transformation
are attacked. Due to the algorithmic structure of the Montgomery ladder ei-
ther a point-doubling operation or a point-addition operation is performed on
specific intermediate values. This circumstance leads to two different possible
intermediate values, which are determinable with the knowledge of the previous
intermediate values or previous point on the curve E. Due to the fact that the
basis point P is public, the first intermediate value depending on the most signif-
icant bit of n is therefore attackable. Thus, the adversary can mount a DPA-like
attack to verify his binary hypothesis, if a point-doubling or a point-addition
operation is performed, leading to a specific intermediate value. Of course, the
adversary needs to repeat this procedure with multiple different basis points in
order to correctly extract the information by correlating the hypothesis with the
power traces. After he or she revealed the most significant bit of n, the adversary
is able to determine the consecutive intermediate value and thus she or he can
attack the next bit of n, cf. [Cor99].
The switching activity of the register transition of the intermediate value is
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Algorithm 10 Determination of the activity A for attacking the Montgomery
scalar multiplication on E
Require: A point P on E, a positive integer n=(nl - 1, ...,n0)2, the position m of
the attacking key bit ni with l-2 ≤ i < 0, and the l-i a priori known secret
key bits
Ensure: The point [n]P
1: P1 ← P and P2 ← [2]P
2: for v = l-2 down to 0 do
3: if nv = 0 then
4: P1 ← [2]P1 and P2 ← P1  P2
5: else
6: P2 ← [2]P1 and P1 ← P1  P2
7: Ptemp ← P1
8: /*Hypothesis for nv=0*/
9: P1 ← ([2]P1)
10: Ah0(v)← P1,x ⊕ Ptemp,x
11: /*Hypothesis for nv=1*/
12: P1 ← (P1  P2)
13: Ah1(v)← P1,x ⊕ Ptemp,x
14: return Ah0(i) and Ah1(i)
needed in order to formulate the two required hypotheses. Algorithm 10 describes
the procedure to determine the switching activity of the Montgomery ladder for
a certain bit of the secret scalar n. The algorithm returns the XOR-results Ah0(i)
and Ah1(i) of the previous and current register values storing the x-coordinate P1,x
of the current point P1 on the curve E, where Ah0(i) bases from the assumption the
investigating ni=0, as Ah1(i) refers to the hypothesis ni=1. The point-doubling
operation is denoted as [2], while the addition operation is symbolized by .
The obtained activities Ah0(i) and Ah1(i) can then be used with the Hamming
distance model to gain the following leakage function:
LFt,ECC_ML,HD(ni,Ah0(i) ,Ah1(i))
HW(Ah0(i)) for ni = 0HW(Ah1(i)) for ni = 1 (6.1)
Please note that it is more reasonable to not use the complete bit representation
of Ah0(i) or Ah1(i) for the Hamming weight operation, because most architectures
do not store the intermediate value of the Montgomery ladder operation at one
point in time. It is more likely that an ECC-coprocessor architecture is storing
the intermediate value sequentially word-wise within the memory, causing a spe-
cific power consumption. In case the word length of the architecture is 32 bits
and thus a 32 bit is chunk of Ah0(i) or Ah1(i) can be used for the leakage function.
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It is also possible to consider the exploitable power consumption by a linear
regression approach. The subspace F2,t;k of LFt,ECC,CSA2 (k(i),Ah0(i) ,Ah0(i)) can be
used instead of the HD model in Eq. (6.1), where ni is denoted as subkey k(i) in
Eq. 6.2 to apply it to the stochastic approach.
g0,t;k(k(i),Ah0(i) ,Ah0(i)) = 1 (6.2)
g1,t;k(k(i),Ah0(i) ,Ah0(i)) =
(Ah0(i))j − 16 for k(i) = 0(Ah1(i))j − 16 for k(i) = 1 (6.3)
Properties of the mutating data path Due to the two threat scenarios the
mutating data path should have the following properties:
• Executing the finite field multiplication operation on several different mul-
tiplier implementations
• Dynamically changing the amount of in parallel processing hardware units
of finite field multipliers
• Changing the current representation of the intermediate values by different
projective coordinates
.
The finite field multiplication is selected for the online allocation and the dy-
namic binding due to its gate complexity and thus, the higher power consump-
tion compared to the addition and subtraction module. In addition, the finite
field multiplication is a basic operation in both ECC-arithmetic operations point
doubling and point-addition with a high utilization factor. This high utilization
factor is perfectly exploitable in order to vary the degree of in parallel processing
multiplication units. The different point-doubling and point-addition algorithms,
which are used in the design, support up to three in parallel working finite field
multipliers. Therefore, the type of multiplier implementation has a strong impact
on the overall power consumption signature of the ECC-coprocessor.
The flexible binding method is applied on the coprocessor by randomizing
the projective coordinate representation. The intermediate values, the current
position on the basis point after some ECC-arithmetic operations, are represented
in different coordinate systems. Instead of randomizing only one coordinate
parameter representation like the randomized projective coordinates reported in
[Cor99], the complete representation is changed.
6.2.1 Mutating Finite Field Multipliers
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Algorithm 11 High-radix Montgomery multiplication from [MHAS08]
Require:
X = (xm−1, ..., x1, x0)2r , /* Operand X*/
Y = (ym−1, ..., y1, y0)2r , /* Operand Y*/
N = (nm−1, ..., n1, n0)2r , /* gcd(R,N)=1, with X,Y < N < 2k =R */
w = −N−1mod 2r
Ensure: Z=XY2−r·m mod N
1: Z = 0
2: v = 0
3: for i = 0 to m - 1 do
4: (ca,z0) = z0 + xiy0
5: ti = z0w mod 2r
6: (cb,z0) = z0 + tin0
7: for j = 0 to m - 1 do
8: (ca,zj) = zj + xiyj + ca
9: (cb,zj-1) = zj + tinj + cb
10: (vb,zm-1) = ca + cb + v
11: if Z > N then
12: Z = Z -N
13: return Z
The design of the finite field multiplier of the ECC Mutate coprocessor is
based on the high-radix Montgomery multiplier in order to process long num-
bers at a moderate resource consumption and acceptable execution duration. The
online allocation concept is not applied on the multiplication algorithm, instead
the core multiplication operation in the Montgomery high-radix algorithm, cf.
Algorithm 11, is mutated in order to manipulate the power consumption signa-
ture. The implementation of the Montgomery multiplier is slightly different from
Algorithm 11 by the mode of operation that it has a fixed runtime independent
from the size of Z. At first, the design properties of the different core multiplier
implementations are utilized in the high-radix Montgomery design, they are then
analyzed in terms of resource consumption and critical path delay, followed by
evaluating the different power consumption signatures of the designs, based on
the methods introduced in Subsect. 3.2.2. The evaluation is conducted on real
measurements derived by the measurement framework presented in Sect. 4.3.
6.2.1.1 Implementation of the Different Finite Field Multiplier Units
The core multiplier of the high-radix Montgomery is implemented by using ordi-
nary CLB primitives of the Virtex 5 platform, thus it mainly utilizes LUTs and
also some registers in order to reduce the critical data path. The architecture
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of the core multiplier is segmented into three basic components in order to per-
form the multiplication based on a sequence of summations in an efficient way.
The basic components are: a partial product generator (ppg), a partial prod-
uct accumulator (ppa), and a carry propagation adder (cpa)2. The concept of
composing a finite field multiplier based on these components and their influence
on the circuit design for an ASIC implementation form a CAD point of view as
given in [MHAS08]. In the following the core multiplier composed by different
implementations of the three basic components is investigated based on the re-
sults of a diploma thesis [Kus10] aimed at a partially reconfigurable Montgomery
multiplier.
Core multiplier realization Based on the results of [Kus10] the ppa compo-
nent has the biggest impact on the physical behavior in terms of the critical path
delay and a power consumption of the core multiplier module. Thus, seven dif-
ferent core-multiplier implementations are investigated in terms of how different
their specific power consumption signatures among each other are. The seven
different ppa types are listed in Tab. 6.1. The designs differ in their tree structure
and basic tree elements and thus affect the critical path delay, the resource con-
sumption, as well as the power consumption. The design properties displayed in
Tab. 6.1 base on an 8×8-Bit multiplier. The selection of this word-size is justified
due to the evaluation efforts in the following paragraph.
All the different multiplier implementations use the same ppg and cpa im-
plementation, respectively. The partial product generator is a simple, straight-
forward implementation in order to generate the AND-wise combined partial
products of the input bits of both operands. For the implementation of the cpa
a Sklansky-adder implementation is used, because according to the diploma the-
sis it is the most resource efficient and fastest multiplier among the investigated
different cpa stages on the Virtex 5 platform.
Evaluation of the different types The arithmetic circuit for evaluating the
power consumption signature of the different ppa implementations consists of
a simple ppg, one of the seven bit ppa implementations and a Sklansky-adder
in suitable size as cpa component. The arithmetic is provided with two input
registers at the operand inputs and at the result output in doubled length com-
pared to the input register. The power consumption signature of generating the
final result (the 8×8 multiplication result) is analyzed by the total correlation
similar to the evaluation in chapter 5. The switching activity is separated into
17 Hamming distance classes according to the maximum bit-length of the result.
2The acronyms are written in lowercase letters to prevent a mixup between CPA (side-
channel) and cpa (basic component multiplier)
124 Chapter 6. Application II: Public-Key Algorithm ECC
Table 6.1: Resource consumption of the different SBox implementations
ppa Reference LUTs Critical path delay
4:2 compressor [OV93] 1893 7.7 ns
Wallace tree [Wal64] 1875 8.3 ns
Overturned stairs [MJ92] 2028 9.2 ns
Balanced tree [ZM86] 1940 11.6 ns
Ripple carry [Kus10] 1910 13.5 ns
Array 7:3 [Kus10] 1922 25.8 ns
Array [Kus10] 1923 40.7 ns
(a) Overturned stairs(A) vs. Wallace-tree(B) (b) Overturned stairs(A) vs. balanced tree(B)
(c) Wallace-tree(A) vs. balanced tree(B)
Figure 6.3: Evaluation of the core multiplier components by the total correlation
over the different Hamming distance classes
For each of the seven designs a set of 50,000 power traces has been captured
under the condition to feed the same stimulus input to the different multiplier
designs.
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Figure 6.4: Interconnection for the data transfer
Out of the 24 design comparisons the three represented evaluation results in
Fig. 6.3 have the most different power consumption signatures to each other. The
ppa implementations based on the overturned stairs, the Wallace tree, and the
balanced tree design have the most different power consumption signatures of
their Hamming distance classes. The signatures of overturned stairs architecture
to the Wallace tree architecture, as well as to the balanced tree architecture
are significantly different, as none of the Hamming distance classes is mapped
correspondently between those designs. Only the signature of the Wallace tree
based implementation and the balanced tree implementation have similarities in
the power consumption signature of seven Hamming distance classes (classes:
0, 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, and 16), cf. Fig. 6.3(c).
6.2.2 Management of Concurrent Multiplication Units
The management of the multiplication tasks is handled by the micro-machine
and its virtualization schemes by distributing multiplication tasks to one of the
multiple hardware multiplier units in the architecture. Due to the hierarchical
architecture of the different arithmetic layers the coprocessor is highly modu-
larized and able to process the different ECC-arithmetic operations on various
configurations of basic finite field processing units. The flexibility of the micro-
machine and virtualization unit is of high priority, so that for each point-doubling
or point addition-operation a different data path configuration can be executed
during the execution of the same superior scalar multiplication of the basis point.
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Due to the virtualization scheme on the data path, the demultiplexing bus ar-
chitecture and the shared BRAM data storage, the micro-machine in conjunction
with the virtualizing schemes can configure the data path efficiently. For partially
reconfiguring one of the hardware multiplier units the management unit has to
distribute its workload on the remaining two multipliers. The VLIW instruction
set allows the micro-machine and the virtualization unit to remap assigned mul-
tiplication tasks to another hardware unit. Thus the concept of dynamic binding
in this architecture is similarly solved as in the application example of the AES.
Also in this case the virtualization concept is the interface between the software
part of the architecture and the hardware segment. The software controls the
data flow by reconfiguring the data path structure of the ECC-coprocessor by
the VLIW.
6.2.2.1 Virtualization Scheme
The central element of the virtualization scheme for the ECC Mutate is the
VLIW instruction set. Table 6.2 depicts the architecture of the instruction set
of the ECC-coprocessor. An opcode sequence in order to trigger one operation
on the data path may have up to three different, sequential instruction types.
These instruction types have a fixed bit length of 32 bits, but the information a
bit position is containing changes based on the interpretation of the instruction
type, cf. Tab. 6.2. The three instruction types can only appear in a strict
sequence with special conditions of the previous instruction type. Therefore, the
instruction types do not need a header for identification purposes.
The instruction Type 1 is first sent to set up the initialization phase of an
executing operation. This instruction type contains the needed information to
configure the GF(p)-Alu component, cf. Fig. 6.4 and Tab. 6.2. In this phase the
multiplexers in the GF(p)-ALU as well as on the data memory are configured.
The third least significant bit, bit 2, is an indication wether the second instruction
type is following or maybe the third instruction type is the successor of the
current instruction Type 1.
In case a memory access is indicated by the field MA the successor opcode
is interpreted as an instruction Type 2 and sets the corresponding access infor-
mation to the data memory. If a constant value access is indicated by the value
"00" in the field AI or the field BI the last opcode command of the initialization
phase is interpreted as instruction Type 3. After the initialization phase with
one, two, or three opcode instructions the data transfer is started and the data
is processed on the data path.
The internal virtualization scheme of the ECC-coprocessor differs from its
implementation for the previous application on a symmetrical block cipher. The
virtualization layer of the AES Mutate consists of micro-programs selected by
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Table 6.2: VLIW structure of the ECC-coprocessor
Instruction Type 1
Bit 31:30 29:28 27:25 24:22 21:16 15:11 10:5 4:3 2 1 0
Function AI BI RES1 RES2 loadA loadB outRES AS MA RT ST
Instruction Type 2
Bit 31:30 29:20 19 18 17:16 15:6 5 4 3:0
Function DIA ADDRA ENA WEA DIB ADDRB ENB WEB not used
Instruction Type 3
Bit 31:28 27:24 23:0
Function DIROPA DIROPB not used
Function Description
AI /BI Selects the input of port A/B of the GF(p)-ALU.
RES1/RES2 Selects the output of a finite field arithmetic unit (FFAU) and
provides it to the output 1/2 of the GF(p)-ALU.
loadA/LoadB Identifies the FFAU, if the current value on the internal busses
are valid to process.
outRES Informs the corresponding FFAU that the result is requested
from the data transfer.
AS Configures the corresponding subtractor-adder-unit to perform
a subtraction or an addition.
MA Request a memory access.
RT Last command of the micro-program.
ST Start signal for the FFAU, which was provided with new data.
DIA/DIB Sets up the multiplexer at the data memory inputs.
ADDRA/ADDRB Memory address of where to store in or to read from the data
memory.
ENA/ENB Enables the memory port A/B for data transfer.
WEA/WEB Indicates if data is stored to the enabled port or data is read
from the enabled port.
DIROPA/DIROPB Addresses the constant value in the pre-calculated curve and
algorithm specific constants.
a random number and a scrambling unit manipulating the incoming opcode se-
quences from the micro-programs. The virtualization layer of the ECC Mutate
coprocessor only consist of a bigger set of micro-programs conducting the ECC-
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Table 6.3: Supported point representations of the ECC Mutate coprocessor
Projective representation Point representation
Affine P(x,y)
Standart projective without y P(X/Z,-,Z) with Z 6=0
Standart projective with y P(X/Z,Y/Z,Z) with Z 6=0
Jacobian with y P(X/Z2,Y/Z3,Z) with Z 6=0
Jacobian Chudnovsky with y P(X/Z2,Y/Z3,Z,Z2,Z3) with Z 6=0
arithmetic operations with a different set of hardware resources in various inter-
mediate representations. For each utilization number of multipliers and possible
value representations a micro-program is stored inside the BRAM.
6.2.3 Various Projective Coordinates
The flexible scheduling concept is applied differently in this application example
compared to the previous example. The point representation is altered instead
of merging the point-doubling and point-adding operations into various compo-
sitions of the scalar multiplication on the curve E. This mutation of the point
representation is different compared to the countermeasure randomized projective
coordinates, which is introduced in [Cor99]. The point representation does not
randomize the Z component of the projective representation as in [Cor99], but
the intermediate values are mapped to another point representation. Table 6.3
presents the different point representations the mutating coprocessor supports.
Thereby, the internal calculations for the intermediate values are different in
terms of their composition and the number of intermediate operational steps.
The compositions of internal computation will of course influence the power
consumption signature and will lead to an irregular pattern for each scalar mul-
tiplication. Usually, an adversary assumes that the irregularity of the power
consumption signature is caused by differently processed values of the scalar
multiplication [n]P. Due to the usage of the Montgomery ladder as scalar mul-
tiplication the operation is balanced. The different patterns of the power con-
sumption signature are independent to the scalar value and mislead an adversary
to false conclusions about the secret value.
Additionally, the various internal sequences of calculating lead to randomiza-
tion of the execution time and thus the begin and the end of each basic ECC-
arithmetic operation is non-deterministic. This behavior of course increases the
effort of mounting a successful DPA-like attack on the intermediate values of the
Montgomery ladder, because of the shuﬄed execution of the operations in the
time domain. The only disadvantage of utilizing various point representations
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Figure 6.5: Composition of the scalar multiplication based on micro-programs
is the additional computational cost for the transformation from one point rep-
resentation to the other. Also the complexity of the pre-computational steps of
the transformation between the various representations depends on the kind of
needed transformation to map from the current representation into the target
representation. The expense differs for each case, for instance the transformation
from the Jacobian coordinates representation to the affine point representation
is more expensive than its counterpart from Jacobian to Jacobian Chudnovsky.
All needed different transformation procedures between the supported point
representations are stored in micro-programs. Also, the different sequences of
procedures to perform a point-doubling or a point-addition with a certain number
of multipliers are stored there. These micro-programs are managed and executed
by the micro-machine with an embedded virtualization unit. A random number
is used to select the projective representation and to set the number of utilized
multipliers in order to perform the next ECC scalar multiplication. The random
number thereby is used for an offset addressing scheme to call the required micro-
program and to execute it on the micro-machine. The addressing scheme also
allows an independent handling of the execution properties3 for both the point-
3Point representation and number of utilized multipliers
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doubling and the point-addition operation. The monotonic execution sequence
of the Montgomery ladder is exploited to integrate the random selection of the
execution properties of the basic ECC-arithmetic operation. This is thereby
achieved without exposing an exploitable key-dependent control flow of the scalar
multiplication to an adversary. Figure 6.5 visualizes the control flow of the
Montgomery ladder and the integration of the randomly selected micro-programs
in order to execute the scalar multiplication in various ways.
6.2.4 Side-Channel Analysis of the Data Path
In this Subsection the side-channel evaluation results of the ECC-coprocessor
design are discussed. The analysis on the ECC-coprocessor has been conducted
by performing several scalar multiplications on the NIST 192 curve while varying
the base point and keeping the scalar value static. The SASEBO-GII FPGA-
Board is used as reference platform in order to capture the power traces of the
implementations. The two previously discussed attack threats are investigated
on the conducted experiments. At first, a SPA attack was investigated and then
the attack on the intermediate values of the Montgomery ladder.
The evaluation of the mutating data path concept is conducted on two differ-
ent mutating and one non-mutating ECC implementations. Two designs with a
mutable data path have been implemented and evaluated, because of the reduced
throughput of the ECC Mutate architecture with CLB primitives based multi-
pliers, cf. Tab. 6.4. The first design is the ECC Mutate architecture using the
DSP48E-slices to perform the basic multiplication within the high-radix Mont-
gomery algorithm of the finite field multiplication. It is denoted as ECC Mutate
DSP from now on. This design is completely based on the implementation pre-
sented in [Ema12]. Therefore, the mutation of the data path is only performed
by the mutating methods dynamic binding and flexible scheduling. The second
design, ECC Mutate CLB is an extension of the Mutate DSP design by using
the three different previously analyzed core multipliers, which are implemented
by using CLB primitives only. Thus, all three mutating methods, including the
online allocation, are applicable on this implementation. This design has one
partial reconfigurable multiplier and two fixed multiplier units using the ppa
types overturned stairs and Wallace tree, cf. Subsect.6.2.1. Only one multiplier
is set as partially reconfigurable at a time in order to process by operations at
least on the other two multiplier units intended to hide the reconfiguration time.
For both designs the random numbers are provided by a Matlab script running
in parallel. The same script is also used to control the partial reconfiguration of
the finite field multiplier in order to manage the reconfiguration process and the
random utilization of the in parallel processing multiplier units.
The unsecured reference version of the coprocessor-design stems from on the
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Figure 6.6: Captured traces for the SPA evaluation
Mutate DSP implementation and, thus, also uses the DSP48E primitives of the
Virtex 5 platform (ECC DSP), but does not alter the data path. The unsecured
coprocessor utilizes the Jacobian coordinates and three in parallel working finite
field multiplier units to process the scalar point multiplication. In detail, the
point-addition operation is performed with three finite field multipliers in par-
allel, while the point-doubling operation is performed with only one multiplier.
The differences of the resource consumption and the required clock cycles to
perform a scalar multiplication for different designs are listed in Tab. 6.4.
The analysis of the first threat is a direct visual interpretation of one cap-
tured power trace. A power trace from each of the three designs for this threat
analysis is depicted in Fig. 6.6. The figure shows the processing of the first three
key bit positions of the secret scalar. The first three values are taken as an ex-
ample, as each bit causes the same process in the coprocessor. In all three cases
the power consumption signature for either processing a zero bit or processing a
none-zero bit value is indistinguishable. Thus, the Montgomery ladder protects
the algorithm from leaking the control flow information, which may be exploited
to reveal the secret bit sequence. The randomization of the two mutating co-
processor implementations increase the needed effort to clearly identify a regular
pattern and thus to identify the point in time were the execution of a specific
ECC-arithmetic is performed.
For the analysis of the second threat the exploitation of the intermediate
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values of the Montgomery ladder operation is investigated. In specific the vul-
nerability of the storing x-component of the current intermediate value after
processing the first unknown key bit is analyzed. An attack for this scenario
needs to enable an adversary to freely select the basis point P for each execu-
tion of the scalar multiplication [n]P. Therefore, 20000 scalar multiplications
with different basis points P and the same scalar [n] are performed on the three
designs in order to capture enough power traces for the evaluation.
For all three analyzed cases no clear result leads to the right value of the
first unknown secret bit of the used scalar value. Thus, it is not possible to
make a clear statement on how much the mutating data path methods improve
the security of the basic ECC DSP design. Only an approximation can be given
based on the shuﬄing randomization by applying the mutating methods. Taking
the randomization of the flexible scheduling (5 different representations), the
randomization due to the dynamic binding (3 different degrees of concurrency),
and the online allocation (3 different multiplier types) into consideration, 45
different states of the data path can occur within the time frame of capturing the
power trace. So, the probability of capturing the power trace with the same data
path configuration with a different basis point is about 145 , under the condition
that the random number provided by the random number generator is equally
distributed. The effort of attacking this hiding scheme should improve about
the factor 45, if the adversary follows the strategy of gathering more traces and
clustering them afterwards into 45 classes to attack a set of traces of one of these
classes.
A possible reason for this unsatisfying result of the analysis may stem from
the fact, that the SASEBO-GII board only provides measurement connections
to monitor the power consumption of internal core-voltages. The main supply
voltage of the BRAM primitives of the Virtex 5 is provided by the auxiliary
supply voltage drain and thus, the monitoring of these bit flips by the internal
core voltage is not precise. In fact, the information of the data-dependent power
consumption of the bit flips inside the BRAM are propagated over the common
ground plate in the FPGA, but also softened and disturbed by the internal
decoupling capacitors inside the FPGA package. A more detailed investigation
with more power traces and different key values may reveal clearer insight about
the vulnerability to this attack scenario of both the secured and unsecured designs
and to verify the above given hypothesis. However, in the limited time frame of
this thesis it was not possible to conduct further experiments.
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Table 6.4: Resource consumption of various ECC designs
Design LUT Flip flops BRAM DSP48E Frequency [n]P [ms] Platformslices [MHz]
ECC P192 without countermeasures
ECC DSP 12047 7719 9 9 166 18.75 Virtex 5
ECC P192 Mutate with countermeasures
ECC Mutate DSP 12047 7719 9 9 165 15.23 - 40.24 Virtex 5
ECC Mutate CLB 14682 7747 9 6 72 32.64 - 86.23 Virtex 5
Fastest unsecured ECC design in literature on NIST curves
P224 [Gün11] 1825 1892 11 26 486 0.45 Virtex 4
6.3 Discussion of the Evaluation Results
In the area of asymmetric cryptography most countermeasures against power
analysis attacks focus on preventing SPA attacks, which exploit the control flow
in order to reveal the secret value. Thus, a lot of countermeasures are focusing
to balance the control flow or to hide the exploitable power consumption of the
control flow. Countermeasures used for preventing DPA attacks on the interme-
diate values of the implemented algorithm are usually called blinding techniques.
These blinding countermeasures are equivalent to the concept of masking coun-
termeasures for securing block cipher algorithms and are more favored to be used
for securing a design than hiding-based countermeasures.
The simple application of blinding-based countermeasures make them very
attractive to secure the design, since most of them do not need any changes
of the architecture or of the implemented operations. For instance, the finite
field arithmetic does not need to be adapted for most of the blinding-based
countermeasures. Therefore, the finite field operations are composed in order
to get an ECC-arithmetic based operation only. Most of the blinding-based
countermeasures exploit the homomorphic properties of the elliptic curve, for
instance the scalar blinding technique, cf. [FV12]. The surveys [Cor99] and
[FV12] provide a good overview of the commonly used or known countermeasures
for elliptic curve cryptography. Especially [FV12] provides very useful results of
a cost approximation analysis for the different countermeasures.
The dynamic mutating data path does not belong to the group of blinding
countermeasures, this countermeasure is more related to the class of hiding meth-
ods. It aims at increasing the effort to identify points of interests in the captured
power traces and tries to hinder the adversary to backtrace an exploitable rela-
tionship between the internal processed values and the power consumption sig-
nature. The cost of applying the mutating data path concept on an ECC GF(p)
scheme is both the increased resource consumption and delay of the discrete
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implemented multiplier modus compared to the specialized DSP48E primitives
on the Virtex 5 platform. Therefore, the online allocation method is the most
expensive method of the mutating data path for this application scheme. The
other two mutating methods, dynamic binding and flexible scheduling, applied
on the ECC-arithmetic layer follow the concept of the blinding-based counter-
measure. The composition of the finite field basic operation is randomized for
each execution of an ECC-arithmetic operation and thus it seems that the power
consumption signatures are independent from the processed intermediate values.
The design introduced in [Gün11] is currently the fastest design in the liter-
ature for the NIST curves P-224 and P-256 implemented on the Virtex FPGA
platform of Xilinx. It is speed and area optimized especially for only these two
curves and uses a dedicated reduction algorithm. Thereby the design does not
need a Montgomery algorithm to reduce the result of the finite field multipli-
cation and thus saves several hundred cycles for the reduction of each modular
multiplication leading to a significantly fast execution time of the curves P-224
and P-256.
On the other hand the ECC Mutate design, in general, can process every
curve by utilizing the Montgomery higher-radix multiplication with integrated
reduction, which leads to more clock cycles per multiplication. The speed loss
and decreased throughput compared to the design reported in [Gün11] is explain-
able by the additional logic stage in order to realize a middleware layer for the
virtualization process of the modular finite field arithmetic in order to compli-
cate power-analysis attacks or to cope with malfunctional processing units. The
article in [Gün11] does not report any countermeasures on the non-public design,
thus only a theoretical approximation can be given of the decreased throughput
in case of applying a blinding countermeasure on this fast design. For instance,
exploiting the method of random key splitting, cf. [FV12], the throughput of the
design in [Gün11] would be halved and the execution time would be doubled.
A virtualization-based hiding method, like dynamic binding, is not possible be-
cause the design depends on only one modular multiplier unit. An approximation
for other hiding-based countermeasures like random delay or clocking cannot be
given without a deeper insight into the design, because the multi-clock based
domain architecture of the ECC design in [Gün11].
The mutating data path countermeasure based ECC Mutate designs on the
other hand can be combined with the previously mentioned blinding countermea-
sure concept in order to increase the needed effort during the trace acquisition.
The combination of blinding-based countermeasures with the mutating data path
concept is very suitable, because most of the blinding schemes, for instance like
base point blinding, cf. [Cor99], or random key splitting, cf. [FV12], do not need
to change the scalar multiplication coprocessor. Therefore, the blinding meth-
ods can be applied without any changes to the ECC Mutate coprocessor. The
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application of both countermeasure methods, blinding and mutating data path,
increases the resistance against power analysis attacks, because due to the mu-
tating properties the profiling phase to build templates in a profiling-based power
analysis attack is increased by the different states of the ECC data path. The
nowadays very common technique of applying various types of countermeasures
to a design in order to prevent side-channel exploitation is therefore applicable
on the architectural level of the ECC algorithm in conjunction with the novel
method of mutating data paths.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
Usually, countermeasures are applied either on the algorithmic level or on the cell
level of a secured cryptographic algorithm implementation. The proposed hiding
based countermeasure concept demonstrates that the effort of successfully at-
tacking an implemented cryptographic algorithm via power analysis attacks may
be increased by the mutating data path concept. From a conservative point of
view the mutating data path concept combines several hiding methods, for in-
stance shuﬄing and noise generation, in order to integrate them into a mutable
data path architecture. The three different mutating methods of the proposed
concept (online allocation, dynamic binding, and flexible scheduling) have been
applied in this proof-of-concept investigation on two different algorithms after
their conceptional discussion. The proposed design flow is used to span up a
huge design exploration space compared to the initial design with many differ-
ent design properties dp(processing unit,concurrency,task), affecting the physical
behavior of the design. The result of this design flow is a synthesized flexible,
during the runtime mutable data path, which combines several hiding techniques.
These techniques are embedded into the dynamical structure of the data path
without compromising the computational correctness of the algorithm. The data
path mutation is driven by a random selection, based on the output of a crypto-
graphically secure random number generator. Thereby, even the designer can not
determine the current active structure of the data path. The effort of exploiting
side-channel leakage of the targeted implementation, based on profiling based
methods, is increased under the assumption of a first order attack scenario.
Still the discussed concept of the mutating data path and the application
examples illustrate the core concept of using a runtime dynamic data path, but
also leave enough space for improvement or further investigation. Therefore, the
following addressed themes are important to investigate in order to improve the
concept or its application on different algorithm platforms.
Partial reconfiguration On the FPGA platforms, for instance the Virtex 5,
the partial reconfiguration at first seems very suitable for the goal of partially
changing the implementation of the data path by the concept of online allocation.
The main challenge in applying the partial reconfiguration concept of Xilinx is
the restriction to only be able to partially reconfigure a complete frame of the
FPGA. The second disadvantage of this partial reconfiguration procedure is the
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slow reconfiguration speed, especially if the reconfiguration is triggered from the
outside of the device, as it is done for the application examples. An improvement
to this circumstance would be to use the internal ICAP interface together with a
fast hardware controller to conduct the partial reconfiguration. Smaller partial
designs can be stored in several BRAM primitives on the FPGA, while bigger
partial designs have to be stored externally. For the secure containment of these
designs the bitstreams have to be encrypted and decrypted on the fly during the
configuration, as shown in the concept presented in [SFH11].
A partial reconfiguration of smaller circuit parts of the data path is not effi-
cient with the partial reconfiguration of Xilinx Inc., because due to the minimal
size of one frame it is not resource efficient. An alternative subject of further
investigation is to exploit the reconfigurable Virtex 5 primitive CFGLUT5 for
the partial reconfiguration purpose of different implementation types for the on-
line allocation. The challenging aspect of utilizing these primitives is that the
designer has to take care by her- or himself of the dynamically changeable inter-
connection between the LUT.
Hiding concept The side-channel analysis on the application examples hard-
ened by the concept of mutating data paths is done by a profiling based first
order attack scenario. A second or higher order attack scenario is usually known
for coping with masking or blinding based countermeasures in order to exploit
the leakage of every processed part of the shared secret. A further interesting
field to investigate may be to design a second order attack scheme or a combined
side-channel analysis attack scheme tailored for the mutating data path hiding
technique. Maybe it is possible to combine the information of the internal con-
troller state, the power consumption signature of reconfiguration process, and the
power consumption of the current active segments of the dynamic reconfigurable
data path to successfully attack this kind of countermeasure.
Masking-based countermeasure schemes have been investigated intensively
and developed over the last years in the side-channel community. One-well known
threat on these countermeasure methods is struggling with data-dependent glitches
based on the circuit design. Even so, theoretical concepts of preventing data-
dependent glitches are not easy to implement and may still leak exploitable
information as reported in [MM12]. This rises the question, whether the data-
dependent and exploitable glitches of the masking scheme can be hidden by
applying the mutating data path concept on top of a masking scheme in order
to improve its resistance against higher-order attacks.
Improvement on the ECC application example As reported in the pre-
vious chapter one of the core concepts of the mutating data path method, the
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online allocation, is sometimes affecting the designs speed, latency, or through-
put negatively. In specific, performing the finite field multiplication in the ECC
Mutate design on CLB primitives like LUTs and flip flops is affecting the perfor-
mance a good deal worse than utilizing the especially for performance designed
DSP multiplier primitives. One alternative to utilize different multiplier imple-
mentations for the online allocation is to introduce an additional layer between
the finite field arithmetic and the ECC-arithmetic and to perform the online allo-
cation on that layer. For instance, a residual number system (RNS) based design
can be used to speed up the modular multiplication on the underlying finite field.
The online allocation can then be performed on this layer by randomizing the
different number bases of the RNS to change the power consumption signature
of a higher-radix multiplication.

Appendix A
Basics to the Concept Chapter
A.1 Information Theoretic Background
• Definition of Joint Entropy: H(X, Y ) = −∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x, y)log2(p(x, y))
• Definition of Entropy: H(X) = −∑x∈X p(x)log2(p(x))
• Definition of Conditional Entropy: H(X|Y ) = ∑x∈X∑y∈Y p(x)log2( p(x)p(x,y))
A.2 CAD Algorithms
A.2.1 Left-Edge Algorithm
Algorithm 12 Left-edge algorithm from [Mic94]
Require: a set of intervals I describing a problem
1: Sort elements of I in a list of L in ascending order of li:
2: c=0
3: while some interval has not been colored do
4: S=∅
5: r=0; /* initialize coordinate of rightmost edge in S*/
6: while exists an element in L whose left edge coordinate is larger than r
do
7: s = First element in the list L with ls > r
8: S= S ∪ {s}
9: r=rr
10: Delete s from L
11: c=c+1
12: Label elements of S with color c
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A.2.2 ASAP
Algorithm 13 As Soon As Possible scheduling from [Mic94]
Require: data flow graphs DFG(V,E) of the implementing algorithm, d latency
bound
1: schedule vn by setting tS0=1
2: repeat
3: select vertex vi whose successors are all scheduled
4: schedule vi by setting tSi = minj:(vj, vi)∈ E
tSj + di
5: until v0 is scheduled
6: return tL
A.2.3 ALAP
Algorithm 14 As Late As Possible scheduling from [Mic94]
Require: data flow graphs DFG(V,E) of the implementing algorithm, d latency
bound
1: schedule vn by setting tLn=d+1
2: repeat
3: select vertex vi whose successors are all scheduled
4: schedule vi by setting tLi = minj:(vi, vj)∈ E
tLj - di
5: until v0 is scheduled
6: return tL
Appendix B
Different Dimensional Subspaces
B.1 Higher Dimensional Subspaces of the AES
Example Circuit
The higher u-dimensional subspace-based LM·,CSAu utilize the basis vector func-
tions of the 9-dimensional subspace LM·,CSA9 . More precisely, the basis vector
functions gj,t;y(x,y) of the LF·,CSA9 (x,y) of the F9,t;y without the weighting coeffi-
cients cgj (subtracted constant) is the basis to calculate the first 9 rows of matrix
A. These basis vector functions are denoted by g∗j,t;y(x,y). Equation B.1 depicts
g∗j,t;k(x, k) with i={0, · · · , 9} for the AES example circuit in Subsect. 4.1.2:
g∗0,t;k(x, k) = 1 (B.1)
g∗j,t;k(x, k) = ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))j for j = 1, . . . , 8
The other entities of the higher rows of the matrix A can also be composed
out of the first nine columns of A. For instance the 37-dimensional subspace
F37,t;y presented in [HSS12] constructs the basis vector functions 10 to 37 by
multiplying two different rows element-wise. Thus, these elements of matrix A
of the AES example circuit are equal to the result of the basis vectors:
g∗j,t;k(x, k) = ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))j1 · ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))j2 (B.2)
= g∗j1,t;k(x, k) · g∗j2,t;k(x, k)
for j = 9, . . . , 37 and 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ 1, . . . , 8
In order to fulfill the requirements E(Rt) = 0 and E(gj,t;y(·))|∀j 6= 0 for
the subspace F37,t;y the weighting coefficients cgj have to be calculated. The
coefficients cgj is the E(g∗j,t;y(x,y), such as E(gj,t;k(x, k) − cgj) = 0 |∀j 6= 0. In
case of the AES example circuit each cgj is calculated as follows:
cgj =
1
216 ·
255∑
k=0
255∑
p=0
g∗j,t;k(x, k) for j = 1, . . . , 8 (B.3)
After cgj is calculated for each basis vector function, each of the j columns
of matrix A are adjusted by the appropriate previous determined weight coeffi-
cient cgj . Higher dimensional subspaces, such as F163,t;y can be constructed in
the same way.
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B.2 Basis Vectors of a Lookup Table Functions
The basis vectors also exploits switching activities inside the basic components
of the FPGA, which are contained in the Sbox circuit. The selected basic com-
ponents for the subspace are three two-input LUTs and one five-input LUT. The
columns above the ninth column are also composed of the entities of the first nine
columns of matrix A. Therefore the same basis vector functions are used to cal-
culate the first nine columns of matrix A, as shown in Eq. (B.1). The following
Tab. B.1 depicts all basis vector functions g∗j,t;k(x, k) for a subspace F13,t,k. Each
gj,t;k(x, k) of LFtoy-AES,CSA12 (k, p) can be determined by using Tab. B.1 Eq. (B.4).
gj,t;k(x, k) = (g∗j,t;k(x, k)− cgj)|∀j (B.4)
Table B.1: Construction of the LFtoy-AES,CSA12 (k, p)
j g∗j,t;k(x, k): cgj :
0 1 0
1 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))1 0.5
2 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))2 0.5
3 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))3 0.5
4 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))4 0.5
5 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))5 0.5
6 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))6 0.5
7 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))7 0.5
8 ((p⊕ k)⊕ Sbox(p⊕ k))8 0.5
j Flutj−8 ((p⊕ k)⊕ SBox(p⊕ k))j: cgj :
9 g∗6,t;k(x, k)⊕ g∗8,t;k(x, k) 0.7656
10 g∗3,t;k(x, k)⊕ g∗4,t;k(x, k) 0.7148
11 g∗2,t;k(x, k)⊕ g∗5,t;k(x, k) 0.7578
12 (g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨ 0.0586
(g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(¬g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(¬g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ g∗4,t;k(x, k))∨
(¬g∗6,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗8,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗3,t;k(x, k) ∧ ¬g∗4,t;k(x, k))
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